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Abstract 
This thesis explores how skills fonnation and lifelong learning policies have 
changed in South Korea in response to the challenges of globalisation and democratisation. It 
examines the modes of regulation of VET and lifelong learning with regard to qualifications, 
funding and the labour market. 
The thesis combines a theoretical analysis with an empirical study undertaken in 
South Korea. It examines, historically, why and how developmental skills formation and 
lifelong learning have been changing into a 'state-coordinated partnership' model. In 
addition, it analyses the characteristics of the 'state-coordinated partnership' model of skills 
fonnation and lifelong learning, focusing on the relation between the state and mobilised civil 
society (or civic participation). Five different international models of skills fonnation and 
lifelong learning are compared with changing models in Korea. Analysis of the changing 
framework for skills fonnation in Korea is based on multiple sources of evidence, including 
secondary and documentary sources, and interviews with social partners. 
The thesis argues that developmental skills fonnation was a part of developmental 
state fonnation, which focused on economic modernisation as a major means for national 
security at the expense of political freedom. Therefore, since the developmental state came to 
an end with the rise of civil society and democratisation in the 1990s in Korea, skills 
fonnation has been changing from the developmental to state-coordinated partnership model 
on the basis of the increasing involvement of social partners. More important, the widened 
civic participation has not resulted in the demise of the state's role. By contrast, it demands 
the state coordination of social partners in building the holistic framework of lifelong 
learning on the basis of social cohesion and participatory citizenship. 
Finally, this study contributes to an understanding of the implications of 
globalisation and democratisation on developmental skills fonnation and lifelong learning 
policies in Korea and other East Asian economies. 
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Introduction 
0-1. Aims of the Research 
Studies of East Asian economies have highlighted the importance of the 
developmental state and developmental skills formation (Johnson 1982, 1995; Castells 1992, 
1999; Green 1997; Ashton et al. 1999). In addition, since the Asian financial crisis in 1997-8, 
heated debates about the causes of the economic crisis still continue. In the meantime, 
Castells, one of the best known theorists of the developmental state, points to the demise of 
the developmental state and warns the danger of global flows of capital and information. 
However, so far, there has been little research to investigate why and how developmental 
states and developmental skills formation have changed in East Asian countries since the 
economic crisis. 
Therefore this thesis explores historically why and how developmental skills 
formation and lifelong learning have been changing into a 'state-coordinated partnership' 
model in South Korea in response to the challenges of democratisation and globalisation 
since the early 1990s. In particular, it examines 'modes of regulation' of vocational education 
and training (VET) and lifelong learning with regard to qualifications, funding and the labour 
market, because the changes in modes of regulation clearly show the characteristics of 
changing skills formation and the framework of lifelong learning. In addition, this research 
analyses the new roles of the state and mobilised civil society in skills formation and lifelong 
learning, focusing on changing relations between them since the transition to democracy. 
0-2. Research questions 
In Korea, lifelong learning has been suddenly recognised as the means to cope with 
the challenges of globalisation and the information age in terms of 'productive welfare' since 
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the economic crisis m 199i. Since then, the government has encouraged enterprises, 
educational institutions and social associations, including trade unions, to participate as 
partners in building the framework for lifelong learning. In addition, with the emphasis on the 
knowledge-based economy, education and training have become major political issues in 
terms of the enhancement of productivity and competitiveness, as well as of overcoming the 
split between "replaceable generic labour" and "self-programmable labour" (Castells 1999: 
361). 
The overarching question of this research is how developmental skills formation 
has changed under the challenges of globalisation and democratisation in Korea. The 
hypothesis is that with the increasing demand for high skills and active civil society, the state 
needs to play an active role in promoting the involvement of social partners in YET, and in 
lifelong learning which requires a holistic approach encompassing adult education, 
continuing vocational training (CYT) and democratic citizenship. In relation to this, three 
questions arise as set out below. First, how are modes of regulation contributing to skills 
formation in the transition from the developmental state model to the state-coordinated 
partnership model? Second, as a subsidiary question, how does lifelong learning contribute to 
the vitalisation of civil society as well as economic development? Third, for these purposes, 
how can more holistic lifelong learning be achieved? 
0-3. Research design 
According to the nature of the research questions, a qualitative research method on 
the basis of a documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews was adopted. 
First, for the theoretical analysis, this study analyses the available literature on the 
changing nature of lifelong learning at the international level since the 1960s, as well as on 
1 The Kim, Dae-]ung government introduced the concept of "productive welfare" which links employment policies 
to welfare. 
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demands for changing skills formation and lifelong learning in the context of globalisation 
and the information age in and outside Korea mainly since the 1980s. 
Secondly, through a comparative documentary analysis of lifelong learning 
regulation in various countries, the systems are classified into five models of lifelong 
learning, namely the welfare state, developmental state, social partnership, network and 
market models. The comparison is based on three dimensions. In relation to the fonn of 
regulation, two dimensions are distinguished. On the one hand, a continuum between state, 
social partnership, network and market models is assumed for the relationship between the 
state and civil society (for different model of skills fonnation and lifelong learning, see 
Ashton and Green, F. 1996; Crouch et al. 1999; Green, A. 2000, 2001). On the other, a 
continuum between centralisation and decentralisation is assumed regarding state control 
(Martinussen 1997; Karlsen 2000; Lundahl 2002). In the third dimension, according to the 
purpose of lifelong learning, the three aspects of social, economic and nation-building are 
distinguished, and in this regard, a welfare state model is compared to a developmental state 
model (Esping-Anderson 1990, 1999). 
In the treatment of 'modes of regulation', this research focuses on funding, the 
qualifications framework and the labour market because it examines changing skills 
fonnation and the emerging framework of lifelong learning. For the same reason, in relation 
to the labour market, this research also emphasises its relationship to skills and qualifications 
framework, as well as industrial relations focusing on the changing role of trade unions. 
Thirdly, semi-structured and open-ended interviews were conducted to provide in-
depth evidence regarding the emerging lifelong learning framework. As Kerlinger argues, the 
semi-structured interview can "supply a frame of reference for respondents' answers, but put 
a minimum of restraint on answers and their expression" (Kerlinger 1969; Cohen and Manion 
1994: 277). Therefore, it can allow for depth in data collection. The semi-structured 
interviews were adjusted according to the different groups of interviewees in order to gather 
relevant data, as well as to explore the interviewees' perception about given issues. 
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0-3-1. Qualitative research as the research paradigm 
Qualitative research has generally been distinguished from quantitative research on 
the grounds that the former attempts to understand social phenomena interpretively or 
holistically in a real context, whereas the latter tends to test hypotheses by statistical forms of 
analysis. Qualitative research can be defined as a way to 
study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, 
phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin, N. & Lincoln, Y. 
2000: 3). 
Qualitative research is likely to be "inductive, hypothesis-generating" whereas 
quantitative research emphasizes "hypothesis-testing" (Silverman 2000: 8). However, it is 
important to consider whether the method of research is appropriate in relation to the 
resources available as well as to the nature of research questions being asked. 
Qualitative research "consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make 
the world visible" (Denzin, N. & Lincoln, Y. 2000). Therefore, as Silverman argues, such 
research can "provide a 'deeper' understanding of social phenomena than would be obtained 
from purely quantitative data" because it is "stronger on long descriptive narratives than on 
statistical tables" (Silverman 2000: 8, 90). More important, qualitative approaches seem to be 
more appropriate to understand social phenomena that are not well known (Strauss and 
Corbin 1990; 1998). In particular, they can provide explanation or interpretation in detail, 
drawing on in-depth information that it might be difficult to obtain by statistical data 
collecting. 
In this regard, qualitative methods are more relevant to my research because the 
research topic is to examine the emerging framework of skills formation and lifelong learning 
in relation to changing developmental skills formation. Not only are there insufficient 
statistical data for the societal analysis of changes in skiJJs formation and lifelong learning; in 
any case, with a quantitative approach it is hard to examine the complicated societal changes 
in their real context. In particular, there is little research regarding the role of trade unions or 
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non-governmental organizations in relation to skills formation and lifelong learning, because 
they have only just been recognized as social partners. In addition, as Green argues in regard 
to the 'comparative logical method', the qualitative approach can provide explanation of 
cases holistically, paying more attention to the "actual mechanisms of causation" (Green, A. 
2002: 23). As a consequence, a qualitative method has been chosen in my research because it 
is appropriate for examining emerging new skills formation and its implications on lifelong 
learning policies in the complex context of globalisation and democratisation. 
0-3-2. Research interviews and participants 
The main purpose of the interviews was to provide convincing evidence for the 
changing role of the state in relation to the participation of employers and labour in 
promoting lifelong learning. The selection of informants was chosen according to their 
position in relation to decision-making. The research interviews were carried out in two 
periods of fieldwork of two months each. The first, undertaken between June and August 
1999 with 25 persons, was preliminary to developing the research questions. The second was 
undertaken between April and May 2001 with 25 persons, to provide more significant 
evidence on the issues in question. Whilst the first interviews were open-ended, unstructured 
and used notes rather than tape-recording, the second were open-ended, semi-structured and 
tape-recorded. 
The interviews were focused on collecting in-depth and informative data from 
government policy makers and social partners regarding the emerging national framework of 
vocational education and training (VET) and lifelong learning. This framework is based on a 
series of Acts which were introduced between 1997 and 2001. In this regard, the main 
interview questions were focused on the role of the VET Policy Commission and local VET 
Committees, and of the Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training 
(KRIVET) because three VET reform Acts of 1997 highlighted these as the main institutions 
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to play a major role in driving VET reform on the basis of collaboration between social 
partners. 
The questionnaires were grouped into two types. One was for policy-makers and 
different groups with regard to the VET Policy Commission and local VET Committees. The 
other was for policy-makers, KRIVET researchers and VET -related social partners with 
regard to the KRIVET (For questionnaires, see appendix 1). 
The interviewees can be categorised into five groups, including both government 
representatives and social partners, with about five interviewees in each group. First, for the 
emerging lifelong learning framework in relation to regulation, policy-makers were 
interviewed. Interviewees from relevant ministries and Presidential Commissions were 
included. Second, with regard to civil associations and trade unions, interviewees from trade 
unions and non-governmental organisations which are involved in adult education and 
training were chosen. The trade unions included teachers' unions and two national trade 
unions, which are participating in the Tripartite Commission. The NGOs included leading 
organisations in relation to citizens' movements and adult education. Third, for employers, 
executive members or researchers from the association of large enterprises and the 
association of small and medium-sized enterprises were interviewed. Fourth, university 
academics and researchers in VET and lifelong learning research institutes were interviewed 
in order to discuss overall modes of regulation in lifelong learning. Finally, teaching 
professionals or executive members of VET providers - two biggest public and one private 
training institutes - were interviewed. 
In chapter VII, the specifics of interviewing techniques will be discussed in detail. 
0-4. Research findings and contributions of the research 
The thesis is an analysis of some incipient changes in the development in Korean 
society and its modes of educational regulation. These are in the direction of state-
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coordinated partnership, a form of social partnership in which the state plays a major role in 
promoting the partnership between the state and stakeholders on the basis of the involvement 
of social partners in making and implementing policies. It should be stressed that these 
changes in an early form of development. 
. The main research findings are as follows. First, with the demise of the 
developmental state, skills formation has been changing from the developmental state model 
to the state-coordinated partnership model in response to democratisation and globalisation. 
Secondly, as civil society becomes mobilised, the involvement of social partners and civil 
associations is increasingly important in relation to skills formation and lifelong learning. 
Thirdly, the state is required to play an active role in institutionalising the involvement of 
social partners and civil associations in the democratic transition. Fourthly, particularly 
during the civilian government between 1993 and 1997, rapid economic liberalisation 
without an appropriate regulatory system caused the financial crisis in 1997. In this regard, 
democratisation should be distinguished from economic liberalisation. Fifthly, a holistic 
approach to lifelong learning can be institutionalised on the basis of the partnership between 
the state and active civil society. Sixthly, to support the holistic approach, state coordination 
should be well-organised and innovative, in order to promote networking between various 
providers for liberal adult education, VET and democratic citizenship. 
On the basis of these findings, this research can contribute to further research, 
particularly in five areas. 
First, this research contributes to understanding the current democratic transition of 
developmental skills formation in East Asian countries, not least because the Korean skills 
formation system has been recognised as a prototype for the East Asian model. The research 
provides a new perspective for the possibility of democratic transition in other developmental 
states. This is very important because there is little research on the democratic transition of 
the developmental state in relation to skills formation, although the "underdevelopment of 
17 
democracy" in a developmental state can provoke disasters for its people, such as the two 
world wars in the cases of modern Germany and Japan (Johnson 1995: 50). 
Secondly, the analysis of the changing roles of the state and active civil society in 
the democratic transition contributes to the debates about the new roles of the state and civil 
society under the challenges of democratisation and globalisation. This is also important in 
that how to respond to economic globalisation in the democratic transition is increasingly 
becoming an important issue in Asian and other developing countries. 
Thirdly, the analysis of discussions on the financial crisis of Korea contributes to 
the debates about why an appropriate regulatory system is so crucial in response to rapid 
economic globalisation. The experience in Korea clearly shows the danger of confusion 
about what the relation between democracy and economic liberalisation should be. 
Fourthly, the analysis of the role of the tripartite system during the economic crisis 
contributes to the debates about the role of the partnership between the state and social 
partners in Asian countries. This research points to the importance of the active role of the 
state in involving social partners and civil associations in structural reform. This means that 
an authoritarian regime can no longer be justified by so-called "Asian values" in East Asian 
countries. 
Finally, this research can also provide an example of the importance of a holistic 
approach to skills formation and lifelong learning in the democratic transition, as well as in 
response to globalisation. 
0-5. Structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. The introduction has described the aims of 
research, the research questions and design, and the main arguments. 
Chapter I explores the research field. It highlights the importance of the democratic 
transition from developmental skills formation to the state-coordinated partnership model in 
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response to the challenges of globalisation and democratisation. It also points to the 
importance of the 'holistic approach' to lifelong learning, for understanding its emerging 
framework with reference to political, economic and cultural contexts. 
Chapter II examines the changing nature of lifelong learning within three stages: 
first, lifelong education for democracy with a humanistic approach; second, the rediscovery 
of lifelong education for economic competitiveness; finally lifelong learning for economic 
development and social cohesion in the knowledge-based economy. In addition, in order to 
analyse the comparative dimension of 'modes of regulation' for lifelong learning, the 
research categorizes five models - the welfare state, developmental state, social partnership, 
network and market models - on the basis of 'regulation' and 'purpose' (Ashton and Green, 
G. 1996; Crouch et al. 1999; Green, A. 2000, 2001). Within 'regulation', two dimensions are 
discussed in terms of the relationship between the state and civil society and between 
centralisation and decentralisation. Within 'purpose', three aspects, social development, 
economic development and nation-building, are discussed. 
Chapter ill discusses the role of the developmental state in skills formationin the 
East Asian context. Two approaches to East Asian skills formation are addressed. The human 
capital approach is criticised because it focuses on individuals without seriously taking 
account of the wider social context. Moreover, this approach downplays the role of the state 
in education and training in NIBs. By contrast, the developmental state approach is also 
criticised in that it stresses the role of the state too much, ignoring the changing relations 
between the state and civil society. In particular, economists' approach to developmental 
skills formation is critically discussed, because it has limits in explaining the transition from 
the developmental state to democracy and the influence of this transition on skills formation, 
particularly since the economic crisis of 1997-8. 
Chapter IV focuses on the changing characteristics of the developmental state and 
developmental skills formation in the Korean context. This chapter highlights the changing 
relations between the state and active civil society under the pressure of globalisation and 
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democratisation. It also examines the suppression of labour and political dissidents, as well as 
the active role of the developmental state in economic development. 
Chapter V examines the impact of mobilised civil society and globalisation on 
developmental skills formation. In this regard, it discusses the five issues of globalisation, 
mobilized civil society, ICT, university-entrance examinations and demographic change. 
Chapter VI examines on the basis of the documentary analysis how the 
institutional framework for VET and lifelong learning has changed under the pressures of 
democratisation and globalisation. It focuses on the changing regulations of funding, 
qualificatioris and the labour market because these can clearly show the characteristics of 
changes in the institutional structures. In addition, this chapter investigates why a holistic 
approach to lifelong learning is important in the democratic transition of developmental skills 
formation, discussing the relations between changing skills formation and lifelong learning. 
Chapter VII analyses the interview data and characterizes the state-coordinated 
partnership model as a 'state coordination and active civic participation'. It points out that as 
democracy has been deepening, the government is pressed to involve social partners and civil 
associations in skills formation and lifelong learning. This chapter examines the role of new 
institutions. The VET Policy Commission and the KRNET are critically examined, while the 
Tripartite Commission is stressed as paving the way for the institutionalisation of social 
partnership in industrial relations and training. The Ministerial Meeting on HRD is also 
examined, to explain how central coordination at the governmental level has changed. This 
chapter points out that for a holistic approach to VET and lifelong learning, the coordination 
of central government should be well organised and innovative in involving social partners 
and civil associations. 
Chapter vm, the conclusion, summarises the thesis and suggests relevant policies 
for the Korean government. This chapter briefly points to the characteristics of the state-
coordinated partnership model, explaining the lessons from the Asian economic crisis and 
education reforms in Korea. In particular, the active role of the state in involving social 
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partners and civil associations in the transition from developmental skills formation to the 
state-coordinated partnership model is emphasised. 
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Chapter I: Skills formation and lifelong learning in the democratic 
transition 
1-1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the research field, addressing the main issues of this research. 
The research field is divided into four areas: the change in skills formation from the 
developmental to the state-coordinated partnership model; a holistic approach to lifelong 
learning; mobilised civil society and democratisation; and new roles of the state and active 
civil society in skills formation and lifelong learning. 
1-2. The move from developmental skills formation to a state-coordinated 
partnership model? 
Studies of the 'East Asian Miracle' have shed light on the major role of education 
policies in the remarkable economic growth in East Asia between 1965 and 1996 (World 
Bank 1993; Green 1997; Ashton et al. 1999). During this period, while the average annual 
growth of GNP in the world level was 3.1%, South Korea grew at 8.9%, Singapore at 8.3% 
and Hong Kong at 7.5% (Castells 1999: 206). As a result, the East Asian countries have been 
regarded as models to explain the important roles of the government in promoting economic 
development (Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Castells 1992, 1999; Stiglitz 2002). Moreover, 
East Asian skills formation systems have been regarded as among the main contributors to 
the rapid economic development (Ashton and Green 1996; Ashton et al. 1999). 
However, after the Asian financial crisis in 1997-8, the remarkable levels of rapid 
economic growth plummeted, and heated debates about the causes of the economic crisis still 
continue. Strikingly, Castells, one of the best known theorists of the developmental state, 
points to the demise of the developmental state and highlights the danger of global flows of 
capital and infonnation. 
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[T]he success of the developmental states in East Asia ultimately leads to the demise of 
their apparatuses and to the fading of their messianic dreams (Castells 1999: 66). 
If [China fails in managing globalization], the developmental state will have run its 
historic course, and global flows of capital and information may reign uncontested -
unless a new form of state, the network state, potentially exemplified by the European 
Union, comes to the rescue of societies, enslaved by their economies (ibid. pp. 328-9) 
Here, some questions arise. Why should the economic success of the development 
states lead to the demise of their apparatuses? Does the demise of the developmental states in 
East Asia lead towards the American-style market economies? And in relation to the question 
about skills, what is the role of education and skills formation in promoting a strong civil 
society? 
Johnson (who coined the concept of the developmental state in his book, MITI and 
the Japanese Miracle (1982)) writing before the Asian economic crisis, pointed to the 
ultimate dangers of the "soft authoritarianism" that is inherent in the capitalist developmental 
state (CDS) strategy (Johnson 1995: 51). He explained how "the underdevelopment of 
democracy in modern Germany and Japan provoked two world wars". Their CDS strategy 
served to "stunt democratic development, which in tum provided fertile soil for the later 
development of fascism and militarism" (ibid. p. 51). 
Here, we can also raise two questions. Are the ultimate dangers of the CDS strategy 
preventable? If so, how can they be prevented in East Asia? 
To find answers for these questions is very important not only for academics and 
policy-makers in East Asian countries, who must urgently find solutions to respond to the 
challenges of globalisation and democratisation after the Asian economic crisis, but also for 
academics and policy-makers in other countries, who have been looking for alternatives to 
the neo-liberal market model. 
This thesis will examine why and how, in Korea, developmental skills formation 
has changed in response to globalisation and democratisation during the period 1993-2002. 
The Korean skills formation system has been recognised as a prototype for East Asian 
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systems, which during the past three decades may have provided the linkage between the 
rapid economic development and the remarkable expansion of education and training. For 
example, school enrolment rates for upper secondary and higher education dramatically 
changed, from 29.3% and 9.0% in 1970 to 89.8% and 61.6% in 1996 (Korean Education 
Index, KEDI 1996: 32). Therefore, this research seeks to contribute to understanding the 
changing systems of East Asian skills formation during this time. Moreover, it also seeks to 
contribute to the debates about the changing role of the developmental state in promoting 
skills formation and lifelong learning, in response to globalisation. 
1-2-1. The definition ofthe developmental state 
In this research, the developmental state is defined as 'the state which focuses on 
economic modernization as the primary means for nation-building or -rebuilding at the 
expense of political freedom'. Compared to other definitions, my definition stresses the 
oppression of political freedom and its limitations. This is important in explaining the 
democratic transition in East Asian countries. 
Johnson argued that the idea of "the developmental state originated in the 
situational nationalism of the late industrializers" (Johnson 1982: 24). In this regard, he 
emphasised that "national goals" of economic development were set by political objectives 
and the developmental state was "plan-rational" (ibid. p. 19). Castells also stresses the 
"building or rebuilding of national identity" as the national goal of the developmental state 
and that "economic development is not a goal but a means" (Castells 1992: 57). These 
definitions are helpful to understand why and how economic development has been driven by 
economic bureaucrats rather than by enterprises or market in developmental states. 
However, it is worth mentioning that authoritarian control over civil society is 
strengthened on top of economic control as economic development is driven as the means for 
nation-building or -rebuilding. Political oppression of political dissidents and labour is 
justified in the name of political stability for economic development and national security, 
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particularly in the initial stage. Then, political elites can concentrate national assets on 
economic development. In the process, they also strengthen their political control over 
enterprises and civil society on the basis of budget distribution, the extensive licensing and 
approval authority of the government (Johnson 1982: 70). 
As a result, in Japan, bureaucrats became a core of political power not least because 
the power of the prime minister and ministers has been very limited in controlling 
bureaucrats (ibid. p. 52). Moreover, this power is expanded and protected by various human 
networks based on "school ties, marital alliances, clan networks, deliberation councils, 
senior-junior relations, and the ministerial clubs of all retired bureaucrats" (ibid. p. 71). This 
mechanism could be effective in driving economic development during the growth period. 
However, it can be a serious obstacle to political changes as well as economic development 
when structural reforms are required. 
From this perspective, this thesis will point out that many western academics have 
underplayed the political suppression of political dissidents, including active civil 
associations and trade unions, and the impact this had on the development of skills formation. 
1-2-2. The definition of developmental skills formation and the state-coordinated 
partnership model 
The research will argue that Korean skills formation has been changing from a 
'developmental' to a 'state-coordinated partnership' model in the context of democratisation 
and economic globalisation since the 1990s2• In this thesis, the state-coordinated partnership 
model is defined as 'skills formation in which the state plays a major role in promoting the 
partnership between the state and stakeholders on the basis of the involvement of social 
partners in making and implementing policies' . By contrast, developmental skills formation is 
defined as 'skills formation for which the state plays a major role in coordinating education, 
training and the labour market on the basis of centralized control and planning, with a stress 
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on moral and social discipline'. The economists' approach will be criticized because it tends 
to neglect how the developmental states emphasize moral and social discipline in education 
and training, as well as control the labour market by the political suppression of trade union 
movements. 
1-2-3. Major points of the thesis 
This thesis will particularly investigate three points. First, the democratic transition 
of the developmental states needs to be understood from an international perspective. As 
Castells argues, the relationship between globalisation and the state has become one of the 
most important issues. 
The relationship between globalization and the state, at the heart of development and 
crisis in the Asian Pacific, is the dominant political issue at the end of this millennium. 
(Castells 1999: 329) 
Therefore, an international perspective is required to examine how the role of the 
developmental state has changed in response to globalisation and democratisation. Therefore, 
this research examines the developmental state model and other four models, the welfare 
state, partnership, network and market models, particularly comparing modes of regulation. It 
is important to review the dangers and liabilities of soft authoritarianism for contemporary 
East Asia, because one of the most important issues regarding skills formation systems is 
how they can continuously create comparative advantages so as to contribute to economic 
development in response to the challenges of globalisation and democratisation. 
Secondly, the thesis will emphasize the importance of a holistic approach to 
lifelong learning, particularly in the democratic transition of the developmental state. 
However, this research will concentrate on skills formation3 because it clearly shows the 
2 South Korea will be caIIed 'Korea' in this thesis, unless North Korea is explicitly mentioned. 
3 According to Koike and Inoki, on-the-job training (OJT) plays the key role in the process of acquiring skills. 
They also stress that long-term employment and a developed school system are prerequisites for skill formation 
(Koike and Inoki \990). 
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changes in modes of regulation and in the institutional mechanism during the democratic 
transition. Different approaches to lifelong learning are related to different approaches to 
skills formation based on the relations between education, training and the labour market. A 
comparative examination of changes in the regulation of VET and lifelong learning will help 
to reveal this relationship. For example, when the VET system and the labour market are 
connected and working well, lifelong learning policies tend to stress adult education and, a 
liberal and humanistic approach. By contrast, educational policies in market-oriented 
economies emphasize lifelong learning based on individual responsibility as panacea for the 
problems of their skills formation systems. 
This study argues that the holistic approach to lifelong learning is required for 
social cohesion and active civil society as well as for economic development and thus it has 
to bring three different approaches to lifelong learning - liberal, economic and democratic -
together. The developmental states during democratic transition have had to cope with 
international pressures for economic liberalization and increasing social inequalities resulting 
from the challenges of globalisation. In this context, what is required is an appropriate 
regulatory system and participatory citizenship for democratic coordination between 
education, training and the labour market. Therefore, the state-coordinated partnership model 
requires a holistic approach to lifelong learning, which can promote active citizenship as well 
as skills and knowledge development. 
Thirdly, this thesis will also stress that democratisation should be distinguished 
from liberalization in understanding the democratic transition of the developmental states. 
For example, while democratisation pursues a participatory system, liberalization focuses on 
deregulation. Western academics who emphasize the role of the state tend to underplay the 
importance of democratisation, worrying that democratisation ultimately leads to 
liberalization and weakening the role of the state. By contrast, in Korea neo-liberalists have 
emphasized the importance of liberalization in the name of democratisation since the civilian 
government came to office. 
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The thesis will critically examine the impacts of liberalization unaccompanied by 
an appropriate participatory system during the Kim Young-Sam government (1993-1997). 
From this, it will emphasize that economic liberalization should be accompanied by the 
democratic involvement of social partners in making and implementing policies. In this 
regard, the state-coordinated partnership model shows that economic development can go 
along with democracy in East Asia. It also emphasizes the importance of fostering innovative 
thinking, solidarity and participatory citizenship in education and training in response to the 
knowledge-based economy. 
To establish a theoretical framework, the study analyses the comparative dimension 
of 'modes of regulation' , pointing to the limits of the economists' approach which ignores the 
significant impacts of an active civil society on developmental skills formation in Korea since 
the early 1990s4• The concept of 'state-coordinated partnership', in which the goal for 
continuing economic development with the democratic involvement of social partners, will 
be proposed on the basis of analysing the emerging framework for VET and lifelong learning 
in Korea. 
One of the distinctive characteristics of the' state-coordinated partnership' model is 
the involvement of social partners in making and implementing policies. Under the terms of 
the VET Promotion Act, the VET Policy Commission and local VET Committees decide the 
VET Plan, the major policies on qualifications, and make major decisions on the tasks of the 
4 The definition of 'civil society' has been intensely debated since the civilian government came to power in 1993. 
Debates have developed according to the development of the citizens' movement versus so-called minjung 
(people) movement as welJ as political democratisation (see Jang Jip Choi (J 993) "Political Cleavages in South 
Korea" in Hagen Koo (ed.), State and Society in Contemporary Korea, New York: CornelJ University Press; 
Korean Council of Academic Groups (1993) Hangug minjuju-ui-ui hyeonjaejeog gwaje: jedo. gyehyeogmich 
sahoe undong [Present Tasks for Democracy in Korea: Institutions, Reforms and Social Movements], Seoul, 
Korea: Changjaggwa bipyeongsa; Sunhyuk Kim (1996) Civil Society in South Korea: Form Grand Democracy 
Movements to Petty Interest Group?, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Summer 1996; Hyuk-Rae Kim 
(2000), The State and Civil Society in Transition: the Role of Non-governmental Organizations in South Korea, 
The Pacific Review Vol.13, No.4). While the relationship between the state and civil society is debated, civil 
society is normally referred to as an aggregate of associations between the state and the market (private capital). 
While the concept of non-governmental organisations (NGO) is preferred by social movement groups to 
emphasise their independence from government, government-sponsored organisations are called non-profit 
organisations (NPO). In Korea, since the 19905, NGOs have led the opinions of civil society, with the support 
of the mass media. Particularly, since the Kim, Dae-Jung government, the influence of NGOs has significantly 
increased and they have actively expanded their policy-related activities in order to exercise pressure on policy-
making and legislation. 
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Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training (KRIVET). Although the 
establishment of local VET Committees has not yet been well implemented, the Act is a step 
in the right direction for the participation of social partners in decision-making regarding 
skills formation. Moreover, the establishment of the Tripartite Commission is a distinctive 
example of the promotion of the involvement of social partners in building a social 
consensus. This tripartite mechanism is a unique experiment in East Asia, reflecting changing 
relations between the state and civil society in Korea. 
With the government-introduced framework of national human resource 
development (NHRD), the co-ordination of nine different Ministries regarding human 
resource development was legalised in 2001 s. This seeks to coordinate the simultaneous 
development of economic competitiveness and social cohesion at the central governmental 
level in response to globalisation. In this context, a new role for the state comes into play - to 
mediate between different ministries and between various social actors, including Chaebols 
and labour. This underlines the need for the state-coordinated partnership model to be based 
on a holistic approach to lifelong learning. 
This is a topic worth studying, since despite the increasing concerns over the 
demise of developmental states, particularly since the Asian economic crisis of 1997-8, there 
have been few studies focusing on the implications of the rising civil society for changing 
skills formation in Asian countries. Such a study can also contribute to understanding the 
emerging relations between the state and civil society during the move towards high skills 
formation in the knowledge-based economy and the informational society6. 
5 The concept of NHRD is defined as the "social and national endeavor to efficiently develop and utilize human 
resources from a national perspective" (Ministry of Education 2000(b )). For the implementation of the NHRD, 
the deputy Prime Minister for the Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development (MEHRD) co-
ordinates nine related Ministries, in charge of education and training, labour market, science and technology, 
and social welfare. 
6 lowe the concept of the 'informational society' to Caste\ls. Caste\ls defines the concept as a specific form of 
society in which "information generation, processing, and transmission become the fundamental sources of 
productivity and power, because of new technological conditions emerging in this historical period" (Caste\ls 
1996: 2 I). He distinguishes the concept from the "information society" which emphasises the role of 
information in society (see ibid. p.2 I). In his view, while information has been critical in all societies including 
medieval Europe, the term "informational" indicates the role of new technological conditions in the current 
information(al) age. 
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In this thesis, the term civil society is not used in the sense of social movements but 
in the sense of non-state social organisation. In chapter V, there will be discussion about 
three different definitions of civil society: the European traditional, American liberal and 
civil movement approaches. The main difference between the European and American liberal 
approach is that while the former definition includes the market, the latter does not. By 
contrast, civil movements in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia have defined civil 
society as a "counterweight" to the authoritarian state (Foley, M.W. and Edwards, B. 1996: 
39). This is defined as a social movement based on active civil associations. 
This thesis will point out that civil society in the Korean context needs to be 
understood more broadly as non-state social organisation, encompassing radical and 
conservative associations. This definition is particularly important to analyse the conflict 
between "conservative civil society versus active civil society" in the democratic transition 
(Choi, J. J. 2002: 193). While the opposition of civil society has been effective in the struggle 
against the authoritarian state in Korea, it is not sufficient for the process of maturing 
democracy. During the democratic transition, the business or ruling class can more rapidly 
increase their influence on government policies compared to civil movements. 
More important, civil movements seem to be in a dilemma, because the opposition 
may contribute to weakening even the democratic government if they continue to focus on 
the struggle against the state without considering the changing power relationships between 
government and Chaebols. Active civil society can unintentionally result in a support for neo-
liberal policies. Therefore, to strengthen the participation of social partners, the 
institutionalisation of participation is urgently required immediately after the establishment 
of a democratic government. For this institutionalisation, civil movements need to urge the 
government to playa major part in the process. 
This study will focus exclusively on the post-secondary phases of lifelong learning 
in relation to skills formation, and within these the areas of adult education and vocational 
training. The concept of lifelong learning (lifelong education) is defined as "all types of 
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organised education activities with the exception of schooling" in the Korean Lifelong 
Education Act of 1999' where "schooling" means both school education and higher 
education. 
With regard to globalisation and information and communication technologies, the 
importance of lifelong learning has been emphasised since the 1990s. Interpretations of the 
concept, however, have differed significantly, depending on the nature of specific education 
and training systems, and the responses to the challenges facing each system (Green 2000: 
35-6; Coffield 1999: 487-8). In each national context, the inherited education and training 
system and the changing labour market to a large extent determine strategies, priorities and 
financing in implementing lifelong learning policies. Therefore, regarding these policies, one 
of the major issues seems to be how the current system can be responsive to the rapidly 
changing labour market in the context of globalisation and the informational age. 
1-3. The move from fragmental and one-dimensional to a holistic 
approach to lifelong learning? 
In Korea, approaches to lifelong learning have been fragmented and one-
dimensional. Different strands of lifelong learning initiatives have been separately 
emphasized, without a clear overall view of a lifelong learning framework or relevant 
strategies8• For instance, such concepts as 'social education', 'adult education', or 'lifelong 
education' and 'vocational' lifelong learning have been used to emphasise the differences in 
their priorities rather than the connection between them9. Roughly speaking, the expression 
"social education" tends to emphasise provision for those who have not completed secondary 
or higher education and left school early, and be identified as 'out-of-school education'. In 
7 By the Lifelong Education Act of 1999, the concept of lifelong learning is narrowly defined as 'lifelong 
education', which excludes training as well as school and higher education. But the concept lifelong learning 
will be used later, unless the meaning of "lifelong education" needs to be emphasised. 
8 With regard to the learning society, three models, namely the skill growth model, the personal development 
model and the social learning model, can be identified. See Coffield, F. (1999: 487). 
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particular, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are likely to prefer this concept because 
they still distrust the role of schools (and the Ministry of Education) in education for 
democracy (democratic citizenship education). 
The concept of "adult education" or "lifelong education" has becoming more 
influential since the Kim, Young-Sam government came to power in 199210• As governments 
have in practice regarded such education as a "luxury", programmes are mainly provided by 
university lifelong learning centres, funded predominantly from fees, and by private adult 
learning institutes, funded entirely from fees (OECD 2000: 13). Therefore they are likely to 
focus on learner-centred personal development. By contrast, the vocational approach to 
lifelong learning based on skills growth has been emphasised mainly by policy-makers, 
employers and economists, particularly since the economic crisis in the mid-1990s. Therefore 
recent lifelong learning policies tend to be geared to an instrumental approach to economic 
development (ibid. p.13). 
At the policy level, lifelong learning initiatives have been fragmented in three 
directions. The first direction, stressing 'wide access to a degree', is advocated by the 
Ministry of Education (MoE) and has emerged on the basis of a 'deficit model'. This mainly 
focuses on widening access to higher education, thus allowing those who missed the chance 
to go to university to get a degree through various alternative ways. For instance, the present 
government introduced and has extended the scope of the Credit Bank System (CBS) which 
"recognizes diverse learning experiences gained not only in-school but also out-of-school" 
(KED! 1999: 4). This means that various adult learning provisions become part of a new 
education system in which a learner can obtain a degree through the accumulation of the 
necessary CBS-approved credits. This approach tends to be geared to awarding a degree, and 
the major part of adult learning which is not based on accreditation can be underplayed. Until 
9 Amongst educationalists, 'social education' has competed with 'adult education' with regard to the definition of 
concepts (See Oh, H.J. (1995), Han, S.H. (1997)). 
10 Civilian governments have relaxed regulations regarding the licensing of adult education institutions in terms of 
purposes, curriculum and facilities. 
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the early 1990s, governments' policies were piecemeal in approach in that they used to stress 
formal education, and lifelong education was recognised as something which might possible 
in the more remote future. 
Secondly, as high skills formation has been regarded as the major factor required 
for survival in the global market, both MoE and the Ministry of Labour (MoL) have initiated 
a vocational version of lifelong learning on the basis of a 'skill adaptation model'. For 
example, the expansion of further and higher education for vocational high school graduates 
was proposed in 1996 in order to upgrade the level of workforce skills, and is being 
implemented (PCER 1997). Vocational lifelong learning based on increasing the access route 
from vocational schools to junior colleges and from junior colleges to polytechnic 
universities, has been advocated. In addition, in relation to vocational training, the training 
levy system was replaced by the Employment Insurance System (EIS) in 1996, and a major 
part of work-based training costs was reimbursed from the' Job Ability Development Fund' 
of EIS. More important, since the economic crisis in 1997-8, this direction has been 
emphasised more, as a response to the issue of unemployment as well as to the concept of a 
knowledge-based society. 
Thirdly, as Korea is moving towards a democratic society, the vitalization of civil 
society based on 'democratic citizenship' has increasingly become important. The campaign 
for democratic participation in civil society has been carried out mainly by NGOs such as 
churches, YMCAs and various other social organizations for last four decades. Many NGOs 
have provided education programmes for those who are disadvantaged or citizens interested 
in building democratic society as a way of promoting campaigns on issues, as well as of 
recruiting members. Most formal educational institutions, including universities, were 
negligent of the demand, partly because the government suppressed such programmes, partly 
because they were not likely to regard such programmes as education. Although compared to 
those in formal education the number of participants were small, the impact of these 
programmes on social movements such as the labour, peasant and environmental movements 
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was significant until they organised their own organisations, such as trade unions, which 
could provide their membership with education programmes. Recently, since civilian 
governments came to power and the demand for adult learning rapidly increased, many 
formal or non-formal private institutions have started to provide similar programmes, 
particularly focused on the middle classes who can afford to pay and have enough time to 
attend. Since the present government recognised their role in promoting civil participation, 
the role ofNGOs in promoting democratic citizenship education has been re-discovered. 
In this regard, this research is based on a holistic and multi-disciplinary approach to 
lifelong learning, and discusses the evolution of lifelong learning with regard to the 
'transition to democracy' as well as to 'economic development'. In this thesis, the holistic 
approach will be defined as reflecting 'interplay and collaboration' between political, 
economic and cultural perspectives. The approach also implies a dynamic relationship 
between schools or universities and informal or non-formal educational institutions and 
voluntary organisations. This approach is particularly appropriate for the study of lifelong 
learning in the transition to democracy because such learning can provide "a response to the 
new and crucially important demand for active self-reliance in a swiftly changing society" 
(UNESCO 1996: 109-110). Moreover, as the OECD Report (OECD 2000), Where are the 
Resources for Lifelong Learning? stresses, taking a holistic view is encouraged by the 
efficiency-driven reforms of lifelong learning which seek to develop "complementary 
partnerships and linkages" of "different parts of education and training systems" (OECD 
2000: 109). 
1-4. Mobilised civil society and changing skills fonnation 
The concept of civil society has rarely been recognised in the literature on the 
relations between economic development and education in East Asian economies before the 
Asian economic crisis in 1997-98. However, as civil society is rising according to the rapid 
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econorruc development of newly industrializing economics (NIEs), the following issue 
becomes important: how can the domain of rising civil society be analysed when studying 
economic development and skills formation in NIBs? As mentioned above, critical 
approaches to the authoritarian state, including neo-liberal and social democratic approaches, 
have emphasised the opposition of the state and civil society in Asian countries. In many new 
democracies in Asia, the relations between the state and civil society need to be reviewed, 
because wel1-structured state institutions are a prerequisite for political and economic 
reforms in the desired direction of democratisation. The political analysis of rising civil 
society is required in order to understand new state institutions, because the role of the state 
has changed according to the changing relations between the forces in a society. 
1-4-1. Two theoretical approaches to East Asian skills formation and economic 
development 
The theoretical approaches to East Asian skills formation and economIC 
development have been roughly polarised between a 'neo-liberal' approach based on 'human 
capital' theory and a 'developmental state' or 'revisionist' approach. The two approaches 
agree in that they regard investment in education as a main contributor to economic 
development. However, they are contrasting in how they interpret government intervention in 
skills formation and economic growth. 
As for East Asian economic success, two contrasting perspectives have competed. 
On the one hand, the mainstream view has been based on the neo-liberal approach, in which 
economic success is mainly attributed to free markets based on competition and openness 
(World Bank 1993)11. This approach has been criticised because it ignores government 
industrial policies, which have shaped the East Asian economic system, including the 
Chaebol-centred system in Korea. The neo-liberal approach also sees government 
II See The World Bank (1993), The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Open University 
Press. 
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intervention in education and training as proper only in cases of 'market failure'. Therefore, 
for example, it cannot explain why government industrial policies drove up the demand for 
skills when the Korean economy was moving towards reliance on the heavy chemical 
industry from the 1970s onwards. 
On the other hand, there is the 'developmental state' or "revisionist" approach, 
which emphasises government intervention based on industrial policies for market protection 
and on economic planning, as well as control of the bank system (World Bank 1993). The 
developmental state plays a major role in "technology acquisition, market protection and 
economic planning" (Henderson 1998: 367). The concept of the developmental state has 
contributed to the broad understanding of the state's role in instigating rapid economic 
growth in East Asian countries. Since the rise of the East Asian economies, this approach has 
attracted the attention of some researchers and policy-makers in Western countries, who have 
sought for lessons from the state-driven model. However, this approach has been criticised 
because it tends to stress only the positive role of the state and downplays its negative sides 
such as the suppression of trade unions (You and Lee 1999). The different roles of the state 
need to be carefully considered according to different economic and political contexts. In this 
regard, this approach to skills formation also tends to overestimate the positive side of state 
intervention in promoting education and training, while it does not pay attention to its side-
effects such as the restraint of critical thinking and creativity. 
Since the Asian economic crisis of 1997-8, the role of the developmental state has 
been deeply questioned (Castells 1999; Lee, J.M. 1999; Weiss 2000). When the Korean 
economy, which was, once, praised as one of four Asian tigers, was hit by the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997, it collapsed entirely in a few months and the government had to request 
financial aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Arguably IMF policies, including 
a drive for capital account hberalisation, provoked the crash (Stiglitz 2002). Rapid economic 
liberalisation without an appropriate regulatory system resulted in the financial crisis in 
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Korea. The crisis also revealed the critical problems of the Korean economic systeml2. The 
crisis resulted in a "sudden increase in unemployment and poverty, a drastic fall in the labour 
share and rising inequalities" (You and Lee 1999: 18). In this context, the developmental 
system was regarded as the main cause of the economic crisis (Kim, DJ. 1999)13. Therefore, 
remaining developmental systems were rapidly dismantled and replaced by new systems. 
However, the Korean economy has bounced back with the government's active role in 
involving social partners and civil associations in overcoming the crisis. 
1-4-2. Two different perspectives on mobilised civil society and economic Iiberalisation 
/-4-2-1. The 'liberalisation responsibility' perspective 
In this context, the developmental state approach has been spilt into two 
perspectives regarding the rise of civil society and economic liberalisation in the 1990s. The 
'liberahsation responsibility' perspective argues economic liberalisation weakened the 
economic institutions based on bureaucratic control and made the economy vulnerable to 
instability of the international financial market (Chang 1998). This approach attributes the 
cause of the crisis to economic liberalisation. It has strength in pointing to the problems of 
liberalisation without proper safeguards and supervision. However, it has weakness in that 
the approach downplays the structural causes of Korean economic problems. More important, 
this approach has a critical weakness, because it tends to brush aside the cleavage between 
the authoritarian state and active civil society, regarding the developmental state as the 
12 They argue that "it was a severe economic crisis of 1979-80 that prompted the move toward liberalization". 
They also point out that modifying the institutional mechanisms has been inevitable because the economy was 
"in the decline of the potential growth rates in the I 990s" (You and Lee 1999: 7). 
13 For an alternative view see Wade (1998), The Asian debt-and-development crisis of 1997: cases and 
consequences'. World Development, August. In his view, it was precisely the uncontrolled moves toward 
Iiberalisation which enabled Chaebol corruption and over-indebtedness. By contrast. many Korean academics 
point to the collusion between the authoritarian regime and Chaebols as the main contributor to the economic 
crisis (See Hee-Yeon Cho 2000). 
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embodiment of its society. Therefore the holders of this view downplayed the democratic 
potential based on social movements of the mobilised civil society. 
In Korea, the transition to democracy started in 1987 when authoritarian rule was 
seriously challenged by civil uprisings and the following labour strikes. After 1987, the 
relations between the state and civil society started to change rapidly. The state no longer 
continued to have relative autonomy in relation to society on the basis of the oppression of 
active civil society. Also, the economic system needed to change according to the changes in 
relations between the state and labour. However, industrial policies, which were heavily 
geared to the Chaebols. failed to transform the bases of the economy from input-driven 
growth, based on low labour costs, to productivity-driven growth (You and Lee 1999: 12). 
In this context, rather than increasing productivity the Chaebols chose 
subcontracting and outsourcing as means to reduce labour costs and to avoid increased 
unionisation. As subcontracting which relied on the low labour costs of medium sized 
companies (SMEs) spread, the productivity gap between large companies and SMEs 
increased. This widening productivity differential has been understood as one of the most 
serious problems of the Korean economy. More important, the influence of Chaebols on the 
government significantly increased after the civilian government came to power in 1993. 
They forced the government not only to liberalise cross-border financial flows, but also to 
deregulate the domestic financial market, and they possessed much of the non-bank finance 
sector. As a consequence, Chaebols shaped a distorted liberalisation process for which the 
government did not install proper safeguards and supervision, using their influence on the 
government: this caused serious weaknesses in the domestic economy, which became 
vulnerable to the instability of the international financial market (ibid. pp. 6-8). 
Ashton et al. do not examine how developmental states articulate their responses to 
rise of civil society and economic globalisation, because they tend to analyse skills formation 
in terms of a dichotomy between the state and the market. Because their research was carried 
out before the Asian economic crisis, they argue that the four Asian "tigers" retain their 
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developmental state model in managing skill formation, emphasising the strength of the well 
organised, bureaucratic machinery of the skill formation system (Ashton 1999: 147). It is 
necessary to pay attention to the increasing social demand for education and training reform 
in the transition from the developmental state to a democratic society. The Education Reform 
Proposals of the Presidential Commission on Education Reform (PCER) point out that 
Korean education, which has been recognised as a main contributor to economic 
development, is no longer appropriate in the globalisation and information age. 
Upon leaving school, things learned by rote, which slip out of our memory, are useless; 
they were useful only for the college entrance examination. Such an educational system 
will lose its relevance in the coming era of information technology and thus the need for a 
massive education reform is being felt acutely .... However, once educated Koreans enter 
the work force they are generally branded as "defective" or "ill-prepared" (peER 1997: 
17, emphasis by original author) 
This thesis investigates how lifelong learning is formulated in relation to changing 
skills formation in the transition to democracy and economic liberalisation. It is interesting 
that while foreign countries praised the role of education in economic growth in Korea, 
Korean government emphasized serious weaknesses of the education system. This is partly 
because employers' demand for the flexibility of the labour market has increased. This 
change reflects increasing Chaebols' outsourcing and the inability of SMEs to train. The 
criticism is also partly because Chaebols increasingly demand high skills and creative labour 
in order to compete with other international companies in the knowledge-based economy. 
In addition, with regard to VET, quantity-oriented planning and the weak linkage 
between education and training institutes and industry have been criticised (You and Lee 
1999: 24). You and Lee point out the problems of skills formation have been cumulated since 
1980s. 
[V]ocational and technical education and training were major policy tools for promoting 
economic growth. When the government was implementing the HeI drive in the mid-
1970s, it made large-scale investments in technical high schools and vocational training 
centers. However, in the 1980s, the government shifted its focus to strengthening the role 
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of the private sector in vocational training by instituting a training levy system and by 
expanding the number of private two-year technical colleges. (You and Lee 1999: 23) 
/-4-2-2. The 'developmental state demise' perspective 
By contrast, the 'developmental state demise' perspective insists that the "success 
of the developmental state in modernizing the economy led, in most cases, to the emergence 
of a civil society, asserting itself against the authoritarian state" (Castells 1999: 326). 
Moreover, Castells argues that the developmental state becomes "the obstacle for the new 
stage of global integration", pointing to the limits of developmental states -in coping with the 
challenges of economic globalisation and identity in the information age (ibid. p. 212). This 
view has strength in trying to trace the causes of the economic crisis to the fundamental 
problems which the developmental state faces in coping with the changing relations between 
the state and civil society as well as the challenges of economic globalisation. 
However, the view also has weakness in regarding the developmental state as the 
embodiment of its society. Therefore, Castells has underplayed its problems resulting from 
the conflict between the state and civil society before the economic crisis. This view seems to 
be problematic because it may underplay the importance and possibility of democratisation at 
the national level in developing countries. As the developmental state was successful in 
modernizing the economy, the emergence of a civil society in Korea needs to be considered. 
The realm of civil society has been expanded by social movements and civic associations 
which playa role in vitalising civil society for participation in the process of democratisation 
(Kim, S.H. 1996; Kim, H.R. 2000). Civil society is normally defined in Korea as the 
aggregate of associations between the state and the market. Therefore, the positive side of 
civil society tends to be emphasised in the transition towards a democratic society 14. 
14 In the literature, the tenn nonnally refers to alJ non-state organisations - i.e. including business. By contrast, in 
Korea, the concept normally refers to the public domain expanded by social movements, which excludes 
business_ 
40 
In this regard, the concept of civil society needs to be freshly defined, as its sphere 
has rapidly increased. As Held argues, the features of civil society are distinct feature from 
those of the state. 
Civil society retains a distinctive character to the extent that it is made up of areas of 
social life - the domestic world, social activities, economic interchange and political 
interaction - which are organized by private or voluntary arrangements between 
individuals and groups outside of the direct control of the state (Held 1995: 181). 
However, he also separates out civic associations from civil society, because the 
"economy constitutes a very distinctive site and pattern of power" (ibid. p. 181). 
The realm of civic associations, thus, refers to the array of institutions and organizations 
in and through which individuals or groups can pursue their own projects independently 
of the direct organization of the state or of economic collectivities such as corporations or 
trade unions (ibid. p. 181). 
Therefore, civic associations include voluntary organisations, churches, political 
organisations and social movements. As democracy deepens, social movements are 
empowered, but so are the Chaebols. While NGOs led by civic movements have significantly 
raised their voices on social change, large firms also have rapidly increased their influence on 
economic policies. This is where the new role of the state comes in, to mediate between 
social partners. This mediation is one of the defining characteristics of the co-ordinating 
state. 
Moreover, given the geo-political context, the reunification of the Korean peninsula 
is still a very serious issue and the state may still remain powerful if it can be successful in 
building up social consensus on the process of reunification. In the process of building 
consensus, the relations between the state and civil society can be freshly adjusted. 
Harnessing the national project of reunification to democracy has the potential for a 
transition from "developmental nationalism" to state-coordinated partnership because the 
unification issue has been put on at centre of both nation-rebuilding and democratic 
movements since the split into two Koreas (Castells 1999: 296). 
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1-5. Democratisation and new roles of the state in skills formation 
The rise of civil society and economic globalisation require new roles of the state in 
promoting social policies, including education and training, based on more democratic 
regulation. The new roles of the state need to take into account the relationship between the 
state and civil society. The Korean economy's experience in the recent economic crisis shows 
that economic liberalisation should have proper safeguards and supervision: democratic civil 
society requires "vigorous political initiatives, funding and legal recognition" to cope with 
opposition by "the more powerful social classes, groups and organizations of existing civil 
society" (Keane 1988: 22, emphasis by ·original author). Otherwise, as Keane argues, civil 
society may be self-paralysing. 
Precisely because of its pluralism, and its lack of a guiding centre, a fully democratic civil 
society would be endangered pennanently by poor co-ordination, disagreement, 
niggardliness and open conflict among its constituents (Keane 1988: 22) 
Therefore it is evident that the transition towards democratisation reqUIres 
centralised planning and co-ordination by efficiently and effectively organised political 
institutions, in order to vitalise a more decentralised and horizontally structured civil society. 
More important, the transition should be operated so as to cope with the challenges of 
economic globalisation and the information age. 
In this regard, the crisis of the developmental state became the turning point for an 
increasing concern about the weakness of social safety nets as well as very low priorities for 
social expenditure in Korea (You and Lee 1999: 20). In terms of skills formation, the lifelong 
learning framework needs not only to compensate for the gap resulting from the demise of the 
developmental state, but to respond to freshly increased social demands according to the rise 
of civil society and economic globalisation. In fact, the failure of manpower planning, the 
rapidly increased rate of unemployment, the increasing social demand for higher and 
continuing education and the need to enhance competitiveness simultaneously pressurise the 
government to establish frameworks for lifelong learning. As a consequence, the Lifelong 
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Education Act of 1999 was introduced and a lifelong education framework has been rapidly 
shaped. In this regard, the Ministry of Education was changed into the Ministry of Education 
and Human Resource Development (MoEHRD) in 2001. The minister of the MoEHRD 
became a deputy prime minister who would coordinate the ministries related to education, 
training, science and technology, culture and social welfare. 
The broad meaning of lifelong learning started to be linked to the concept of 
"national human resource development (NHRD)". Within the framework of education and 
the NHRD issues of education and employment come together, and the role of the state is 
emphasised as a coordinator which brings public and private sectors together to promote high 
skills formation. In addition, in response to the rise of civil society, its role is freshly 
recognised as promoting a third sector for lifelong education and promoting a learning 
society. 
So far, the division between the Ministry of Education (MoE) and the Ministry of 
Labour (MoL) results in disconnected approaches to lifelong learning, focusing on adult 
education or training. However, as seen in the build-up of the MoEHRD, the national system 
of lifelong learning is emerging within the premises of economic and social development. As 
the Korean economy becomes liberalised, the broad framework of lifelong learning is 
increasingly important in that how to link education and training to labour market policy has 
become a main issue for the NHRD strategy in the transition to democracy. Therefore, with 
regard to this framework, decentralisation and the participation of civil society are proposed 
by the government. Whilst the role of the state is focused on building up an NHRD 
infrastructure and strategic coordination, implementation is devolved to local governments 
and non-governmental sectors (Kim, T.K. et. al. 2000: 84). However, compared to the 
emphasis on the role of central and local governments, universities and enterprises, the role 
of labour (trade unions) and civil associations is not well recognised. In this regard, the 
paradigm of skills formation is changing, from the 'state directed' towards the 'state 
coordinated' model. It can be conceptualised as 'decentralised centralism' (Karlsen 2000). 
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As for applying the concept of decentralised centralism, the effects oflT on 'modes 
of regulation' in lifelong learning need to be considered. The accomplished national 
information infrastructure (NTI) in Korea is transforming lifelong learning from being 
fragmented and one-dimensional to being connected and multi-dimensional. The Internet is 
also regarded as being a potential means to transform lifelong learning from a luxury to a 
practical instrument to tackle unemployment issues in the transition to democracy. Korea has 
become one of the most successful countries in the world with regard to the "diffusion rate of 
the Internet" (Lee, H.J. et al. 2001: 2)15. More than a quarter of all households (4 million) 
subscribed to the high-speed and broadband Internet service at the end of 2000, whilst there 
were only 2 million in August 2000 and less than one million in April 2000 (ibid. p. 5). On 
the basis of the development of ICT, under the name of lifelong learning informal learning is 
integrated into education networking in three ways under related regulations. A major part of 
informal adult and vocational education is connected under the regulations of the Credit Bank 
system, under which accredited institutions can provide some education programmes leading 
to recognition as college credits, and training becomes a part of lifelong learning by linking 
qualifications to credits. In addition, plant-based vocational education to degree level started 
to be integrated in the name of a 'corporate university'. More important, in 2001 nine virtual 
(cyber) universities started to recruit between 120 and 900 students, 7 for university degree 
and 2 for two-year college degree. In such a context, as Castells argues, the switchers become 
the power holders as the "interoperating codes and switches between networks become the 
fundamental sources in shaping, guiding, and misguiding societies" (Castells 1996: 471). 
Therefore the rapid application of IT to learning strengthens 'decentralised centralisation' 
based on polarisation between the state and providers. 
After the economic crisis in 1997-8, lifelong learning was freshly emphasised as a 
vocational and employment-related means to tackle the unemployment issue, as the rate of 
15 See also Time (Asia Edition), Cover Story: South Korea: All wired up, December 11,2000 
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unemployment soared higher than had ever been experienced. In this regard, the government 
has sought a more integrated approach to education, training and the labour market. 
Therefore this thesis will examine how the lifelong learning framework is shaped to 
respond to the rise of civil society and economic liberalisation in the transition to democracy 
in Korea, focusing on modes of regulation in the lifelong learning framework. For a 
theoretical analysis, I conceptualise skills formation as moving from the 'developmental 
state' to the 'state-coordinated partnership' model. Compared to the social partnership model, 
the state-coordinated partnership model can be defined as meaning that because the 
participating system of social partners is not well institutionalised, the state is required to 
have a major role in mediating between social partners. This thesis examines how state-
coordination model of lifelong learning is shaped. The distinctive characteristics of 
developmental state and state-coordinated partnership models are as follows. 
Figure 1-1. Comparison of two models of skills formation 
Developmental state model State-coordinated partnership 
model 
Education system Front-ended and divided Flexible and connected 
(Lifelong learning) 
Organisational model Centralism / Vertical Decentralised Centralism / 
Networking 
Cooperation between Ministries Separated Coordinated 
Manpower policy Manpower planning (Demand- Active Labour Market Policy 
Supply control) 
Participation of Civil Society Exclusive Inclusive 
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I -6. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored four issues in relation to the research field. First, it 
highlighted the importance of the democratic transition from developmental skills fonnation 
to the state-coordinated partnership model in East Asian developmental states. The Korean 
experience proves the possibility of democratisation at the national level in developing 
countries. In this regard, it is also very important to examine how developmental skills 
formation has been changing in Korea. The democratic transition will be examined in chapter 
VI and VII in detail. 
Secondly, the importance of a 'holistic approach' to lifelong learning was stressed 
in the democratic transition. The holistic approach is increasingly required, to provide a 
response to the demand for both high skills and active civil society in Korea. It can be 
achieved by effective reforms which seek to develop complementary partnerships and 
networks of various parts of the education and training systems. The role of the state is also 
crucial for the wide involvement of social partners in skills formation. The holistic approach 
to lifelong learning will be discussed in chapter II and other chapters. 
Thirdly, a mobilised civil society is a prerequisite for the democratic transition in 
developmental skills formation. However, it is very important to distinguish democratisation 
from economic liberalization. A mobilised civil society requires a democratic and enabling 
state, particularly steering the transition to a democratic society. Therefore the symbiotic 
relations between the state and active civil society need to be institutionalised. The impact of 
mobilised civil society will be examined in chapter V in detail. 
Finally, the active role of the state is required for the involvement of social partners 
in skills formation and lifelong learning. The state has to take a role not only in mediating 
between social partners, but also in institutionalising the partnership between social partners 
required for a maturing democracy. In this regard, the main role of the state has been 
changing, from commanding the nation to encouraging partnerships between stakeholders. 
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The changing role of the state will be discussed in chapter VII and VID, the conclusion, in 
detail. 
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Chapter II: Lifelong learning policies, globalisation and the 
information age 
II-I. Introduction 
This chapter is composed of two parts. The first part discusses how the purposes 
and focuses of lifelong learning have changed at the international level since UNESCO 
adopted the concept of lifelong education in the 1960s. The developments are divided into 
three stages: from the 1960s to the mid-1980s; from the mid-1980s to the rnid-1990s; finally 
from the mid-1990s onwards. The fmal stage is discussed in detail. The second part of this 
chapter compares five models of lifelong learning on the basis of regulation and purpose. 
According to the extent of regulation, a continuum between the state, social partnership, 
network and market models is distinguished on the basis of the relationship between the state 
and civil society. By contrast, according to purposes or emphasis, three social and economic 
development and nation-building aspects are distinguished. In this part, various responses to 
globalisation are examined with emphasis on different regulations and institutions for 
education, training and the labour market. 
11-2. Changes in the purposes of lifelong learning 
The concept of lifelong education has gained world-wide prominence since 
UNESCO adopted it and posed the notion as a potential alternative to existing educational 
principles in the 1960s (Len grand 1970, 1989). The term "lifelong education", as many 
educationalists have pointed out (see Matheson and Matheson 1996: 220-223; Lowe 2000), is 
far from newl6• In ancient China, Confucius (552-479 BC) and Mencius (372?-289? BC), 
16 In an Asian Confucian society, zeal for education was traditionally revered and scholars were highly respected. 
Therefore, learning throughout life was one of the most important virtues of the 'superior man'. 
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who have been regarded as the founders of Confucianism, viewed seamless learning as the 
virtue of the 'superior man' and emphasised the pleasure of learning; however, learning was 
focused on individual commitment and was limited to the ruling class. 
The outstanding achievement of the Montreal Conference in 1960 was to introduce 
the concept for the first time at an international assembly. However, at the outset, lifelong 
education was scarcely more than a new term applied to a relatively old practice, that of adult 
education (Faure et al. 1972: 142-3). For example, in relation to adult education, the concept 
of lifelong education was expressed half a century earlier in the UK. In the 1919 Final Report 
of the Ministry of Reconstruction Adult Education committee, it was suggested in the 
conclusion that adult education must be regarded as a "permanent national necessity" and 
"should be both universal and lifelong". In addition, Basil A. Yeaxlee (1883-1967), who was 
deeply involved in adult and religious education, published a book entitled 'Lifelong 
Education' in 1929. 
It was Learning to be (1972) that reformulated much of the ongoing debate on 
lifelong education with key ideas and proposals for a humanistic and democratic approach to 
education. However, in the 1980s, western policy makers started to recognize lifelong 
education as a means of enhancing economic competitiveness. Finally, since influential 
international organisations successively proposed lifelong learning in the mid-1990s, lifelong 
learning has become a key idea in the discourse of economic development and social 
cohesion. In addition to economic development and social cohesion, active or democratic 
citizenship has been also pointed out as one purpose of lifelong learning, particularly in 
relation to the transition to democracy and the context of globalisation as well as to self-
reliance at the individual level. In this regard, a holistic approach to lifelong learning is 
suggested. 
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11-2-1. Lifelong education for democracy with a humanistic approach 
It is, however, in the Faure Report that the concept of lifelong education first 
covers the entire educational process, from the point of view of the individual and of society. 
Learning to be (1972), a full-scale report with key ideas and concrete proposals for 
educational reform, reformulated much of the ongoing debate on lifelong education. The 
Report stresses lifelong education as the guiding principle in educational policies for 
realising a learning society: "Every individual must be in a position to keep learning 
throughout his[or her] life. The idea of lifelong education is the key of the learning society" 
(ibid. p. 181). According to the Faure Report, 
the lifelong concept covers all aspects of education, embracing everything in it, with the 
whole being more than the sum of its parts. There is no such thing as a separate 
'permanent' part of education which is not lifelong .... lifelong education is not an 
educational system but the principle on which the over-all organisation of a system is 
founded (ibid. pp. 181-2) . 
This emphasis on education both outside the school and for adults can be 
understood only in the context of the current debate about the role of an education system. 
Since the Faure Report, debates about lifelong education or learning have 
developed through three phases. The initial phase (from the early 1970s to the early 1980s) of 
the discussion about the concept of lifelong education or learning was mainly driven by 
educationalists and arose from two main sources: a criticism of traditional education, and a 
recognition of the effects of rapid changes in society (Moreland and Lovett 1997: 202). These 
different perspectives were closely related to three major tensions which exist in the field of 
lifelong education (ibid. pp. 202-3). First, whilst proponents of lifelong education, for 
example Cropley (1989) focuses on it as a means of coping with and adapting to change, 
others, for example Dave (1976) and Gelpi (1985), perceive it to be a means of promoting a 
more democratic, egalitarian society. A further tension arises between those who focus on the 
individual and those who emphasise the importance of individual and collective development. 
Finally, some utopian writing on lifelong education put it forward as a solution to society's 
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problems, whilst others fear its potential to become more manipulative and repressive than 
the present education system (Tight 1998; Gelpi 1985). 
Thus the concept of lifelong education encompasses conflicting views about the 
nature of society and change, problems with the education system and the implications of a 
framework of lifelong education. Briefly speaking, in this phase most discourses focused on 
explaining the importance of lifelong education and were limited in developing the concrete 
strategies to realise it. Therefore, whilst the initial phase of the debates helped make the idea 
popular around the world, its idealistic and humanistic suggestions made it difficult to attract 
the broad attention of policy-makers, whose major concern still tended to remain within the 
boundary of the school system. 
11-2-2. Rediscovery of lifelong education for economic competitiveness 
During the second phase (from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s), as lifelong 
education had been discovered as an important educational policy in the UK, the United 
States and other developed countries, the development of the issue passed from 
educationalists to politicians and enterprises. In the early 1980s, the economic market became 
more competitive and economic depression was prolonged. In addition, Britain and the USA 
felt strongly not only economic challenges in the world market from Japan and other rapidly 
developing countries, but also the importance of skills and knowledge for success in the 
information age. 
Therefore, the "New Right"l7 governments of Britain and the USA determined to 
lead national revivals based on 'principles of aggressive free-market capitalism', and targeted 
education as one of the main causes of economic failure (Esland 1996: 45). In this context, 
Britain and the USA developed a distinctive education reform agenda, to make a new 
17 First in Britain and then in the USA Thatcher and Reagan came to power on the plank of sma)) and strong 
government based on the free market economy. The major ideas of the New Right were significantly influenced 
by Hayek's free market liberalism and Friedman's monetarist economics. In terms of educational policies, the 
governments emphasised competition and parental choice based on market prinCiples. 
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education system in which education was required to be a contributor to economic 
performanceJ8• By the same token, in the education of adults, vocational education and 
training (VET) were emphasised under the name of "continuing education", with a close link 
to employment policies and schemesl9• This means that continuing education was recognized 
as a means to tackle increasing unemployment or job transfer in the liberalized or flexible 
labour market. Therefore, it is not surprising that continuing education or an economic 
approach to lifelong education started to become popular when neo-liberal governments came 
to power in the USA and Britain. 
The initiative in the development of learning opportunities for adults passed from 
education to training, and from adult education to continuing education or lifelong education, 
in which work-related learning and the individual responsibility to learn become a plank of 
the governments' policies. Therefore, whilst employers started to raise their voices with 
regard to vocational education and training in the light of efficient human resource 
management, educationalists criticised the governments' policies because of their narrow 
approach based on the division between vocational and non-vocational education (Young 
1998). Still, in this phase, the school system was the main concern of education reform. In 
relation to the education of adults, policy-makers preferred the concepts of continuing 
education, or vocational education and training, to lifelong education, because they regarded 
lifelong education as economically unsustainable educational consumption rather than 
investment. 
18 See the US government report (1983) by the National Commission on Excellence in Education entitled A nation 
at risk: The imperative for educational reform with the alternative title of An open letter to the American 
people It ignited the powerful educational reform drive in the 1980s. Also, in the UK, after Thatcher came to 
power in 1979, the Conservatives implemented a range of educational policies and legislation to carry out their 
educational reform agenda. 
19 In fact, in the UK, the concept of continuing education became popular after two reports by the Advisory 
Council for Adult Continuing Education (ACACE) entitled Towards Continuing Education (1979) and 
Continuing Education: From policies to practice (1982). It was regarded as an alternative 'adult education', in 
the argument for a comprehensive and integrated system of continuing education for the whole post-
compulsory sector. But with the demise of ACACA in 1983, Manpower Service Commission (MSC) took over 
the initiative in education for adults, focusing on vocational education and training. For the development of the 
VET, the Technical and Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI) was designed and guided by MSC to provide 
skills with a view to employment. 
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11-2-3. Lifelong learning for economic development and social cohesion 
During the current phase (from the mid-1990s onwards), with the advent of 
globalisation and the information age, the concept of lifelong (or lifetime) learning has 
become a key issue in contemporary policies for education and training. A series of reports 
from international organisations have been influential during the time in which lifelong 
learning and the learning society have become major issues in governmental policy around 
the world. These include Learning: The Treasure within (UNESCO 1996), Lifelong Learning 
for All (GECD 1996), The Golden Riches in the Grass: Learningfor all (The Nordic Council 
of Ministers 1995) and Teaching and Learning: Towards the Learning Society (European 
Union White Paper; European Commission 1996). 
Compared to lifelong education, Tuijnman and BostrCSm point the characteristics of 
the concept of lifelong learning: lifelong learning pays more regard to the role of "non-formal 
learning in a variety settings"; it is "by definition a holistic, visionary, normative and value-
laden concept"; and it implies "a shift in responsibility not only from the state to the world of 
work and the civil sectors of society, but also form the state to the individuals" (Tuijnman 
and BostrCSm 2002: 102). 
Why has lifelong learning become a broad consensus in international discourse on 
education and training? It reflects major changes in the wider economic and social context in 
which education and training policies are shaped and implemented (GECD 1996:88). As the 
labour market has become flexible, the main responsibility for employment has moved from a 
government to individuals. Many governments also tend to emphasize the importance of 
lifelong learning in return for reducing social welfare benefits as well as deregulating the 
labour market. In this context, lifelong learning policies have increasingly stressed the issue 
of social cohesion as well as economic development. 
Therefore, lifelong learning is recognised as an investment and has become the key 
to linking education to employment. For example, in the UK, the recent promotion of lifelong 
learning is closely linked to the 'New Deal'. the ambitious labour market policy of the New 
53 
Labour. In this respect, discourses on lifelong learning are moving on from discussion about 
its vision and principles to discussion about strategies for responding to and integrating in 
practice the expanding and diverse learning needs and aspirations. 
First in the USA, and then in many other countries including the UK and Korea, 
governments have initiated the construction of the information super-highway which will be 
the infrastructure for the "information age". In addition, the Internet has already become a 
catalyst for the rise of the "network society" (Castells, 1996) based on informational 
technologies and communication, and for the paradigm shift in education and training from 
provider-oriented to leamer-centred learning. In other words, rapidly developing information 
and communication technologies (leT) seem to provide a crucial element which can 
transform education and training system as a prerequisite for the implementation of lifelong 
learning. 
However, as Ant argues, despite all good intentions for lifelong learning and the 
considerable investment in it with regard to vocational training policy by the European 
Commission, it is difficult to identify the systematic implementation of national lifelong 
learning policies, except a few countries (Ant 2000: 29-30). This means that despite the 
political rhetoric of lifelong learning, the scientific evaluation of its effects still remains 
uncertain. 
In addition, to investigate this phase of lifelong learning, especially on post-
compulsory (post-secondary) education and training, it is necessary to reflect the changing 
roles of the state, social partners and individuals in relation to lifelong learning in terms of 
globalisation and the information age. 
11-3. Lifelong learning, globalisation and the information age 
The OECD, which has vigorously promoted a strategy of 'recurrent education' 
since the late 19605, published a report in 1996 entitled Lifelong Learning for All, with the 
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explanation that the concept of recurrent education was gradually being replaced by that of 
lifelong learning (OEeD 1996: 88). This change from recurrent education to lifelong learning 
is important in relation to lifelong learning policies. The concept of lifelong learning is likely 
to emphasise the role of the individual as well as infonnal or work-based approaches to 
learning. These differences mainly derive from major changes in the wider economic and 
social context in response to globalisation. 
The report suggested that coherent strategies for lifelong learning must take three 
conditions into account. First, a lifelong learning system has to be based on a great variety of 
initiatives taken by different actors in many spheres of life and work. Second, the role of 
government in monitoring, steering and redistributing is required to make the available 
opportunities equitable, systematic, flexible and efficient. It is increasingly important to have 
good co-ordination among many policy sectors, involving macroeconomics and structural 
policies (ibid. p. 97). These strategies are seen as responses to the new context of 
globalisation and of an expanding social demand for lifelong learning. 
However, it can be pointed out that as policy makers and enterprises have 
committed themselves to addressing lifelong learning as a means of coping with economic 
globalisation since the 1980s, the focus of lifelong learning practice has moved from human 
development or democratic participation into economic growth and competitiveness. This is 
recently apparent in most government documents, which advocate policies to promote 
lifelong learning relatively focused on enterprise-based continuing vocational education and 
training, rather than other forms of education. Also, the notion of lifelong learning which 
stresses informal and independent learning, has been preferred to lifelong education, which 
generally seems to imply formal education. In this context, as much research shows, the more 
educated and those in professional and permanent jobs are the most likely to receive further 
training, and the least educated and those in low skilled and part-time or temporary jobs, the 
least likely (McGivney 1994). Therefore, it is not surprising that the necessity for advocates 
of lifelong learning to address issues of social cohesion is becoming recognised. 
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However, as the centrifugal forces of globalisation relentlessly disrupt and fragment 
societies, governments simply cannot afford to exempt education systems from their 
responsibilities for promoting social cohesion. There are no other public agencies left 
which can do it (Green 2002: 14) 
Whilst the OECD report stressed the role of lifelong learning in relation to 
economic development and competitiveness, the UNESCO report (1996), Learning: the 
Treasure Within, introduced a broader concept of the notion of lifelong learning. The 
UNESCO report puts greater emphasis on the following four pillars as the foundations of 
'learning throughout life': learning to know, learning to do, learning to live together, learning 
to be. In particular, the concept of 'learning to live together' is regarded as important in a 
context of worldwide interdependence and globalisation. 
In addition, in order to seek out educational synergies with regard to 'learning 
throughout life', the report points to the importance of a dynamic relationship between school 
or university and in- or non-formal educational organisations and voluntary bodies (UNESCO 
1996: 109). It implies that new partnerships between the state and the voluntary sector in 
relation to lifelong learning are increasingly required. In conclusion, the report suggests that 
'broadening the initial concept of lifelong education beyond the immediate requirements of 
retraining provides a response to the new and crucially important demand for active self-
reliance in a swiftly changing society' (ibid. pp. 109-110). This demand indicates the 
importance of active or democratic citizenship in the globalised world. 
As shown above, recently most national or international organisations related to 
education and training have identified globalisation as the major factor behind the demand 
for lifelong learning. In particular, governmental documents have stressed almost with one 
voice that the challenge of 'globalisation harnessed by information and communications 
technologies' is forcing them to upgrade education and training systems. In most 
industrialised countries, in the North as well as in the South, a distinctive issue in the reform 
of education and training is how to enhance national competitiveness in the context of the 
global economy. 
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However, the emphases are different depending on national institutions of 
education, training and the labour market. Therefore it is necessary to investigate how states 
stress competitiveness as a way of linking global competition, productivity and technology, 
as well as social cohesion as a way of linking social welfare and widening participation in 
learning. More important, democratic citizenship needs to be emphasized because an active 
civil society as well as the government, is required to take a role in governing as well as in 
adapting to globalisation 
Globalisation is becoming an increasingly influential concept applied to the 
understanding of the current transformation of economy and society. Therefore major debates 
in the social sciences and cultural studies have placed emphasis on globalisation with regard 
to the role of the state as well as economic and social change (Giddens 1991, 1994, 1998, 
1999; Reich 1991, 2001; Ohmae 1991, 1996; Robertson 1992, 1995; Beck 1992, 2000; 
Waters 1995; Hirst & Thompson 1996; Castells 1996, 1999; Green 1997; Stiglitz 2002). 
However, until now economic globalisation has been a contested phenomenon in terms of the 
impacts on society as well as of the move towards a global economy. 
Prophets of globalisation, such as Reich and Ohmae, even predict the end of 
national economies, and of the nation state as the primary unit of governance; they emphasise 
the advent of the world economy in which national borders no longer define economies. 
Other theorists, such as Hirst and Thomson, are more cautious, claiming that while there is 
evidence of increasing internationalisation in economic and political matters in some regions, 
the concept of globalisation is over-reliant on economic liberalism. 
However, whilst globalisation in movements of goods and services is not new or 
even recent, today's globalisation process seems to be fundamentally different in its 
specificity. For example, the speed and amount of capital flows using information and 
telecommunications technologies are increasing. As Castells argues, one of the distinctive 
characteristics of contemporary globalisation is that the deregulation of markets and new 
information technologies are in close interaction (Castells 1996: 85). In particular, as seen in 
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the experience of the recent south-east Asian financial crisis, the rapid global integration of 
financial markets driven by new information technologies has a very strong impact on "the 
growing disassociation of capital flows from national economies" (ibid. p. 85). 
Moreover, the wave of economic liberalisation, accelerated by the launch of the 
WTO (World Trade Organisation) system in 1995, makes the power of anyone state to 
control macro-economic systems weak. The OECD Report also points to the new wave of 
globalisation based on the three closely-related phenomena of "market deregulation, the 
advent and spread of new information technologies based on micro-electronics, and the 
globalization of financial markets" (OECD 1996: 29). As experienced in the recent financial 
crisis in Korea, rapid financial liberalisation without a transparent supervisory system may 
leave developing economies vulnerable to the speculative movements of capital. The negative 
effects of multi-national, capital-driven globalisation have given warning of the urgent 
necessity of reforming financial systems in developing countries. 
On the one hand, as stated above, it is mainly the new information and 
communications technology that makes current globalisation possible. Castells uses the 
concept of the "information technology paradigm" to pinpoint the essence of current 
technological transformation, in that this technology is in close interaction with the economy 
and society (Castells 1996: 61). He points to five characteristics of the new paradigm as the 
material foundation of the informational society: information as the new paradigm's raw 
material, the pervasive effects of new technologies, networking logic, flexibility, and the 
convergence of specific technologies into a highly integrated system (ibid. pp.61-62). For 
example, as firms are confronted with stronger competition from around the world, they must 
enhance their competitiveness through productivity growth. As a result, firms vie to adopt 
new technology and to restructure work organisations. 
Therefore the process of globalisation, accelerated by information and 
communications technology, feeds back into productivity growth made possible by the new 
technology and by organisational change which is based on networking logic and flexibility. 
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In this context, governments try to intervene in the economy in order to enhance national 
competitiveness. As a result, governments place emphasis not only on building a productive 
infrastructure, including an information highway as a way of supporting technological 
development in industries, but also on promoting lifelong learning as a way of investing in 
human capital, which becomes increasingly important in a knowledge-based economy. 
Clearly, the trends of globalisation have important implications for education and 
training. Particularly, the relationship between international competitiveness and education 
has recently become a major issue in policy and strategy on education and training (Green, A. 
and Steedman 1993; The Nordic Council of Ministers 1995; Ashton and Green, F. 1996; 
DECO 1996; Aldrich 1996; Avis et al. 1996; Green, A. 1997). The DECO Report (1996) 
points out that in the global economy, the balance of imports and exports will be closely 
linked to the skills of the labour force in producing marketable goods and services with high 
added value (DECO 1996: 29-30). This is reminiscent of Reich's concluding argument in The 
Work of Nations: 
All that will remain rooted within national borders are the people who comprise the 
nation. Each nation's primary assets will be its citizens' skills and insight (Reich 1991: 1). 
Green (1997) also points to the importance of skills formation as a major objective 
of education for governments both in the developing world and in the advanced nations: 
For the newly industrialising nations it[education] is seen as a condition of economic 
development. For the advanced nations it is seen as one of the principal means for 
maintaining high standards of living in the face of increasing global competition, 
particularly from the developing countries. (Green 1997: 181-2) 
In this context, while the current neo-liberal fashion for putting education on the 
market weakens governmental control over national systems in certain respects, this has not 
directly led to a denationalisation of education on a global level (ibid. p. 180). 
Furthermore, as one of the characteristics of the current global economy, rapid 
increases of international flows of goods, capital and labour result in a new international 
division of labour, and this threatens social cohesion. For example, as Castells argues, the 
59 
new division of labour is constructed around different positions20 in the informational and 
global economy, but these do not coincide with national economies because information 
technology enables economic agents to network across national borders (Castells 1996: 147). 
Positions in the division of labour mainly depend on the characteristics of labour and the 
technological infrastructure. In this context, the roles of governments and entrepreneurs are 
critical in that the international division of labour is mainly modified by them. Therefore, as 
economies become interdependent and open to the global economy, states are forced to foster 
developmental strategies which promote social cohesion as well as national competitiveness 
when they reform education and training systems. In particular, the issue of social cohesion 
becomes significant in relation to lifelong learning because of the dissolution of 
communities, the fragmentation of society, the weakening of habitual institutions such as 
families and churches, and the cultural diversity of lifestyles which is as a result of 
globalisation. This is why recently most governmental documents and the reports of 
international organisations such as the OECD (1996) and UNESCO (1996) place emphasis 
on the promotion of lifelong learning in relation to social cohesion. 
As global competition forces companies to harness new technologies to production, 
new skills are required, and the demands create a new learning paradigm. Education is 
becoming 'investment in human capital'. Therefore, the social partnership between the public 
and private sector, or between government, employers and workers, has been stressed in 
changes in the education and training structure. The need for the linkage between education 
and enterprise is reciprocal and greater than ever before. On the one hand, high value-added, 
flexible production systems demand high levels of generic skills which can be developed 
with knowledge and applied knowledge. On the other, the current curtailment in public 
expenditure is encouraging universities to solicit financial support from the private sector. In 
particular, as multi-national corporations try to reduce their taxes by playing countries off 
20 Castells distinguishes four different positions as follows: the producers of high value, based on informational 
labour; the producers of high volume, based on lower-cost labour; the producers of raw materials, based on 
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against each other to see who will give them the best concessions, tax regimes have been 
restructured in many countries, drastically reducing funding to universities. 
In addition, the impacts of globalisation on society have been enormously 
significant in political and cultural as well as economic contexts. Waters defines 
globalisation, in its full-blown fonn, as "a social process in which the constraints of 
geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become 
increasingly aware that they are receding" (Waters 1995: 3). Since the mid-1970s, many 
industrialised nations have tried to find a solution for economic development in the global 
market, setting the scene for intensified competition. This has also facilitated "time-space 
compression" (Giddens 1994: 7), meaning that national boundaries cannot constrain the 
movement of information and capital and nation states can no longer maintain an exclusive 
national culture. Increased flows of labour and the diffusion of culture are also important 
components of globalisation. The trends of mass tourism and international migration require 
valuing diversity (op.cit. p. 30), so language barriers and cultural differences have to be 
taken into account. Furthennore, a complex world characterised by cultural mixture and 
changing values, skills and competencies increasingly presents a major challenge to the 
commonly accepted identities of communities and families as well as to formal education as a 
socialising system. In an environment which is becoming ever more complex, varied and 
uncertain, a front-loaded education is not sufficient, and continuous learning to manage 
change is more and more necessary for adults. 
In conclusion, as education is becoming a potent means to raIse national 
competitiveness, social pressure for efficiency in the field of education and training is 
increasing. This causes substantial alterations in education systems and the learning process 
in relation to lifelong learning. First, the application of information and communication 
technologies to education facilitates in practice the possibility of moving towards a learning 
society. Second, global uncertainty and the weakening of the nation state's vital role in 
natural endowments; and the redundant producers, reduced to devalued labour (Castells 1996: 147). 
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supporting social cohesion may be accompanied by widening gaps between more developed 
and less developed countries, and between the rich and the poor in a society. Therefore one 
of the major policy issues that emerges is how education and training systems can be 
restructured to promote social cohesion, and to strengthen the democratic community (DEeD 
1996: 29). 
11-4. Five models of lifelong learning and a learning society 
The purposes, strategies and frameworks of lifelong learning are significantly 
different between countries, not least because the different ways of organising and funding 
lifelong learning are, to a large extent, evolved from their inherited education and training 
systems, as well as each system's specific relationship with the labour market (Hodgson 
2000:5). Therefore, to understand the different patterns of lifelong learning frameworks, it is 
necessary to investigate the inherited education and training system and each country's 
response to the changing labour market linked to globalisation and the information society. 
For the theoretical analysis of different lifelong learning frameworks, the 
discussions will be related to five models, using grid matrix methods. Lifelong learning 
policies can be classified by regulation and purposes, as shown in Figure II-I. In this 
research, the term "regulation" is defined as the "controlling of an activity or progress, 
usually by means of rules" (Ashton and Green 1996: 43)21. According to the extent of 
regulation, two dimensions are distinguished. On the one hand, a continuum between the 
state, social partnership, network and market models can be assumed with regard to the 
relationship between the state and civil society. On the other, a continuum between 
centralisation and decentralisation is assumed regarding state control. 
In the third dimension, according to "purposes", three social and economic 
development and nation-building aspects can be distinguished, on the assumption that 
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particularly in the developmental state, nation-building is regarded as pivotal for the 
legitimacy of the state in tenns of independence and sovereignty. 
Figure n-l. International comparison of lifelong learning policy 
PURPOSES 
SOCIAL ECONOMIC NATION 
BUILDING 
Centralised Singapore 
UNESCO Malaysia 
RREGUL STATE Japan22 Taiwan 
ATION Nordics S.Korea 
Decentralised V ~. 
PARTNERSHIP France ~ / 
Gennany 
NETWORK OECD 
UK(New Labour) 
........ 
MARKET (Quasi- UK(NeW'Rlght) Chile 
market) 
In this regard, the statist approach can be subdivided into two models. One is a 
welfare state model, which is based on high regulation combined with high participation of 
civil associations such as trade unions. The other is a developmental state model, which is 
based on high regulation combined with low participation. In other words, whilst the welfare 
state model is based on the relationship between a strong state and strong civil society, the 
developmental state model is based on the relationship between a strong state and weak civil 
21 They more broadly define regulation as the "process whereby individual or small-group actors are constrained 
by legal rules or social convention to follow certain actions" (Ashton and Green 1996: 43, notes 13). 
22 In Japan, the term lifelong learning has been regarded as non- or in-formal learning, focused on non-vocational 
adult education, which used to be called 'social education'. Whilst non-vocational adult learning has been 
mainly provided by the state, vocational adult learning, which is mainly on-the-job training has been delivered 
by employers. Therefore, lifelong learning policies have focused on non-vocational adult education which has 
been delivered by the state. 
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society. As a consequence, five models, namely the welfare state, social partnership, network, 
market and the developmental state models, can be identified. 
A decentralised state can be fit the social partnership model, since the state power 
is devolved to local government level in order to promote the role of firms and local 
education authorities in dealing with local labour market issues. The social partnership model 
is built on the role of social partners at the regional and sectoral level regarding standard-
setting and collective funding. By contrast, the network model stresses control at the 
institutional level. Whilst the social partnership model is based on an institutionalised system 
and is embedded in law, the network model can be based on a looser and voluntary 
relationship between the state and social organisations, as well as between social 
organisations. In particular, the network model can be freshly defined as a more flexible way 
of organising institutions on the basis of "co-operative competition" on the assumption that 
this model, using law and policy, promotes active co-operation between firms, education and 
training providers on the basis of competition (Crouch et al. 1999: 192). However, this is 
different from the market model, in that the network relations are based on "trust in each 
other and other institutions" and therefore they do not necessarily take "the form of market 
transactions; exchanges are diffuse, long term, possibly even uncalculated" (ibid. p. 164). 
More important, this model has been freshly re-discovered with the emphasis on rapid 
changes in which work organisation is moving from a Fordist towards a more flexible post-
Fordist model based on information technologies (ibid. pp. 198-206). 
This research is primarily interested in the post-compulsory (post-secondary) phase 
of lifelong learning excluding higher education. Therefore, the main concern of this chapter 
will be the challenges facing initial vocational training (NT), continuing vocational training 
(CVT) and adult education. The changing relationships between the education and training 
sYstem and the labour market will be examined in the context of globalisation and the 
information age. In particular, mechanisms through which the state, enterprises, trade unions 
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and other civil associations are related to each other will be analysed in terms of regulation 
focused on standard-setting and financing. 
11-4-1. The welfare state model 
In the post-compulsory (post-secondary) learning context, the first model (I) 
emphasises the role of the state in promoting a holistic approach to education. This model can 
be said to characterize an educational 'welfare society' and is mainly advocated by 
educationalists or social reformers who have proposed not only the expansion of learning 
opportunity as a key part of welfare services, but also lifelong learning as a cornerstone of the 
participatory democratic society. In this model, the responsibility of the state in the 
development of higher and further education systems is stressed. Therefore its approach to 
lifelong learning or a learning society seems to be idealistic or holistic, as shown by its 
implementation in the northern Europe countries (The Nordic Council of Ministers 1995). 
The Faure Report (1972) from UNESCO is the representative of this approach. 
The Nordic countries have been regarded as having one of the ideal types of adult 
education in the world23. The Nordic welfare state model has been characterised by the 
state's responsibility for social services, full employment policies and minimal income 
differences (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999). This model, which one might have called a 
Swedish model because Sweden has significantly influenced other Nordic countries, has 
some distinctive features in relation to lifelong learning24. 
First, compared to other models, the welfare state model, based on state-led 
regulation, has been more likely to ensure "equality of access" to education and training 
through "strategic oversight [of] the distribution of provision" (Green, A. et al. 1999: 20, 
Interim Report to CEDEFOP). Moreover, this model plays an important role in promoting 
23 Sweden was nominated as having the best adult education in the world by Newsweek in 1991. 
24 Denmark might be put into a category ofthe social partnership model rather than the welfare state mode\. 
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social justice based on citizen participation. In particular, popular education has contributed 
to the development of "basic democratic values in society", in that adults can develop their 
right to express their opinions and to participate in civic matters through the use of their right 
to learn throughout their life span (Abrahamsson 1995: 105). More important, it has been a 
substantial educational and social measure with which to avoid the risk of the social 
exclusion of the elderly and disadvantaged. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that adults in Sweden, Finland and Norway score in 
the top group in the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) (Tuijnman 2002: 175, see the 
Table). Tuijnman succinctly points to the characteristics of the Nordic model, explaining the 
reasons for the outstanding result for Sweden as follows. 
These include the historically important role played by the labour movement and the 
poplar education it actively promoted, the long-time commitment to social equality and 
the comprebensive scbools which were introduced all over the country in the early 1960s 
(ibid. pp.174-5) 
Second, adult education has been strongly regulated as an important element of 
welfare policy by the state because it has been regarded as valuable consumption in a better 
quality of life. Therefore, "equity" as open access to all kinds of adult learning, and citizen 
participation in democratisation, have been emphasised, particularly in the 1970s and the 
early of 1980s. Adult education has been free and has played a role in increasing "the ability 
of adults to understand, critically appraise and take part in cultural, social and political life" 
(Abrahams son 1995: 104). It has been provided by study circles2s, folk high schools, and 
municipal adult education centres. On the other hand, while personnel education or in-service 
training for employees has traditionally been organised in companies and regular educational 
institutions under the responsibility of employers, trade unions have played a role in 
25 Study circles have played a key role in promoting adult education in Sweden. They have "their roots in popular 
movements, another forum for civic participation, community actions and adult learning" (Abahamsson 1995: 
101-2). 
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promoting adult education and training at the work place through participation in decisions 
relating to in-service training. 
Third, centralised control over education and training system has been 
decentralised to promote "efficiency" since the 1990s, although the central government 
continues to play a crucial role through the central funding mechanism. Compared to other 
European countries, the level of unemployment in Sweden was very low for more than 
several decades, until the early 1990s, because of an active labour market policy (ALMP) 
based on the corporatist structures. The labour market board (Arbetsrnarknadsstyrelsen, 
AMS), "a tripartite, multilevel, and administrative (as well as policy-making) institution", has 
been the main instrument of ALMP (Crouch et al. 1999: 152). However, as the level of 
unemployment went up dramatically to around 7 per cent in the early 1990s, policy makers in 
Sweden have became sceptical about how far an active labour market policy reduces 
unemployment. In this context, AMS has been decentralised to "work closely with firms and 
educational authorities on local labour market issues" (Crouch et al. 1999: 155). At the same 
time, ALMP has been shifted to "respond to individual firms' needs" as the "rigidities in the 
system" have been acknowledged, particularly "outside the Fordist sector" (ibid. p. 155). 
Now, the significance of ALMP has changed. 
The aim of ALMP is to use public funds for the unemployed, not just passively to give 
them income support, but to provide them with skills training. temporary work 
experience, and career advice (Crouch et al. 1999: 155). 
Other Nordic countries such as Finland have also become more decentralized, 
moving towards local and institutional control (Green, A. 2000: 41). 
Fourth, with the emphasis of the labour market policy on "training for the 
competitive needs of the new flexible economy", adult education and training were 
underlined in the 1990s as a measure to counteract unemployment or to avoid the risk of 
social exclusion (Crouch et al. 1999: 153; Abrahamsson 1995: 107). Since the conservative 
liberal government came to office in 1991, it placed emphasis on youth and higher education 
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rather than adult education, as well as underlining the new role of municipal adult education 
"as a tool to counteract unemployment" (Abrahamsson 1995: 111). Since then, increasing 
public resources have been invested in vocational education and training to combat 
increasing levels of unemployment, and municipal adult education has started to play an 
important role in training for employment and work qualifications. The extra money was 
funded "within the framework of labour market policies" rather than through the education 
budget (ibid. p. Ill). This means that closer co-ordination between education and 
employment has been called for, and this change was a turning point in the evolution of 
lifelong learning in the mid-1990s. In this context, the concept of lifelong learning has been 
stressed in policy documents with regard to "flexibility and rapid adaptability" (Crouch et al. 
1999: 153). To widen access to adult education and training, money is available to assist 
both short-term and long-term studies. In addition, all gainfully employed persons are entitled 
by law to educational leave of absence. Those policies have played a role in training "adults 
for various duties, to contribute towards the transformation for working life and to help 
achieve full employment" (Abrahams son 1995: 104). 
Fifth, compared to the other models, another characteristic is the high level of state 
spending on adult education and training. Investments in education and training for adults as 
well as the young have been put high on the list of priorities for public policies, because they 
have been regarded as "integral components in the formation of the Swedish welfare model" 
(ibid. p. 117). This holistic approach to learning throughout the lifespan has been regarded as 
the characteristic of the Nordic model. 
However, since the 1990s, lifelong learning policies have been changing, as the 
driving force in implementing Swedish full employment policies has moved from "strong and 
bureaucratic state intervention" to close partnership with firms at the local level 
(Abrahamsson 1995: 118). The impacts of this change can be outlined as follows. As 
Abrahamsson argues, "collectively organized solutions backed up by overall organizationally 
pre-fabricated patterns" seem to be no longer workable (ibid. p. 118). Policies focus on 
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decentralisation to find a more individualised approach to adult learning rather than a 
systematic strategy of recurrent education. In this new context, the provision of adult learning 
is forced to meet individual needs for "competence up-grading", and at the same time "the 
issue of access and participation of adults with low prior education level[s]" becomes 
important (ibid. p. 119). 
11-4-2. The social partnership model 
The social partnership model, exemplified in Germany and France, is built on the 
foundations of a regulatory framework within which the social partners take part in 
promoting education and training through well-institutionalised systems. It is worth 
mentioning that the models overlap since social partnership is also part of the welfare state 
model. However, as Streeck argues, the social partnership model is mainly based on the idea 
that "the market finds it difficult to provide adequately for their[skills] formation but also the 
state" (Streeck 1989: 97-8). Moreover, he points to two major reasons for the market failure 
in skills formation: short-term pursuit of individual interests, and skills as a collective good26 • 
By contrast, a statist model is likely to cause inflexibility and 'problems of deadweight' 
(Green, A. et al. (CEDEFOP) 1999: 21). In relation to the limitation of the state, Streeck 
argues that state provision of industrial training cannot meet the demands of rapidly changing 
industries, and that, through regulation, enterprises should be places of learning as well as 
production (Streeck 1989: 98). In this context, the social partnership model seems to offer an 
alternative which overcomes the limitations of state bureaucracy as well as the market failure 
in relation to skills formation. This model can take the form of a 'state-led' social partnership 
(France) or a 'decentralised ' social partnership (Germany) according to the degree of 
centralisation. 
26 Streeck also argues that employer-led training under the market is likely to be narrow and job-specific, and 
cannot meet the "increasing need for unspecific, 'extra-functional' skills" which is increasingly recognised in 
highly capital-intensive or knowledge-intensive production (Streeck 1989: 97). 
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The German system is regarded as a typical example of a social partnership model 
in that the well-organised social partners play major roles in relation to skills formation at the 
intersection of industrial relations and economic policy. The social partners' organisations 
include trade unions and elected works councils on a workplace level as workers' 
representatives on the one hand, and employers' associations, trade associations on a sectoral 
basis and the Chambers, on a regional basis for business interests on the other. The German 
system has the following characteristics, which are mainly applied to apprenticeship. 
First, as Streeck argues, the German industrial training system can be well 
described as a form of "neo-corporatism". In particular, the system of apprenticeship is 
characterised by the combination of social partners' involvement in policy determination and 
practice with the devolution of the decision-making powers of the Federal Government to 
state and local governments and social partners. Since the Second World War, Germany has 
developed a distinctive form of "social market", in which the state sets the rules for 
regulation of the market to secure the interests of the social groups. In this context, "neo-
corporatism", which is based on "the mechanisms of consensus building" (Streeck 1987) and 
a solid foundation of "trust" (Fukuyama 1999), has become deeply rooted in a civil society. 
Secondly, the German "dual system", as the core of German neo-corporatism in 
human capital development, represents well-institutionalised vocational training, which is 
based on the combination of private initiative ("market") and public provision ("state") 
(Streeck 1987: 3). Apprentices attend a public vocational school to study general subjects and 
more theoretical occupational subjects for one or two days a week, and for the rest of a week 
they learn practical skills at the workplace. Moreover, on the basis of consensus principles 
organised social partners play the major part in the evaluation of vocational training policy as 
well as the determination of objectives, subjects and standards of training (ibid. p. 15). As 
approximately over sixty per cent of the age group go through this training programme, the 
dual system not only constitutes the core of social partnership with regard to vocational 
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training, but has become the cornerstone of high skill economy in Germany (DECD 1995). 
The duration of vocational training is, as a rule, three years (op.cit. p. 95). 
Thirdly, another characteristic of the German system is that IVT is treated as an 
educational activity and is closely linked with the school system (ibid. p. 12). Therefore, 
while the system sustains the close connection of vocational training to industrial practice, 
vocational training is provided within a safely established organisational structure and is 
comparatively unaffected by short-term economic needs and interests. For example, trade 
unions and employers' associations have by and large taken great care not to deal with 
industrial relations and vocational training issues separately because both regard training as a 
vital part of the infrastructure of a successful economy (ibid. p. 10). 
Fourthly, the qualification system, which is closely linked to the dual system, 
significantly contributes to the promotion of vocational training. As federal law requires 
qualifications for the practice of a wide range of occupations, young people are likely to 
participate in vocational training. Moreover, as vocational training and access to jobs are 
treated as important parts of sectoral agreements, employers generally tend to invest in 
training rather than poaching high-skilled workers. In addition, with regard to the labour 
market regulation in Germany, the sectoral determination of wages for jobs has been another 
important feature which promotes training. 
Fifthly, standard-setting has also been carried out through social partners. The 
federal Institute for Vocational Training (BiBB), which is made up of representatives of 
employers' associations (who prefer firm-specific skills), representatives of trade unions 
(who prefer the skills to be more general rather than firm-specific) and representatives of the 
state governments (who run vocational schooling, a component of the dual system of VET) 
draws up regulations regarding "training laws, standards, or curricula" (Gill and Dar 2000: 
492-496). In addition, the vocational training committees of the many Chambers, which are 
regulated by the relevant state ministers and responsible for the supervision of enterprise-
based training, include trade union representatives and teachers in vocational education in an 
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advisory role. These committees determine the suitability of member firms for training, 
monitor through training counsellors the quality of training, and penalise the member firms if 
necessary (ibid. p. 495). This mechanism plays a role in linking the skills provided by the 
VET system to the demands of the labour market (Culpepper 1999: 4-5). 
By contrast, the French system also has its own characteristics as another example 
of a social partnership model of further vocational training. The French VET system is 
distinctively divided into two stages, namely initial VET, which is a part of the state 
education system, and further VET, which is provided by a social partnership between 
government and associations of business and trade unions (Crouch et. al. 1999: 112-117). 
The specific characteristics of the French state-led social partnership in further VET can be 
described as follows. First of all, all employees are entitled to paid leave for vocational 
training, and all firms over a certain size are obliged to contribute to collective training funds 
through a levy system, under which a business must allocate 1.4 per cent of its payroll to 
training (DECD 1995: 273). In addition, agreements on training provision between peak 
organisations of business and labour, as well as training plans shared between local branch 
associations and local government, are regulated by law. At firm level, unions have been 
given the right to negotiate over training provision in the workplace. 
Compared to the German neo-corporatist model, French further VET has the 
following characteristics. First, compared to the German system, it is a state-led partnership 
model in that the state is the main funding source for initial vocational training, and statutory 
institutions take a key part in providing education and training. What makes the distinction 
between the German and the French system for further VET is that whilst Germany does not 
have a levy system except in construction, all French firms over a certain size are obliged to 
spend a certain amount of money on training (Streeck 1987: 57, Crouch et. al. 1999: 115). As 
a result, the system tends to promote an equitable distribution of training costs between 
companies, and is able to cope with the market failure which may be caused by externalities 
in training. 
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Secondly, in the French system, initial vocational training is provided mainly at a 
school base. Those who are training as apprentices after compulsory education are allowed to 
follow courses at vocational education centres (CFAs) by a special type of work contract. In 
addition, since the 1989 Orientation Act, adult training has become "an integral part of the 
schools' functions" (OECD 1995: 273). 
Thirdly, the government oversees the distribution of levied funds and sets standards 
with its national diplomas. For example, a baccalaureat professionnel. which gives the 
vocational education track the same formal status as the general education track, has "opened 
a new path for social promotion" in that it provides more opportunities for students from 
lower social classes to obtain higher qualifications (Prost 2000:29). Since the 1985 education 
refonn, this training track via Iycees professionnels leads to the award of professional 
baccalaureats, short higher education diplomas and even engineering diplomas (op.cit. p. 
273). The introduction of the new vocational baccalaureat contributes not only to the 
enhancement of the status of the vocational track, but also to the improvement of the 
competence of the workforce for the future (op.cit. p. 27). This change seems to be in line 
with the fact that since the late 1970s, vocational education has become one of the key 
concerns of educational policies and the agenda of vocational education reform has been 
linked to the issue oflifelong learning. 
As shown above, this model has developed in parallel with a democracy which is 
based on the involvement of trade unions. In addition, the two systems have their own 
characteristics, which originate from their different historical background. Whilst the German 
model is based on its "heritage of community bonds and corporatist regulation" between 
employers and trade unions (Streeck 1989: 92), in France, which has been regarded as a 
model of the "educator state" (Lelievre 2000), the state has directly intervened in education, 
and regulation has been imposed on social partners. 
However, this model also has some drawbacks (Green et al. (CEDEFOP) 1999: 
22). First, it could lead to labour market rigidity due to statutory regulations or sectoral 
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agreements, and is likely to be inflexible in rapidly changing economic conditions. Secondly, 
if labour market rigidity prevents companies from restructuring to meet the new economic 
challenge accelerated by globalisation and the information technology revolution, the model 
could lead to unemployment. Thirdly, a levy system could provoke resistance from 
employers. 
Streeck, also, points out that globalisation has become a serious challenge to the 
social partnership model, because it has been developed on the basis of social negotiation and 
co-determination as well as a facilitating state at national level (Streeck 1997: 252). He 
insists that economic globalisation results in "de-politicised, privati sed and market-driven 
forms of economic order" as it destroys the conditions for "market-modifying and market-
correcting political intervention in the economy" (ibid. p. 255-6). From this perspective, the 
German vocational training system, in particular, based on the dual system, has been 
challenged in order to cope with the dramatically changing economic environment of the last 
two decades. In addition, significant changes to adapt to new situations have taken place in 
the dual system. These changes are 
the older average age but improved basic qualifications of trainees, --- more years of 
general education prior to entering apprenticeships; the ongoing consolidation of 
apprenticeships in many sectors to create fewer, broader courses that avoid overly 
narrow, early specialization; the addition of new apprenticeships in the expanding sectors 
. of the economy: services and high technology; the increased combination of 
apprenticeships and higher education, --- ; and, an expansion of alternative education 
routes .. - that will continue to erode apprenticeship's monopoly position in the provision 
of initial vocational and technical skills (Finegold 1999a: 404-5). 
11-4-3. The network model 
The third model emphasises the importance of networks in promoting lifelong 
learning. Networks are normally regarded as "informal", they "work through norms of 
reciprocity and community exchange" (Crouch et al.1999: 164). Briefly speaking, networks 
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work on the basis of "trust" and "informal co-operation", particularly at the local level (ibid. 
p. 164). In other words, as Crouch explains, network relations are deemed not to work on the 
market principle, but to be "embedded in a social structure" which promotes co-operative 
relations and trust. As a consequence, with regard to education and training, the network 
model may be an alternative to the social partnership model in that it is more flexible and 
responsive to learners' (or firms') needs without losing some of the characteristics of 
"collectivist and non-state" (ibid. p. 168). 
In this regard, the network model can be defined as a way of organising lifelong 
learning on the basis of informal co-operation and trust between education and training 
providers, enterprises and other relevant organisations, including local government, local 
trade unions, non-governmental (or voluntary) organisations and political parties. For 
instance, co-operative enterprise networks can provide employees with training as a 
collective goods, with more flexibility than regulated systems. 
Potentially networks share some of the collectivist and non-state qualities of corporatist 
associations, while possessing more flexibility and proximity to firms' needs (ibid. 
p.168). 
As Crouch argues, this flexibility might contribute to resolving the problems of 
structural rigidity, which have recently arisen with skill creation in the corporatist model. 
However, he also points out that compared to the corporatist model, the difficulties of the 
"transition to institutionalized trust" might limit the size and scope of training by networks as 
well as of other co-operative projects (ibid. p. 168). In other words, narrow relations based on 
interpersonal trust might restrict the scale of skill creation in networks, because these tend to 
be limited to the same parts of firms and their supply chains. Therefore, as seen in the case of 
the Training and Enterprise Council (TEC) in the UK, networks can be patchy and exclusive, 
excluding other parts of firms and trade unions. 
[N]etworks usually have a geographically precise and small location, though some 
exceptions to this might found (for example, in specialized professional networks) if 
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sufficient steps are taken to sustain frequent electronic and other fonDS of communication 
(Crouch et al. 1999: 164). 
In this regard, the move towards an "informational society,,27 (Castells 1996: 21) 
may be valuable in resolving some of the limitations, in that it tends to focus on wide access 
to education and training through horizontal networking based on the 'information 
technology revolution'. Therefore, networks can be freshly defined as 
open structures, able to expand without limits, integrating new nodes as long as they are 
able to communicate within the network, namely as long as they share the same 
communication codes (ibid. p. 470). 
As Castells argues, the framework of relationships between networks, including 
interoperating codes and switches, plays a major role in shaping the social structure (ibid. 
p.471). Therefore the architecture of an inclusive network system becomes pivotal in 
promoting lifelong learning. A lifelong learning framework based on networking logic can be 
highly dynamic as wel1 as interconnected. 
In this informational network model, however, whilst access to higher and 
continuing education could be limitless, the real opportunities might be allowed primarily to 
those who are already well educated or from advantaged backgrounds. This means that in the 
network model, lifelong learning tends to depend in practice on levels of social capital. By 
the same token, the main responsibility for lifelong learning is likely to be left to individual 
commitment and firms' interests. In addition, politicians and enterprises have strongly 
advocated lifelong learning with the advent of the information age. As a consequence, the 
initiative in the development of new learning networks has passed from educationalists to 
politicians and employers who are more interested in economic competitiveness. 
The New Labour government in Britain seems to be trying to move in this direction 
under the name of social partnership as the Third Way. The partnership, however, is still 
27 Castells distinguishes between the concepts of "information society" and "informational society". According to 
his explanation, whilst the term 'information society' emphasises the role of information in society, the term 
'informational' indicates the attribute of a specific form of social organisation in which information generation, 
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mainly based on non-institutionalised and non-statutory networks, in other words, those in 
which voluntary cooperation and trust are regarded as the key feature rather than legislation. 
But the government partly centralises power in strategic areas through funding systems, in 
order to enhance "standard-setting, monitoring and steerage" (Green 2000: 36). 
For example, the Labour government's White Paper, entitled Learning to Succeed: 
a new framework for post-J 6 learning (DfEE 1999) proposed the establishment of a Learning 
and Skills Council (LSC) and 47 local councils, to promote planning collaboration between 
employers, programme providers and community groups. With the establishment of these 
bodies, post-16 education and training, excluding higher education, seems to move from a 
network model based on voluntary partnership in a more state-driven direction dominated by 
employers. In addition, if they are scrutinised more carefully, compared to the German model 
of social partnership, the proposals stress creating "voluntary co-operation" between 
education and training providers and social partners at the local and regional level (ibid. 
pp.239-242). More important, as the Labour government has emphasised the concept of 
"effective co-operation" in its documents, including the White Paper (1999: 21), Learning to 
Succeed, the concept of the partnership seems to mean co-operative competition to increase 
effectiveness rather than the recovery of the past tripartite system. 
This means that in developing a network-based learning society the role of the state 
as the strategic co-ordinator or the main investor in the infrastructure is stilI crucially 
required. Moreover, through its key role, the influence of the state has expanded into 
informal learning, which has previously been left to the voluntary sector, through evaluation, 
qualifications, recognition. 
processing, and transmission become the fundamental sources of productivity and power, because of new 
technological conditions emerging in this historical period (see Castells 1996: 2 I) 
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11-4-4. The market model 
The fourth model is driven by market principles, and education itself becomes a 
commodity. In this model, 'customisation of education' is prevalent and participation in 
learning is mainly decided by the leamer's choice and the purchasing power of economic 
interests. In addition, the role of the state is strictly restricted to making market principles 
work. Therefore the division between those from comparatively advantaged backgrounds and 
those from disadvantaged backgrounds is deepened; everybody is forced to continuously 
compete with each other to obtain better qualifications which guarantee a more stable and 
profitable position than that of others. The "New Right" governments in Britain and the USA 
during the 1980s advocated this direction under the pretext of promoting economic revival. 
This model tends to be an attractive approach for policy makers who confront serious 
economic depression and budget pressure, but when the crisis or special circumstances are 
overcome it is difficult to prolong this approach in the long term, because social cohesion 
will be seriously threatened. More important, given the fact that education has been a battle 
field where politicians not only seek public support for election, but try keep a lever for 
promoting economic policies, particularly by linking education and training to employment 
policies, it is difficult to find governments which base education and training completely on 
market principles. 
Therefore, it is worth noting that as seen in the case of the New Right governments 
in Britain, a "quasi-market model" has developed as an alternative to the welfare state model 
in public sectors such as education in Europe (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993). The quasi-market 
model is distinctive from the market model in that whilst education is considered to be left to 
the market principle, state regulation is also regarded as an important element to promote 
competition based on that principle. The quasi-market model lacks a price mechanism 
because the price is fixed by the government. It is also characterised by quasi-monopoly 
provision because providers are determined by the government and there is no competition. 
In other words, it tends to "steer at a distance", particularly with a funding system linked to 
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evaluation (Power and Whitty 2000: 537). As Green points out, this model has been a 
dominant form in the UK and the Netherlands, and its influence has spread through northern 
and central Europe. Its main characteristics are as follows, although they are also divergent, 
depending on national education systems: 
School choice, local school management, institutional competition, perfonnance-related 
funding, regulation by contract, funding regime and market relations, flexible and loosely 
regulated labour markets, and voluntarist training regimes (Green, Wolf and Leney 1999; 
Green 2000: 41). 
This market model relies heavily on information. Compared with other models, 
issues of inequality, under-investment and resource waste are more likely to arise. 
11-4-5. The developmental state model 
The fifth model can be applied to new nation-states in which nation-building is the 
primary purpose of education and training policies and economic development is the main 
means of nation-building. Developmental skills fonnation needs to be understood from a 
perspective of state formation. 
The "detennination of a nation" in East Asia did not reside primarily in the economic but 
in the political sphere, with economic growth often viewed as indispensable for military 
security. (Woo-Cummings 1998: 322) 
Economic development has been regarded as not a national goal but a major means for the 
goal, national security. 
As Castells argues, the rise of the East Asian developmental state was closely 
linked to a 'nationalist project' for survival and sovereignty. Therefore, the developmental 
state could develop on the basis of "double-edged, relative autonomy". Relative autonomy 
vis-a-vis the global economy contributed to making the country's firms competitive in the 
international realm, but to controlling trade and financial flows. Relative autonomy vis-a-vis 
society was strengthened by repressing or limiting democracy, and building legitimacy on the 
improvement of living standards rather than on citizen participation. These two 
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characteristics are very important to understand the benefits and drawbacks of the 
developmental state in a balanced perspective. 
The defining features of the developmental state model are as follows. First, the 
distinctive feature is state-driven economic development in the late industrialisers. This is 
mainly based on manpower planning and the regulation of the demand for and supply of 
skills, whilst other models, particularly the network models, tend not to intervene in demand. 
Compared to other models, including the welfare state and the partnership model, the state 
takes a leading role and dominates weak civil society. 
Secondly, this model places emphasis on socialisation through civic and moral 
education as a way of nation-building. In line with this perspective, skills formation has been 
understood on the basis of 'state formation,28. Skills formation as a part of state formation in 
the context of 'situational nationalism' (Johnson 1982) can be observed in post-Napoleonic 
Prussia, which might be regarded as the first developmental state (Green 1990; Marquand 
1988). In addition, this model was used in the case of the Meiji Reform in Japan. In relation 
to state formation, skills formation was parallel with citizen formation, which was mainly 
focused on 'loyalty to the nation-state' and 'compliance with social order'. 
Thirdly, another distinction of this model is rapid growth in formal education. 
There is no doubt that cheap and well-disciplined manpower was a major factor in rapid 
economic growth in East Asian developmental states. The abundant workforce was a major 
contributor to the initial economic take-off, and demand for education has expanded as a 
result of economic development. In particular, vocational education and training has been 
strongly defined by the economic demands of industry. 
Finally, in this model 'zeal for education' is significantly linked to aspirations 
generated by economic growth. With regard to the zeal for education in East Asia, it needs to 
be emphasised that most people have so far experienced the importance of education in 
28 In relation to state fonnation in terms of education, see Education and State Formation (Green, A. 1990). 
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relation to changes in social status. In other words, they are convinced that education pays for 
its costs, and it has been regarded as one of the most safe and profitable investments. 
In the next chapter, the developmental state model will be investigated in more 
detail. 
11-5. Conclusion 
This chapter explored how the purposes of lifelong learning had changed from a 
humanistic approach to an economic approach in response to globalisation. It pointed out that 
with the commitment of policy makers to addressing lifelong learning as a means of coping 
with economic liberalisation since the 1980s, the focus of lifelong learning policies has 
moved from democratic participation into economic development. In particular, the 
deregulation and increasing flexibility of the labour market have been driving forces in 
promoting an economic approach to lifelong learning. 
However, countries' strategies and frameworks for lifelong learning are 
significantly different because they have different modes of regulation which have, to a large 
extent, evolved from their inherited education, training and labour market systems. Therefore, 
to understand the different patterns of frameworks for lifelong learning, five models of 
lifelong learning were compared how 'modes of regulation' are different and how each 
country differently responds to the changing labour market. The differences can be identified, 
as shown in Figure 11-2. 
81 
Figure ll-2. Comparison of five models in funding and standard-setting 
Funding Standard-setting 
Welfare state model State (holistic) State with labour 
participation 
France Collective (levy) State-led social participation 
Social partnership model 
Regulated cost sharing Social Partnership 
Germany 
Network model Voluntary cost sharing Regulated Voluntary 
Awarding Body 
Market model Individual Provider 
Developmental state model State (selective) State without labour 
participation 
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Chapter III: Education and State Formation in Developmental States 
III-I. Introduction 
This chapter examines the role of the developmental state in East Asia and 
discusses two approaches to developmental skills formation. The human capital approach is 
criticized, and developmental skills formation is explained on the basis of the developmental 
state approach. Developmental skills formation is also critically discussed in relation to state 
formation and industrialization in East Asian countries. 
The theory of social capital is examined, to argue against the human capital 
approach, and to contribute to the theory of developmental skills formation. 
III-2. The role of developmental states in education and training 
In the discussion on the role of the state in promoting economic growth in East 
Asian countries such as Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea, two different 
perspectives have competed. The World Bank Report (1993), The East Asian Miracle, 
categorised them as the "neoclassical view" and the "revisionist view". The neoclassical 
view, which is represented by the World Bank's perspective on the relation between 
education and training and economic growth, attributes successful Asian economies to 
market-friendly economic policies which admit very limited government intervention. The 
World Bank Report (1993) points out that in the neoclassical view limited government 
intervention is allowed 
to ensure adequate investments in people, provide a competitive climate for private 
enterprise, keep the economy open to international trade, and maintain a stable macro 
economy (World Bank 1993: 10). 
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However, any other government interventions, which are not market oriented, are 
regarded as leading to "more harm than good", because this view is not likely to admit market 
failures beyond these areas (ibid. pp. 9-10). For example, the Report stresses the importance 
of investment in education, particularly primary and secondary education, as a locomotive in 
promoting the rapid economic growth of the High Performing Asian Economies (HAPEs). 
However, it points to the limited role of governments with regard to the efficiency of training, 
and to the performance of labour markets in the delivery of training. Therefore this approach, 
in explaining the rapid growth of the East Asian economies, admits the need of state 
intervention only in the rare instances where it rectifies market failure. 
By contrast, the revisionist view points out that governments have played important 
roles in the rapid development of Asian economies by leading the market rather than 
supplementing it. The view insists that government interventions have been driving forces in 
industrial development by altering the economic incentive structure to remedy markets 
failures, which consistently prevent economies from investing in industries that would boost 
the rapid growth of the national economy. Many proponents of this view have provided 
significant evidence through their studies on the role of developmental states in East Asian 
countries. As a result, the revisionist perspective provides 
valuable insights into the history, role, and extent of East Asian interventions, 
demonstrating convincingly the scope of government actions to promote industrial 
development in Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, China (World Bank 1993: 9). 
However, the revisionists tend to overemphasise the benefits of the interventionist 
industrial policy and downplay its drawbacks. 
Similarly, Ashton et al. (1999) contrast the neoclassical approach with statist 
approaches. They argue that the neoclassical approach, which emphasises the importance of 
human capitaf9, regards the market as the most efficient mechanism through which to co-
ordinate the factors of production. In addition, this approach tries to minimise the role of 
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government within the boundary of 'market failure' or labour market imperfections (Ashton 
et al. 1999: 12). In contrast, the statist approach stresses the role of the 'developmental state' 
as a key factor in initiating and steering the process of industrialisation. 
In line with the developmental state approach, much research has been carried out 
to understand the relationship between education and training and rapid economic growth in 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong (Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 
1990; Castells 1992; Ashton and Green, F. 1996, Ashton et al. 1999; Green, A. 1999a, 200 I). 
Within the 'developmental state' theory, two different perspectives can be explored in 
relation to education and training. One perspective stresses the role of the developmental 
state in relation to nation-building rather than to economic purposes. As one of the leading 
proponents of this perspective, Castells stresses this role as a means of realising 'a nationalist 
project of self-affirmation of cultural and political identity in the world system' (1992: 58). 
From this perspective, the nature of the developmental state has begun to be understood in 
the broader perspective in which the developmental state has interacted with the economy 
and society in the name of nation-building. This perspective has contributed to a broadening 
of the understanding of the developmental state. 
In line with this perspective, Green, A., who has theorised the relations between 
education system and state formation, points to the characteristics of developmental skills 
formation in Singapore. 
The education system has also been a very effective instrument of socialization, not only 
in helping to nurture the development process, but also more generally in imparting social 
attitudes deemed necessary to create a cohesive society with hard-working and 
disciplined labour (Green 2001: 99). 
He relates the emphasis on values and moral education in school to economic 
growth, arguing it has contributed not only to the promotion of political stability, but to the 
creation of a hard-working and disciplined labour force. In this perspective, roughly 
29 With regard to human capital theory, it will be discussed with the developmental state theory in more detail in 
the next section. 
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speaking, until authoritarian governments were seriously challenged with the collapse of the 
Cold War system in the mid-1980s, the relationship between education and economic growth 
in developmental states needs to be understood in terms of "state formation" (Green 1999a) 
rather than narrow skills formation. In addition, from his point of view, the rapidly increased 
demand for education, is also related to cultural factors, including traditional legacies and the 
changed social situation, as well as to economic growth. As a consequence, the role of the 
developmental state has begun to be analysed as in close interaction with civil society. 
The other perspective mainly focuses on rapid economic development in explaining 
the role of the developmental state. Economists tend to prefer this perspective in that their 
main concerns have been to investigate the distinctive characteristics of the rapid economic 
growth of "late industrialisers" (Amsden 1989) in East Asia. They place emphasis on the 
advantage of the developmental state in that the relative autonomy of the state from vested 
interests makes the regulation of skill demand and supply as well as manpower planning 
possible. Ashton et al. have developed this perspective into 'developmental skill formation' 
theory based on an analysis of the mechanisms of skills formation through the linkage of 
education, training, economic growth and wider labour-market policy issues in the above four 
East Asian countries (Ashton et al. 1999). Their approaches to developmental skills 
formation are based on the extension of their own theoretical framework for skills formation 
(Ashton and Green, F. 1996). 
In this respect, the role of developmental states in education and training is too 
focused on economic purposes, without sufficient consideration of political and social 
purposes. As a consequence, the nature of the developmental state tends to be understood in 
the narrow perspective of economic growth. More important, the role of authoritarian 
regimes could be exaggerated, in that economists tended to assume that 'the state can be an 
internally cohesive unitary actor and can sustain its autonomy from civil society' (Ashton et 
al. 1999: 18). These two different perspectives on developmental states will be discussed in 
more detail in the next section. 
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1II-3. Two approaches to East Asian skills formation 
As education and training have been recognised as important factors in economic 
development in the globalised economic context, the concept of skills formation has been 
important for employers and policy makers as well as educationalists. Therefore the reform 
of education and training system has become a key issue for policy in terms of 'economic 
competitiveness', since successful economies rely on "high-tech" industries and well-
qualified workforces to cope with global competition (Reich 1991; Barber 1996; Ashton and 
Green, F. 1996; Green, A. 1997; Brown 1999). In particular, with the advent ofa 'knowledge 
society' or an 'information society' based on the rapid development of information and 
communications technologies, the continuing development of human resources and changes 
in learning culture have become important for policy makers. 
To investigate the changing role of the state in moving towards a high skills 
economy In developmental states, this chapter will critically examine two theoretical 
approaches to East Asian skills formation models, which are based on two theories of 
'human capital' and the 'developmental state'. These have contributed to the understanding 
of the relationship between education and training and rapid economic growth in Asian NIEs 
(Newly Industrialising Economies). 
111-3-1. The human capital approach 
As explained above, human capital theory, which has been stressed in the neo-
classical approach, tends to regard the market system as the most efficient mechanism for 
promoting skills formation3o• The main founders of human capital theory, such as Schultz and 
Becker, argue that human capital formation is mainly carried out by individual choices based 
on the rational calculation of costs and benefits (Blaug 1992: 209). Human capital theory has 
30 Brown, P. defines skills fonnation in the broad meaning as "the development of the social capacity for learning, 
innovation and productivity" (1999: 235). 
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been built on the works of Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964) in the 1960s. Their theory 
developed Adam Smith's idea that investment in education helps to increase the productivity 
of workers (Schuller and Field 1998: 227). As Baker points out, the main assumption of 
human capital theory is that 
schooling raises earnings and productivity mainly by providing knowledge, skills, and a 
way of analyzing problems (Becker 1993: 19). 
In the case of Baker, the theory also treats the influence of on-the-job training or 
families on the knowledge, skills and attitudes as an important factor in human capital 
formation. As Blaug points out,. it is the "genuine novelty" of human capital theory that 
expenditures on such social services as education and health care are treated as investment 
for the sake of future pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns rather than as consumption and 
only for the sake of present enjoyment (Blaug 1992: 207). It was very difficult to imagine 
until the 1960s that expenditures on education and training could be regarded as similar to 
investment and physical capital, and that there were "common analytical grounds between 
labour economics and the economics of the social services" (ibid. p. 207). In this respect, 
Coleman points out that human capital theory is based on the assumption that 
the concept of physical capital as embodied in tools, machines, and other productive 
equipment can be extended to include human capital as well (Coleman 1997: 83). 
The basic premises of the theory are that human beings invest in education and 
training in order to increase their lifetime incomes and other benefits, and that their choices 
of investment in learning are decided on the basis of market rationality. Rapid educational 
growth is attributed primarily to the economic demand for skills. In addition, economic 
development enables income growth, which enables individuals to pay for their learning and 
for new job opportunities, which increase the demand for skills. Eventually, economic 
development is a prerequisite for educational growth. In particular, economic research based 
on the theory has emphasised the 'rate of return' on the basis of cost-benefit analysis by the 
individual, as a criterion for agents to making decisions on investment in learning. Human 
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capital analysis, the measurement of human capital is mainly based on the duration of 
education or work for qualifications in terms of inputs, and on individual income or 
productivity levels as outputs. In this regard, it stresses the "individual agent", as well as 
assuming "economic rationality, and transparency of information" (ibid. p. 230). 
In this approach, therefore, state intervention is admitted only in the case of market 
failure3]. Based on this perspective, the World Bank report (1993) admits government action 
is needed only where there are failures in the market, including the information available to 
parents (Ashton et al. 1999: 10). 
However, human capital theory still raIses controversial issues with regard to 
methodologies and ideas. First, one of the biggest problems is that the assumption that higher 
productivity can be measured by return to skills in terms of monies ignores the screening 
aspect of skills. The main assumption, that education and training raise the productivity of 
workers and increase their lifetime incomes, has been challenged by the 'screening 
hypothesis'. Its point is that employers' preference for educated workers mainly reflects the 
fact that employers are likely to 
treat educational qualifications as a screening device to distinguish new workers in terms 
of ability, achievement motivation, and possibly family origins, that is in terms of 
personality traits rather than cognitive skills; cognitive skills are largely acquired by on-
the-job training and employers are, therefore, fundamentally concerned with selecting job 
applicants in terms of their trainability (Blaug 1992: 213-4). 
The screening hypothesis can be stated as 'strong' hypothesis, that denies the direct 
effect of education on productivity and the 'weak' screening hypothesis, that qualifications 
affect the selecting of employees (Woodhall 1997). The 'weak' screening hypothesis is 
undoubtedly more true than the 'strong' screening hypothesis, in that while it is certain that 
employers use qualifications as a screening device in initial job selection, it is, however, 
difficult to deny that employers continue to prefer well educated employees, and pay them 
more than less educated employees throughout their working lives (Dore 1997: xxvii; 
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Woodhall 1997). As Woodhall points out, the screening hypothesis has contributed to 
focusing "attention on the precise way in which education or other forms of investment in 
human capital influence productivity" and reminding as "that education does far more than 
impart knowledge and skills" (Woodhall 1997: 222). 
Secondly, some critics have questioned the mechanism by which human capital 
impacts on productivity or earnings. The theory is criticised because it focuses on individuals 
without seriously taking account of "the wider social context within which much learning 
takes place" (Schuller and Field 1998: 227). In this respect, Bowls, S. and Gintis, H. 
criticised the assumptions about individual choice in human capital theory (Bowles and 
Gintis 1975). As they argued, schooling develops the consciousness and attitudes which 
enable the labour force successfully to be accustomed to discipline such as 'punctuality, 
conformity and respect of hierarchies', as well as teaching knowledge and skills. In addition, 
they argued that the economic return to schooling is mainly related to the need of capitalists 
to legitimate their authorities over workers. However, their position was different from that 
of the screening hypothesis in that they did not limit the role of the school system to 
screening or labelling and admitted that "schooling enhances worker productivity" (ibid. 
p.75). They chose to focus on understanding the social mechanism through which workers' 
productivity is affected by schooling, and on explaining the "social relations of the 
educational process" (ibid. p. 75). Their critique indicates another fundamental problem of 
human capital theory in that its superficial understanding of the role of school system is 
criticised for its neglect of the social relations of production. Therefore, human capital 
formation must comprise social relations and culture, which affect personal attributes as well 
as knowledge and skills. It should be recognized that such mechanisms affect workers' 
productivity in complex ways. Otherwise, human capital theory underplays socialisation. It is 
very difficult to understand why formal education systems, particularly in developmental 
31 Particularly, the effect of 'externalities' in education and training, by which individuals and enterprises can 
benefit from free ride, is explained with regard to the characteristic of 'public goods' 
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states, have been recognised as the main means to promote hard work and respect for 
authority and hierarchies through the strong stress on moral and social education 
The economic value of the socialisation function of education, as intemalising 
favourable social attitudes, has been recognized by some human capital theorists, like Becker 
(1993) and Blaug (1992). Therefore, the role of education in socialisation seems to be no less 
important than its role in conveying knowledge and skills. More important, the emphasis on 
social education and values in schools has been recognised as the main source of discipline 
and social cohesion in East Asian countries. Green, A. argues that the stress on social 
discipline and cooperative attitudes in schools has crucially contributed to economic growth 
in East Asian economies in at least four ways, including the promotion of political stability 
and social order, the creation of a hard-working and disciplined labour force, the success of 
team work and instilling of national values (Green 1999a: 265). 
Thirdly, in addition to the above methodological criticisms, this approach seems to 
have critical limitations, not only in explaining rapid educational growth before economic 
development, but also, in understanding the role of the state in recently developed countries. 
For example, it is evident that the rapid universalization of primary education from liberation 
in 1945 to the 1950s was to meet the "enonnous educational demand of Korean people" 
rather than economic demand (Kim, Y.H. 2000: 98). In other words, the rapid expansion of 
primary education and rapid decline of adult illiterate rates was possible because of the 
combination of the popular education movement for nation-building with people's 
enthusiasm for education. Education was recognised as a main instrument to enhance social 
status as the ruling class was eliminated during the colonial period. More important, the rapid 
expansion of public education for school-age children can be better understood as a part of 
'nation building', in that the state of south Korea needed to foster a new morality and 
national ethics as a newly liberated state which had to confront an antagonistic north Korea. 
In particular, as the state instilled anti-communism, social discipline and the 'you can do' 
ideology were given priority in school education as a means to go against North Korea. 
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In addition, as David Ashton and Francis Green (1999) point out, this approach 
seems to have limitations for understanding the role of the state in education and training in 
NIEs. First, it does little to address the strong state investment in education and training when 
the NIEs were moving towards a high value-added from a low value-added economy. 
Specifically, it does not account for the state's use of high skills routes to drive up the 
demand for skills. Second, it disregards the role of the state in influencing the character of the 
labour market as well as the supply and demand for skills. 
Finally, this approach has critical limitations for describing the role of the family in 
promoting education, because it focuses on individual decisions. It is worth pointing out that 
it has been the family, including parents and relatives, that has supported the study expenses 
of school study, while governments have invested less in education. For example, the total 
amount of private lesson fees has outweighed the school education budget since the mid-
1990s in South Korea. More important, compared to Western countries, the percentage of 
mature students is still very small at the university level, because a family is only likely to 
support study until graduation from university. It was the investment by the family in 
education that made the rapid expansion of education possible on less than 5 percent of GNP 
in East Asian education systems. Therefore, when students make their decisions about going 
to university and which subject to study at the university, the influence of their family is huge 
compared to Western countries. 
111-3-2. The developmental state approach 
By comparison, the developmental state theory emphasises state intervention as the 
main factor in promoting skills formation and economic growth. As shown above, the theory 
stresses the role of the state as a driving force in the pursuit of national goals. Briefly 
speaking, the theory can be divided into the political economy approach (Johnson 1982; 
Amsden 1989; Ashton et al. 1999) and the historical-structural approach (Castells 1992; 
Green, A. 1999a) according to the emphasis or purpose of the developmental state. Whilst the 
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political economy approach is likely to stress economic growth as the goal of the 
developmental state32 , the historical-structural approach emphasises nation-building as the 
purpose of the state's societal project. 
It was Johnson's book entitled MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The growth of 
industrial policy. 1925-75 that theorised the concept of the developmental state in the 
framework of the political economy approach. Johnson argued that the developmental state 
was born out of the "situational nationalism of the late industrializers" (Johnson 1982: 24). In 
his explanation, the state, as a late industrialiser, strongly drove industrialisation on the basis 
of national goals rather than market rationalism. Therefore, other economic interests were 
subjected to the political objectives of rapid industrialisation through the developmental state 
(ibid. p. 24). In addition, in the 'plan-rational' system, it is the degree of national consensus 
on the overarching goals such as rapid economic growth that the success of the system 
depends on. Therefore the state drives 'consensus building' through the education system. 
More important, as Johnson argues, whilst the plan-rational system has weakness in dealing 
with unexpected or unfamiliar problems, compared to the market-rational system, it has great 
strength in dealing with routine problems (ibid. p. 22). In goal-oriented strategic actions, 
effectiveness is a more important evaluative standard than efficiency, which is the most 
important one in market rationalism (ibid. p. 21). 
By contrast, Castells deepens the theory by advocating a historical-structural 
approach to development, which stresses the role of the developmental state with regard to 
nation-building rather than to an economic purpose. In other words, in his explanation, 
"economic development is not a goal but a means" (Caste lIs 1992: 57). This perspective has 
contributed to the broad understanding of the state's role in instigating the rapid economic 
growth in Asian NIEs, including Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Unlike 
most economists, Castells tries to explain how these states originated from the need for 
32 Johnson also stresses nation-building to a degree (see his book titled 'MIT! and the Japanese miracle: The 
growth of industrial policy, 1925-75 (1982». 
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political survival amongst newly divided nation states or small countries threatened by 
surrounding big powers. The state itself took the place of society "in the definition of societal 
goals" and drove a fundamental transformation of the economic order to implement the 
societal project, that is, the "building or rebuilding of national identity" (ibid. p.57). The East 
Asian developmental state was born as a way of state formation or reformation in the context 
of the Cold War system33• Therefore, the developmental state could develop on the basis of 
"double-edged, relative autonomy": 
Relative autonomy vis-a-vis the global economy, making the country's firms competitive 
in the international realm, but controlling trade and financial flows. Relative autonomy 
vis-a-vis society, repressing or limiting democracy, and building legitimacy on the 
improvement of living standards rather than on citizen participation (Caste lIs 1999: 325). 
These two characteristics are very important for understanding the benefits and 
drawbacks of the developmental state in a balanced perspective. In particular, the meaning of 
relative autonomy vis-iI-vis society needs to be carefully considered in discussing the 
relationship between education and state formation. For instance, the autonomy of the 
developmental state from the demands of civil society is exemplified by the repression of 
political dissenters, including trade unions, and the deconstruction of traditional dominant 
classes by land reforms. In addition, it has been justified in the name of 'national security'. 
However, as the nature of situational nationalism has rapidly changed with both economic 
growth and the demise of the Cold War system, the role of the state in relation to the national 
project has been required to base itself on citizen participation rather than physical forces. 
Therefore, Castells argues that 
the success of the developmental states in East Asia ultimately leads to the demise of their 
apparatuses and to the fading of their messianic dreams (ibid. p. 66). 
This means that the society which was substituted by the state needs to be vitalised 
by civic participation. However, the forms of civic participation will be various, depending 
33 Castells argues that the "East Asian developmental state was born of the need for survival, and then it grew on 
the basis of a natonalist project, affirming cultural/political identity in the world scene (Castells 1999: 278) 
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on the relationship between the state and civil society. Roughly speaking, according to the 
power relationship between the state and civil society, a continuum between the elite (or 
authoritarian) bureaucracy in Japan, social partnership in Gennany, networks and the market 
can be assumed. 
The theorization of East Asian skills fonnation has been built on the above 
developmental state theory in order to understand the process of skills fonnation in the 
broader contexts of East Asian countries. For such theorising, the concept of state fonnation 
has significantly helped in examining the relationship between nation-building, economic 
development, and education and training systems in Asian developmental states. 
As Green, A. (1990) emphasises, the social origins and characteristics of national 
education systems can be best understood from the nature of the state and the process of 
'state formation,34 or 'nation building'. Through his research on the major nations of Europe 
and North America in the 19th century, he concludes that mass schooling was mainly 
"organised from above by the state" as the most powerful means for nation building (Green 
1990: 308). In addition, he points out that the major incentive towards providing national 
education systems was 
to provide the state with trained administrators, engineers and military personnel; to 
spread dominant national cultures and inculcate popular ideologies of nationhood; and so 
to forge the political and cultural unity of burgeoning nation states and cement the 
ideological hegemony of their dominant classes (ibid. p. 309). 
As Green, A. (1990) has shown, the major impetus for the creation of centralised 
national education systems in continental Europe was the military and political needs of late 
absolutism, and the process of state formation was intensive. By comparison, in the United 
States, where military needs of state formation was weak, the political pressure for 
centralised national education system was not so strong. However, after the revolution and 
34 He defines state fonnation as "the historical process by which the modem state has been constructed". It 
includes "not only the construction of the political and administrative apparatus of government and all 
government-controlled agencies which constitute the 'public' realm but also the fonnation of ideologies and 
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independence, the process of state fonnation was driven by the political needs for the 
cultivation of national identity, and for the promotion of social cohesion based on republican 
values. More important, in the case of Prussia, which can be called "the first of the strong 
developmentalist states in the modem world", the national education system was created as a 
means to build up the new Prussian state after its fall to Napoleon (Green 1999b: 65). Once 
established, the education system became a cornerstone of rapid industrialization. He applies 
this to the NIEs in Asia (Green 1999a). State formation theory lays claim to being the basis 
for skills formation theory with regard to the developmentalist state. 
David Ashton and Francis Green (1996) have developed skill formation theory, 
based on the political economy approach, to understand the role of education and training 
systems in promoting rapid economic growth in Asian developmental states, including 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. They emphasise the role of institutions in 
relation to skills formation and propose six components for the institutions required for high 
skills formation: the commitment of the ruling class to a "higher goal" (Ashton and Green 
1996: 113) and to the innovative use of the productive system; an education system 
producing high levels of basic skills; the commitment of groups of leading employers to the 
goals of high level skills formation; regulation and accountability at the workplace; some 
means for encouraging workers to commit to the goal and to continuous development at 
work; finally an off-the-job training system for the knowledge base required by the skills. As 
Ashton and Green conceptualise the skill formation theory, it has been articulated with the 
process of state formation and industrialisation. They argue that the processes of both state 
formation and industrialisation mainly determine skill formation (ibid. p. 105). In addition, it 
is assumed that "state formation and industrialisation are relatively autonomous yet 
interdependent processes" (ibid. p. 105). Through the investigation of Asian NIEs, they 
emphasise the importance of a "higher goal", which can "legitimise the political elite's use of 
collective beliefs which legitimate state power and underpin concepts of nationhood and national 'character' " 
(Green, A. 1990: 77). 
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state powers to regulate the behaviour of both capital and labour" with a degree of autonomy 
from vested interests (ibid. p. 113). 
Although Ashton and Green have contributed to the conceptualisation of the 
process of skill formation, their theorising has some limitations. First, they tend to 
overemphasise manpower planning mechanisms as the distinguished feature of Asian skills 
formation system. Whilst Singapore seems to epitomise this mechanism, in the case of South 
Korea particularly since 1980s, educational growth tends to have been 
a response to the Korean people's pressure on the government to expand educational 
opportunity, rather than the outcome produced by [the] government's intentional 
consideration [of] economic demand (Kim, Y,H. 2000: 115) 
When military governments, which came to office by force and failed to build an 
overarching consensus on new 'social goals', tried to raise people's support through 
education reform, educational policies were decided by political considerations rather than 
economic planning. More important, as education has long been recognised as one of the 
most important means to acquire respect through higher social status amongst most people in 
Korea, it is very difficult for political parties to suppress increasing educational demand 
when it is in conflict with economic demand. For example, although governments tried to 
increase the ratio of vocational track students to academic track students at the upper 
secondary level before, most policies fell short of their goals, and at last in the mid-l 990s the 
government gave up these policies. Recently vocational schools have increasingly found 
difficulty in recruiting, because parents and students prefer the academic track. 
More important, from the 1970s until the mid-1990s, the priorities of the Korean 
skills formation system were to provide a qualified and disciplined workforce through the 
strongly centralised control of curriculum, with an emphasis on national ethics and values as 
well as discipline. In particular, employees were forced to work hard under strong discipline, 
without the protection of trade unions. Trade unions were regarded as associations beneficial 
to North Korea because of the "red complex" instilled through instruction in national ethics 
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and values. This is a neglected dimension in Ashton and Green. To put it bluntly, 
industrialisation and the rapid growth of the GNP could acquire an overarching consensus 
because they were linked to competition in nation-building with North Korea. Therefore, in 
the case of Korea, the emphasis on national ethics, values and discipline needs to be 
considered no less than manpower planning as the distinguished feature of Asian skills 
fonnation system. 
In addition, Ashton and Green tend to stress the role of ruling groups in the process 
of skill formation. Therefore, when they collect data, they rely too much on government 
documents and interviews with policy makers, who are likely to legitimise the role of the 
state due to their status35 • One of their limitations is that they over-emphasise the role of the 
state as independent of vested interests in carrying out the national project. In particular, the 
political economy approach tends to over-emphasise the role of the state in the growth of 
education and training and to have limitations in explaining the changing relationship 
between the state and civil society with regard to skills fonnation. 
This is likely to result in a lack of balanced consideration of the interaction 
between the state and civil society. If the issue of economic growth had been treated in 
relation to democracy in Asian contexts, the role of the state might have been seen differently 
in a more dynamic relationship between the state and civil society. In line with this 
perspective, the Asian economic crisis in 1997 seems to be a turning point in discussing the 
role of the developmental state in relation to both economic globalisation and democracy, 
including transparency and trust. For example, with the economic crisis, collusion between 
governments and the Chaebol, which were regarded as the locomotives of rapid economic 
growth, was recognised as one of the main culprits in the globalised economic context. By 
contrast, the involvement of social partners and civil associations in policy-making and 
implementation has arisen as a social issue in overcoming the economic crisis. In this respect, 
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the role of the developmental state has been challenged with regard to the provision of 
education and training in the context of globalisation. 
As Ashton (1999) points out, a paradigm shift is arguably taking place with regard 
to the skills formation theory36. One of the most important changes is a demand for a political 
economy of skills formation, which enables skills to be defined in relation to "a broader set 
of social relations" (ibid. p. 347). Brown emphasises the importance of a political economy 
of skills formation as a way to raise "fundamental issues about education, inequality and 
economic opportunities" (Brown 1999: 239). This emphasis contributes to reflection on the 
limitations of a narrow economic perspective in understanding the changes caused by both 
globalisation and democracy in Asian NIEs. In this respect, Ashton et al. (1999) note the 
challenge of economic globalisation and democracy facing East Asian developmental states. 
However, they still focus on the role of the state, and fail to articulate the rapid changes in the 
role of developmental states with regard to skills formation. 
With regard to developmental skill formation, particularly since the economic crisis 
of 1997-8, the focus of research has been moving towards the investigation of the changing 
relationship between the state and civil society (Green, A. 2001)37. This new analysis will 
contribute to understanding the distinctive characteristics of each developmental state, 
because the changing relationships between the state and civil society depend on their 
responses to the challenges of democratisation and globalisation. The political economy 
approach, however, still over-emphasises the role of the state as an embedded agent of the 
3S A more important reason why they rely on government documents or interviews with policy makers can be that 
it is not easy to find English documents written by non-government organizations (NGOs), or to interview 
critics who can speak English well in Asian countries in which English is spoken as a foreign language. 
36 Ashton identifies four intellectual developments as examples of paradigm shift: the move toward an 
interdisciplinary perspective; the rediscovery of the central importance of comparative analysis; the start of an 
attempt to examine the impact of new productive systems on the process of skill formation; major advances in 
thinking of implications for policy (1999: 347) 
37 The High Skills Project: Education and Training Routes to a High Skill Economy, by Green, A., Lauder, H. and 
Brown, P. partly showed this move. This research project was funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council of Great Britain (ESRC). 
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national project, without discussing political conflicts between the state and active civil 
society. 
I11-4. Changes in skills formation and social capital 
111-4-1. Redefinition of skills formation and social capital 
Recently, as social structures have been recognised as closely linked to human 
capital formation, skills formation has been freshly defined with the aid of the concept of 
'social capital'38 (Putnam 1995; Fukuyama 1995, 1999; Coleman 1997). Whilst human 
capital is acquired through changes in persons' skills and capabilities, social capital is created 
by changes in the "structure of relations between actors and among actors" (Coleman 
1997:82-3). Social capital is a variety of social structures or relations, within which 
productive activities of persons or corporate actors are facilitated (Coleman 1997: 81). 
Brown tries to define skill formation more broadly as "the development of the 
social capacity for learning, innovation and productivity (LIP)" (Brown 1999: 235). As a 
result, he emphasises the importance of social capital in theorising skill formation. As he 
argues, "skill acquisition and utilisation are social acts ... which are predicted on relations of 
trust (high or low) which are themselves embedded (or disembedded) in an historical context 
(ibid. p. 237)". This definition reflects the fact that the concept of social capital has become 
important in the West with regard to "key dimensions, such as the relationship between social 
inequality, democratic communication and civic participation" (ibid. p. 237). 
As discussed with regard to human capital theory, the economic value of the 
socialisation function of education, intemalising favourable social attitudes, has been no less 
important than knowledge and skills in East Asian economies. As most East Asian countries 
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are trying to be 'high skills' or 'knowledge based' economies, they need new types of skills 
fonnation system, which emphasise lifelong learning rather than 'front-loaded' learning. In 
addition, they have begun to stress creativity, constructive communication skills and problem 
solving rather than punctuality, conformity and respect for hierarchies, which used to be 
emphasised as preferred attitudes for the work force. More important, as attitudes to work are 
recognised as being important as knowledge and skills with respect to human capital 
formation it has become a main concern of policy makers to facilitate attitudes as well as 
knowledge and skills which are compatible with high skills and the knowledge based 
economy. This means that successful human capital formation should be rooted in social 
capital. The increasing demand for social capital is one of the main reasons for putting 
education reform high on policy agendas. 
DI-4-2. A high skills economy and social capital 
The concept of social capital is becoming one of the key terms in analysing a high 
skills economy. Brown suggests that the definition of high skills39 needs to be extended, 
beyond the degree of the stocks and flows of human capital. Green also, in relation to a high 
skills economy model40, point to "a high level of workforce cooperation supported by civic 
trust and social capital ... as an important part of the model" (Green, A. 2001: 64-5). In 
addition, they also emphasise a wide diffusion of workforce skills as a characteristic ofa high 
skills economy. Here, it is worth pointing out that, as Crouch et al. argues, "institutionalized 
38 Putnam, in his lecture, defines the social capital as "features of social life -networks, norms, and trust- that 
enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives" (1995: 664-5) 
39 Brown includes seven facets as characteristics of a high skills economy: first, an inclusive system of education 
and training; second, a systematic process of skills upgrading; third, a high level of entrepreneurial and risk 
taking activities; four, institutionally embedded relations of 'high' trust; five, a model of human capability 
based on lifelong learning; six, a system of occupational selection based on the diverse range of human talent, 
knowledge and creativity; seven, a means of coordinating the supply and demand of labour (Brown 1999: 239). 
40 Green, A. defines a high skills economy as "an economy with a wide diffusion of workforce skiIls where these 
are fuIly utilized to achieve high productivity across a wide range of sectors, at the same time prodUCing high 
wage rates and relative income equality" (200 I: 64). 
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trust" is required in order to develop more extensive relationships beyond personal trust, 
which tends to inhibit the development of collective goods (Crouch et al. 1999: 168). 
As a high skills economy has become a goal for economic policy of the world's 
developed and developing countries, routes to such an economy have been a major concern 
of policy makers as well as relevant academics. To investigate these routes, first of all, four 
questions can be discussed. First, what is the definition of high skills and a high skills 
economy? Second, what ways are available to reach it? Third, how can economies move 
towards it? Fourth, what are the advantages of each route, and the barriers to moving on it? 
At least the following three characteristics need to be included in relation to the 
definition of a high skills economy. First, it has to develop a learning society that enables 
people to learn throughout their life and so as to share their skills to maximise social 
capacity. Secondly, it has to build up relations of trust as a key part of social capital. In 
particular, it is essential that human capacity and skills obtained by continuous learning 
should be rewarded as a basis of relations of trust. Moreover, the relations of trust need to be 
extended to the level of institutionalised trust through negotiation between social partners. 
Thirdly, it is necessary to construct a coordination system between supply and the demand for 
labour in order to promote social cohesion and relative income equality. 
III-5. Developmental states and globalisation in East Asian economics 
East Asian developmental states, except for Singapore, have been challenged by 
globalisation and democratisation since the mid-1980s. In particular, the economic crisis in 
Asian countries in 1997-8 ignited heated discussions on the implications of globalisation for 
the role of developmental states. Castells (1999) argues that the success of the developmental 
state in economic development has ironically contributed to its demise in East Asian 
economies, because the developmental state is in contradiction with global and informational 
capitalism. In relation to Japan, he proposes that 
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this multidimensional crisis results precisely from the success of the Japanese model of 
development, which induced new economic, social, and cultural forces that came to 
challenge the priority of the nationalist project, and therefore, the developmental state 
(ibid. p. 216). 
In his explanation, the demise of the Japanese developmental state started in 1989, 
and there was continuing crisis and political instability throughout the 1990s. He points to 
three sets of factors as main causes of the end of the Japanese developmental state. First, the 
financial system got out of government control under the conditions of the rapid globalisation 
of financial markets. Secondly, a transfonnation of the industrial development model toward 
"global decentralization" undermined the "systemic interaction between the developmental 
state and Japanese-based multinational networks" (ibid. pp. 235-6). Thirdly, the social 
structure based on patriarchalism was threatened by the rapid mobilisation of women through 
the increase of their participation in the political system as well as in the labour market. In 
sum, he argues that the demise of the Japanese developmental state as the embodiment of the 
Japanese national project results from its fundamental contradiction with the infonnational 
paradigm based on the network society (ibid. p. 241-8). As for the Japanese education 
system, its inability to generate "the critical mass of researchers and research programs" is 
pointed out as a critical weakness for continuing industrial, technological, and cultural 
development (ibid. p. 245). 
With some oversimplification, Castells reaches the conclusion that the East Asian 
developmental state model came to an end because of the incompatibility of the 
developmental state with the global and infonnational paradigm. Furthennore, he argues that 
"the developmental state became the obstacle for the new stage of global integration and 
capitalist development in the East Asian economy" (Castells 1999: 212). 
However, as he also has to admit, the pattern of economic development and crisis 
in the East Asian countries was "dependent on the specific set of relationship between the 
state, economy, and society" (ibid. p. 213; Henderson 1998). To understand the differences 
between countries in the impact of the economic crisis and its aftennath, "the interplay of 
103 
internal, social dynamics and external, financial flows, both mediated by the institutions of 
the state" should be carefully considered (Castells 1999: 213). The various responses of East 
Asian developmental states show how they have responded differently to the challenge of 
globalisation, depending on their situational and institutional contexts. 
Singapore is an example which shows that global and informational capitalization 
has been compatible with the developmental state. Its fmancial markets have been globalised 
and made transparent under state control. Since the 1990s, Singaporean economic strategy 
has changed, becoming more flexible and open under the challenge of globalisation (Mallet 
1999: 268-9). First, Singapore has tried to "promote entrepreneurial ism and gradually expose 
state-run corporations to market competition" (ibid. p. 268). Second, Singapore's companies 
have invested in other Asian countries, such as China and Indonesia, to overcome the 
limitations of its small domestic market. Third, the government has driven the project for an 
'intelligent island' to improve the efficiency of business and government. The government 
has recognized the importance of the 'technical innovation and creative thinking' in order to 
continue Singapore's success in the globalisation and information age. Therefore the 
government has tried to "perpetuate [Singapore's] success by adding computers and a dash of 
economic liberalization to the old combination of political and social engineering and state 
economic leadership" (ibid. p. 269). 
However, it is evident that a maturing economy and information revolution bring "a 
more complex society" and mUltiply "the number and capabilities of competing interests" 
(George 2000: 198). Therefore, there are significant changes in state control. 
The degree of central control required in an earlier phase of development has already 
been recognized as unsustainable. Hence, the spirited move towards entrepreneurship in 
both private and public sectors. (George 2000: 206) 
This change increasingly requires a shift from a top-down, charismatic mode towards 
democratic and institutional mechanisms. 
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Taiwan shows a successful transition to democracy in response to globalisation. 
The consistent achievement of a "soft landing" of Taiwan economy has been accompanied by 
political liberalisation since 1987. During the 1990s, the Taiwan government played a 
"secondary role in the growing competitiveness of Taiwanese firms" while "networks" of 
these firms in Taiwan and other countries found "their own way out of the semiconductor 
slump" (Castells 1999: 291). The largest reserves of foreign currency in the world could 
protect the economy from speculative attacks during the economic crisis. 
China has become another example of the developmental state in that it has 
successfully transformed its economic system from socialism to capitalism under the strong 
control of the state. Its economic success has been remarkable, even during the period of the 
Asian economic crisis in 1997-8. Therefore it is too early to predict the demise of the 
developmental state in China. However, it is also uncertain how long the Chinese communist 
party can keep control of China's economy without confronting political conflict. 
By contrast, from the experience of the financial crisis, Korea learned the lesson 
that the rapid liberalization of the financial markets without an appropriate supervisory 
mechanism is likely to lead to economic instability (Stiglitz 2002: 84). The financial crisis in 
Korea stemmed from the rapid and distorted liberalization of financial markets, which 
permitted excessive cross-border short-term loans to Chaebols which were in crises of 
profitability in the 1990s (Castells 1999: 291). Korea failed to install proper supervisory 
mechanisms in preparing for financial market liberalization during the early and mid-1990s. 
This was partly because of pressure from the United States and the IMF for rapid 
liberalization of the financial market (Stiglitz 2002: 94), and also partly due to disorderly de-
regulation which resulted from the increasing influence of the Chaebols on the government 
during the period of Kim, Young-Sam government. The government was very optimistic 
about the implications of globalisation for the Korean economy and advocated economic 
hberahsation in the name of democratisation. This experience shows that economic 
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liberalization should be distinguished from democratisation, particularly in the transition 
from the developmental state to democracy. 
Since the 1980s, globalisation has been mainly driven by the free market-oriented 
"Washington consensus" (between the IMF, the World Bank, and the United States Treasury) 
about development policies for developing countries (ibid. p.16). The Washington consensus 
arose from the "integration of traditional IMF concerns for macroeconomic stability (anti-
inflation, anti-deficit policies) and the Bank's agenda of efficiency-enhancing reforms 
(openness, competition, deregulation, privatization)" (You 2002: 214). It reflected a "shift in 
ideology toward neo-liberalism that emerged after the erosion of the golden age" (ibid. p. 
214). 
In this context, what kinds of alternative strategies are possible in response to 
globalisation in East Asian countries? Here, two questions can arise. Can the developmental 
state still be viable? Or, as Castells argues, is a new form of the 'network state', like the 
European Union, required to protect societies from unlimited global flows of capital and 
information? (Castells 1999: 329). In this regard, it is significant to examine the democratic 
transition in Korea because, with the active role of Kim, Dae-Jung government in overcoming 
the economic crisis, the Korean economy is likely to become more competitive (Stiglitz 
2002: 127). The government took an active role in economic reform as well as in 
overcoming the economic crisis, promoting the involvement of social partners in making and 
implementing policy. 
As the Cold War system wound down in the late 1980s, the possibility increased 
for Korea to pursue the national project of reunification on the basis of the participation of 
various social partners. While Korea has exhausted the possibilities of the developmental 
state, the role of the state is still crucial in building a consensus regarding the unification 
project. In addition, through the experience of the economic crisis in 1997-8, the role of the 
state is freshly recognized with regard to providing the "social safety net" and the 
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"productive welfare,,41. For example, since the economic crisis, the issue of unemployment 
has suddenly become the most important item in the political agenda, and the social gap 
between the poor and the better-off has widened on an unprecedented scale. Therefore, with 
regard to the issue of Korean reunification, it is important to redefine the new role of the 
state, which is different from the past developmental state. The democratic form of the state 
can contribute to pursuing the national project on the basis of citizens' participation in and 
international support for 'East Asian peace'. 
III-6. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed two approaches to East Asian skills formation and 
investigated the role of the state in skills formation and economic development. It criticized 
the human capital approach because it focused on individuals without seriously taking 
account of the major role of the state in defining social institutions in which individual 
learning took place. By contrast, this chapter also pointed out that the developmental state 
approach was likely to over-emphasise the role of the state, neglecting the oppressive 
mechanisms of the state, particularly in labour control. In addition, social capital theory was 
discussed to emphasise the importance of social structures and relations within which high 
skills formation and learning were facilitated. 
Finally this chapter explored how developmental states responded differently to the 
challenge of globalisation, depending on their institutional contexts. It pointed out that Korea 
learned the lesson that the rapid liberalization of the financial market unaccompanied by an 
appropriate supervisory mechanism could lead to economic crisis and economic liberalization 
should be distinguished from democratisation in the democratic transition. 
41 With regard to the issues of welfare and employment, the present Korean government emphasises the concept of 
productive welfare, like 'welfare to work' in the UK. With this concept, the government bring the issue of 
employment together with the agenda of education and training reform. 
107 
In the next chapter, the role of the developmental state in skills formation will be 
explored in the Korean context. 
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Chapter IV: The developmental state and skills formation in Korea 
IV -1. Introduction. 
In this chapter, the characteristics of developmental skills formation in Korea are 
analysed, with a focus on the relations between nation-building, education and economic 
development. First, in relation to the developmental state, three different perspectives -
political, political economy and sociological approaches - are analysed. On the basis of this 
analysis, developmental skills formation is defined. Then the characteristics of developmental 
skills formation in Korea are critically examined, with discussion of the division of Korea, 
military dictatorship and the stress on national values and discipline. 
The development of skills formation in Korea will be divided into four stages: pre-
developmental skills formation between 1945 and 1961; developmental skills formation 
between 1961-1992; the transitional period between 1993 and 1997; and the state-
coordinated partnership mode of skills formation from 1998 onwards. This chapter will 
mainly focus on the period of developmental skills formation. 
IV -2. Developmental state and Asian developmental skills formation 
The term 'developmental state' was first defined by Johnson in his book titled MIT! 
and the Japanese Miracle (1982). Through an analysis of the Japanese economic 
bureaucracy, he sought to explain how and why the developmental state intervenes in the 
economy. He emphasised the existence of "national goals" of economic development set 
according to political objectives (Johnson 1982: 19). In addition, he argued that the idea of 
the developmental state originated from the "situational nationalism of the late 
industrializers" (ibid. p.24). With regard to the controlling power of bureaucracy, he 
emphasised the implementation of industrial policy. 
109 
The government did not normally give direct orders to business, but those businesses that 
listened to the signals coming from the government and then responded were favored 
with easy access to capital, tax breaks, and approval of their plans to import foreign 
technology or establish joint ventures (ibid. p. 24). 
Since then, Marquand has adopted Johnson's concept of the developmental state to 
examine the post-war economic development of European countries such as France, Sweden 
and Germany, as well as nineteenth-century Prussia and twentieth-century Japan (Marquand 
1988). With regard to the relationship between developmental states and the market, he 
emphasises the role of the state as a "conductor". 
The developmental state has not suppressed~r dictated to the market: it has acted as a 
sort of conductor, trying to direct and harmonise the efforts of market actors whom it can 
influence, but not command (ibid. p.1 07). 
Although there are differences according to national contexts regarding power 
relations between social classes, as he argues, it seems to be evident that the developmental 
states have strongly "constrained" the market by drawing the "boundaries within which 
markets operate", and defining the "terms on which competition takes place" (ibid. p. 107). 
He is in line with Johnson's argument that differentiates the rational plans of the 
developmental state from the ideological plans of the Soviet-type command economy 
(Johnson 1982: 18). This means that the developmental state is 'market-manipulative' rather 
than anti-market. Moreover, Johnson argues that the plan-rational system of the 
developmental state, with a "strategic, or goal-oriented, approach to the economy", should be 
not only differentiated from the Soviet-type approach to economy, but distinguished from the 
market-friendly or market-oriented approach (Johnson 1982: 19). 
More important, he points out that one of the most important roles that the 
developmental states have tried to play is to deliberately create comparative advantages by 
planning to "shift resources into more advanced sectors", as well as by "favouring some 
market actors at the expense of others" (ibid. p. 106). This idea can be expanded to 
developmental skills formation, in that East Asian developmental states have deliberately 
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created their comparative advantages such as low wage and well-disciplined labour, by 
linking education and training to economic development. 
Amsden (1989), Castells (1992, 1999) and other academics have also used the term 
to explain the characteristics of rapid economic development in the East Asian countries 
known as NIBs, such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. With the developmental 
state approach, Johnson, Amsden and other academics are explicitly challenging the neo-
liberal market model of economics. Green stresses the shaping role of the development states 
in relation to civil society, explaining rapid economic development as a part of their projects 
of nation-building. 
The defining characteristic of the developmental state is the dynamic, shaping role played 
by the state leadership and bureaucracy in relation to civil society (Green 1997:32). 
In this regard, he points to the "dual" goals, skills formation and citizen formation, 
of East Asian education systems (Green 1999a: 261). According to his explanation, citizen 
formation is a part of skills formation, but also a part of nation-building. In this regard, East 
Asian skills formation needs to be understood in the context of national-building. Moreover, 
as he argues, there have been specific historical and social conditions for East Asian 
developmental states and skills formation such as situational nationalism, the Cold War 
system, and the absence of powerful social interest groups (ibid. p. 263). In the next section, 
these conditions will be examined, mainly in the Korean context. 
Here, one important question arises. Can the Johnson's developmental state model 
be applied to analyse the role of the authoritarian state in Korea? This question is very 
important because it can explain the characteristics of the Korean developmental state. In 
addition, it provides the clue to explain why the Korean developmental state came to an end 
with the success of its national project. It is certain that the Japanese developmental state was 
the model of the Park Chung-Hee government. Park then declared in his book entitled The 
State, the Revolution and I that the purposes of the military coup were nation re-building and 
economic modernisation (Park, C.H. 1997). In the book, he praised the success of the Meiji 
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Restoration and following modernization in Japan as a "miracle" and the Meiji Restoration 
would be a good model in performing the revolution in Korea from then onwards (ibid. 
pp.I72-7). 
The major role of the Korean developmental state can be understood as the rapid 
industrialisation for nation re-building by a military regime in the context of the division of 
Korea and the Cold War. In this regard, the Korean developmental state followed the model 
of the pre-war Japanese developmental state. For the economic modernisation, the Korean 
developmental state relies on "maximal state's intervention and authoritarian integration" 
(Cho, H.Y. 2000: 410). The division of Korea provided the state with a legitimation for 
centralised political control and ideological domination based on anti-Communism. In 
particular, the Korean War not only destroyed the economic and social structure, but also left 
South Korea being a "tremendous bulwark" against Communism (Choi, J.J. 1993: 25). 
Therefore, economic development easily acquired a national consensus for the sake of 
national security, because escape from poverty was regarded as a prerequisite to protect 
South Korea from the ideological attacks of North Korea. 
In this context, economic development was pursued under tight authoritarian state 
control in the name of 'anti-Communist' nationalism. Therefore, Korean developmental skills 
formation emphasised 'patriotic values' and discipline based on 'Can do' ideology rather 
than critical thinking and creativity. It is characterised by centralised political control, 
manpower planning, and stress on patriotic values and discipline. 
IV -3. The characteristics of the Korean developmental state 
Some political approaches to the Korean developmental state tend to focus on the 
issue of state versus civil society (Choi, J.J., 1993; Kim, H.R., 2000). Those who take these 
approaches are keen to analyse the development of civil society as a counterweight of the 
developmental state. Choi, a leading academic in Korea who uses this approach, argues that 
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the anti-Communist state has been challenged by civil society along the three cleavages over 
"democratization, economic justice, and reunification" (ibid. p. 44). In this sense, he defines 
the nature of the developmental state in the 1970s as follows: 
state-led, authoritarian developmentalism: consolidation of a stable political base through 
coercive force; accelerated industrialization through tightly staged authoritarian planning, 
with a heavy reliance on foreign capital; and the creation of a political alliance of civilian 
bureaucrats, technocrats, and industrialists centered on military elites (ibid. p. 26). 
While this interpretation admits that the developmental state became a "catalyst for 
economic development", it is very critical of the role of the state in terms of democratisation 
(ibid. p.49). For example, Choi argues that "state power that functions to demobilize and 
disarm the radical opposition movement must be characterised as a negative power" (ibid. 
p.49). 
However, in his view, the concept of civil society tends to be defined as all civil 
associations excluding business, and civil society take an active role in the democratic 
transition. He defines civil society as 
a network of organisations or a structure of classes, which emerge at certain historical 
junctures as articulate political and social groups to advocate common interests (ibid. 
p.l3). 
One of the weakest points in this definition is that it leaves out the class 
organisations of the bourgeoisie. It is more like the Gramscian idea of a popular national 
alliance, which is probably where it comes from. But Choi refers to the entirety of non-state 
forces in society, not just the progressive ones. This is the precisely the problem with this use 
of the term. When he defines civil society, what he really means is 'progressive social 
movements'. The definition is similar to those of a strand of American academics who 
normally define the concept as intermediary associations between the state and market 
(Diamond 1994)42. This analytical framework of the 'state versus civil society' focuses on the 
42 Diamond defines civil society as an "intennediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state. This 
excludes individual and family life, inward-looking group activity (e.g., for recreation, entertainment, or 
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contrast between the authoritarian state and progressive civil society. Therefore, the shaping 
role of the authoritarian state in relation to civil society, particularly business communities 
and anti-Communist groups, as well as power struggles in civil society between the class 
organisations of the bourgeoisie and labour, are rarely analysed. In other words, this approach 
tends to counterpose the state and civil society too much, without reference to the class 
analysis of Korean society43. As a result, it downplays the fact that weakening the state 
without the participation of social partners could result in the dominance of Chaebols rather 
than the increasing influence of civil associations on the society, and accelerating the pursuit 
of economic liberalisation. Therefore, the analytic framework of the' state versus civil society 
(excluding business)' needs to be changed into 'participatory relations between state and civil 
society (including business)" particularly with regard to the increasing influence of 
Chaebols. In this sense, it is not surprising that even Diamond, one of the leading academics 
accepting American version of 'state versus civil society', admits the need for "robust 
political institutions" in democracy-building (ibid. p. 16). In his view, how the "market-
oriented" economic reforms can be paralleled with "strong, well-structured" state institutions, 
which are "somewhat insulated from the day-to-day pressures of politics", has become a very 
important issue for democratisation in the East Asian context (ibid. p. 16). 
By contrast, some political economy approaches are likely to emphasise the 
characteristics of rapid economic development in a "late industrialising" country (Amsden 
1989; Ashton et al. 1999). These approaches tend to contrast the state with the market, and 
spotlight the positive power of the developmental state over capital accumulation, regulation 
and manpower planning, although some, like Castells, try not to downplay the authoritarian 
nature of the politics that accompanied this power. In her book entitled Asia's Next Giant: 
South Korea and Late Industrialization, Amsden argues that the late industrialising state 
spirituality), the profit-making enterprise of individual business firms, and political efforts to take control of the 
state" (Diamond 1994:5). This definition is more coherent, but disguises its fundamentally anti-state bias. 
43 For the class analysis of Korean society between the 1970s and 1980s, see Suh, K.M. (1990), Hangugsahoe-ui 
gyegeubgujo[The Class Structure of Korean SOCiety], in Kim, C.K. and Kim, H.K. (eds) Hangugsahoelon[A 
Theory of Korean Society}, Seoul: Hanul. 
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"intervenes with subsidies deliberately to distort relative prices in order to stimulate 
economic activity" (ibid. p.8). In addition, she emphasises the advantage of the 'institutions 
of late industrialisation' , which are 
an interventionist state, large diversified business groups, an abundant supply of 
competent salaried managers, and an abundant supply of low-cost, well-educated labor 
(ibid. p. 8). 
In addition, she emphasises the importance of learning to catch up with the 
industrialised countries through the adoption of borrowed technology. Also, the education 
and training systems can be included as institutions of late industrialisation. In this regard, 
Ashton et al. suggest 'developmental skill formation' by linking the role of the 
developmental state machinery to development in education and training system (Ashton et 
al. 1999). Amsden is seriously oblivious to the politics of the developmental state. 
These approaches tend to stress the advantage of such features of the Korean 
developmental state as state subsidies, the banking system based on government-large firm-
bank collaboration, regulation of skills demand and supply, and manpower planning. By 
contrast, they are likely to downplay the negative effects of the authoritarian state on the 
economy, including corruption. In addition, they also pay no attention to negative effects on 
social relations, including the oppression of the working class, which resulted in one of the 
most militant labour movements in Asia (Castells 1999: 286). More important, as they focus 
on state power, they seem to be less keen to analyse changes in civil society, which has 
increasingly influenced policy making particularly since the early 1990s, although some like 
Wade would cogently argue that corruption in some areas became worse through rapid 
liberalisation. 
On the other hand, in a broader perspective, some sociological approaches tend to 
stress nation-building rather than economic purposes in analysing the rise of developmental 
states (Castells 1992, 1999). These approaches analyse the role of the developmental state in 
terms of changes in the society as well as economic development. Castells emphasises the 
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concept of the nationalist project as the goal of developmental states and argues that "for the 
developmental state, economic development is not a goal but a means" (Castells 1999: 277). 
He explains the Korean nationalist project as the "creation of major Korean companies able 
to become global players in the world economy" (ibid. p. 259). In his view, the Korean 
developmental state achieved the national project "by using foreign loans, American military 
support, and the ruthless exploitation of Korean labor" (ibid. p. 259). 
Green points out two characteristics of developmental skill formation, explaining 
the "wider project of state formation" as a driving force behind educational development. 
The fIrst is the degree to which educational development is planned and the role the 
central state and bureaucracy plays in this. The second is the emphasis placed on the 
moral and social dimensions of education (Green 1997: 48). 
He emphasised the characteristics of "central control, planning, and stress on values and core 
skills" as key features of East Asian skills formation (Green 1999a: 257). This approach 
seems to try to explain skills formation with regard to both economic development and 
nation-building. 
In sum, it may be suggested that the anti-Communist nation-building project 
expanded formal education and pro-government informal learning, stressing values and the 
socialisation of people into commitment to the project, and as a result the disciplinary 
attributes significantly contributed to economic development. By contrast, changes in 
education system and skills formation can be well understood in relation to the changing role 
of the developmental state which is based on the rise of civil society since the late 1980s. 
Although these three perspectives evaluate differently the contribution of the 
Korean developmental state, they are common in regarding the Park Chung-Hee regime as 
the prototype of it. Therefore the analysis of the Korean developmental state will be focused 
on the characteristics of that regime. In next sections, the rise of anti-Communist nationalism 
and economic development machinery will be examined. 
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IV -3-1. The division of Korea and anti-Communist nationalism 
The nature of the developmental state in Korea cannot be fully understood without 
considering the context of the division of Korea in the era of the Cold War. After liberation 
from Japanese colonialism in August 15, 1945, the Korean people's aspiration to build an 
independent nation-state was undermined by the divided occupation by U.S. and Soviet 
troops. Before the US occupation forces arrived in South Korea on September 8, 1945, many 
political and social organisations rapidly appeared and an atmosphere of "revolutionary 
nationalism" was epidemic (Choi, J.J. 1993:14)44. After the arrival of the US forces, the Right 
and the former Japanese collaborators established many counter-revolutionary organisations 
to compete with revolutionary nationalism. Under the direct supervision of the US military 
government, which privileged the Right or the Middle over the Left, a right-wing leader, 
Syngman Rhee, became in 1946 the chairman of the Representative Democratic Council, 
which later became the cornerstone for the formation of a separate regime in South Korea. 
After this, the revolutionary nationalism was increasingly oppressed by the US military 
government and the cleavages between the Right and the Left were deepened (Cumings 
1981). 
The establishment of two separate regimes in 1948 signalled the division of Korea 
and resulted in the bloody Korean War (1950-1953). The Korean War became a turning point 
in the relations between the state and civil society in South Korea. The South Korean state 
changed "from an extremely unstable and fragile anti-Communist state into a powerful 
bureaucratic one ruled by an authoritarian regime" (Choi, J.J. 1993:22). Most important, the 
war laid the basis for a Korean developmental state, in three aspects. First, the military 
became one of the most powerful political groups as a result of American military aid. The 
44 By the end of October, people's committees had been established in 7 provinces, 12 cities, and 131 counties 
under the national umbrella organisation of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI). 
The fonnation of the Korean People's Republic (KPR), whose leadership was dominated by the Left, was 
proclaimed on the basis of the CPKI just before the arrival of US forces. However, the US military government 
soon refused to admit the KPR's authority. See Kim, N.S. (1984), Namlodang yeongu[A Study of the South 
Korean Labour Party}, Seoul: Dolbegae. In Cumings' view, the total number of political and social 
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military forces of South Korea rapidly expanded, from 50,000 in 1950 to 600,000 by the end 
of the war (Lee el al. 1990:358). Second, revolutionary nationalism was almost eliminated, 
and the external logic of the Cold War was internalised as a national consensus to "regulate 
social and class relations" (Cho, H.Y. 2000: 410). Political dissidents and opposition 
movements were violently oppressed in the name of national security. Third, Korean industry 
had been completely destroyed, and also the landlord class was decisively weakened. 
Therefore, the state could easily centralise power without serious challenges from the 
previous regime. In this context, education was defmed as one of the most powerful 
instruments for building the ideological legitimacy of the anti-Communist state, and it was 
strictly controlled under the supervision of the state. 
During the 1950s, the anti-Communist state strengthened the authoritarian regime 
with massive military and economic aid from the United States. After the war, as Choi 
argues, nationalism was transformed into "statism that privileged anti-communism over 
unification" (Choi, 1.1. 1993: 23). Moreover, as the Korean economy was almost destroyed 
due to the war, South Korea remained a pre-industrial society until the 1960s. The Rhee 
regime, relying on anti-Communist apparatuses and U.S. aid, tried to prolong its rule by 
force, but was overthrov.rn by the April 19 Uprising in 1960. However, the new government 
came to end \\;thin one year, as a result of the May 16 military coup. Under the pretext that 
radical faction of students were calling for immediate negotiations with North Korea on 
reunification, Park Chung-Hee, who had been a Japanese Army officer, led the coup. Raising 
the issue of reunification in such an idealistic way suggesting a south-north student 
conference at Panmunjom in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) provoked an anti-Communist 
reaction from the military forces. The coup became a turning point for the Korean 
developmental state, because the military regime tried to seek legitimacy through state-driven 
economic development in the name of national security. 
organlsallons was much higher. See Cumings, B. () 98), The Origins of the Korean War, vol. J, Princeton: 
Pnnceton L'nlversJl)' Press. 
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IV -3-2. The military dictatorship aDd social engineering in Korea 
General Park came to power under martial law, promising the elimination of 
corruption and the reconstruction of the nation. The military regime exercised almost 
absolute power based on the military style of command until its end. Park immediately 
established a military junta called the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) 
and imposed authoritarian rule during the first two years. The National Assembly was 
dissolved and all political activities were banned. The press was also strictly censored. In 
addition, the SCNR created the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), which was later 
symboJised as the most oppressive state apparatus of the Park regime. To keep power by 
winning the coming elections of 1963, the junta enacted the Purification Act to prevent over 
4,000 former politicians from participating in political activities (Lee et al. 1990:362). Just 
before the presidential election, the exclusion of many civilian politicians from political 
activities was lifted. Moreover, the KCIA played a major role in creating a highly centralised 
new political party, called the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) with huge funds from 
unidentified sources. Later, SCNR members and many other officers, who had participated in 
the military coup, occupied most of the powerful posts in the party, so as to control the new 
assembly as well as the new party. Thanks to its strong political organisation supported by 
the military forces, the Park regime came to power, and one month later the DRP won the 
general election. The DRP had a majority of the parliament in spite of winning only 32% of 
the votes because, under the pretext of securing political stability, the new proportional 
representation system awarded up to two-thirds of a large proportion of seats to the party 
acquiring the most seats in the general election (ibid. p. 363). 
Later, after the 1971 presidential election, in which the opposition party leader, 
Kim Dae-Jung. won the 45% of the vote, but 52% in the cities and about 60% of the Seoul 
vote, Park feared political uncertainty, suddenly announced a state of emergency and 
declared martial law in 1972. All political activities were banned and even basic citizens' 
nghts were demed. 
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The constitution was suspended. and the National Assembly and all political parties were 
dissoh·ed. Further political activity was forbidden, and restrictions were placed on other 
civil liberties. including free speech (ibid. p. 365) 
Under martial law, Park proclaimed the new Yusin regime (the word is same as the 
Meiji 'Restoration' of Japan, in Chinese) and became a dictator with unlimited power4S • 
Under the new Yusin Constitution, the president was to be elected indirectly by a body called 
the National Council for Unification (NCU), which was headed by the president and was 
easily manipulated at his discretion. In addition, the president was not only to appoint one-
third of the National Assembly but would also control the whole range of state affairs 
through special emergency measures. Korea became a highly regimented society by the end 
of 1972. 
It looked as though the fOl1Jltf head of the SCNR had succeeded in a bold bid to retrieve 
in ci\;Jian guise the power he bad wielded in the 1961-63 period (ibid. p. 365). 
In this context, the Park regime pursued a project for rapid economic growth to 
"compensate for its lack of legitimacy" (Choi, J.1, 1993: 28). For the project, compressed 
industrialisation strategies were imposed through five-year economic development plans. 
Once an economic development goal was targeted, all other things were subjected to the goal. 
No complaints were aJlowed; they were punished under the pretexts of political stability and 
national security. Therefore, Korean society itself was dominated by military discipline, and 
government departments and all social institutions were forced to act in a military, top-down 
style. As Cho argues, the regime mobilized the nation to realize the national goal (Cho, H.Y. 
200 1). In this regard, two examples may be selected, 
4' ~1an:.. of Korean academics try to explain the character of the rushin regime, applying the concept of 
'bureaucratic authontanamsm' (Guillermo O·Donnell). They regard economic factors as the main cause of the 
regime See Han, S.J (1987) 'Bureaucratic Authoritarianism and Economic Development in Korea during the 
Yushm Penod' m Kin\, K.D. (cd). Dependency Issues in Korean Development, Seoul: Seoul National 
Lm\erslt~ 
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First, to mobilise the people, the Saemaeul (New Village) movement was launched 
by the government in the winter of 1971-72; every village as well as a whole range of public 
sectors were forced to playa role in changing people's consciousness based on 'hard-work, 
self-help, cooperation'. During this period, one of the most popular slogans was 'Can Do', 
which could be interpreted as meaning that everybody can follow the state's direction 
without any excuse, like a soldier in a war. Later, the movement spread from rural areas to 
every urban area and to big and medium-sized companies. In this process, every village, 
school, and workplace was required to organise various Saemaeul-related associations, 
including a Saemaeulleaders' association and a Saemaeul women's association, as vanguards 
to promote the movements. In particular, schools were forced to lead in spreading the pro-
government ideologies to communities as well as homes. The importance and effects of the 
movement were inculcated through compulsory subjects and constant events at every school 
until the early 1990s. By then, the National Council of the Saemaeul Movement had become 
one of the most powerful pro-government organisations in promoting industrialisation, as 
well as in building a national consensus on the national project. It also had a huge influence 
on eJections as a major political agent for the ruling party, and contributed to its long-term 
rule. 
Second, when the labour movement began to arise because of inhumane work 
conditions and low wages, the military regime severely suppressed it and tightened its control 
over labour. In particular, after the Yushin regime, any independent union was regarded as 
pro-Communist and illegal. In addition, most labour-related activities, including even night 
schools by churches, were banned as threats to national security. As economic development 
strategy moved toward heavy and chemical industries from light industries, most national 
resources were poured into Chaebol-dominated heavy industries. The Chaebol-oriented 
economIc polICIes contributed to rapid economic growth, but brought some serious side-
effects. FIrst of all. the strategy forced unendurable sacrifices on labour, and relied on the 
government's suppressIon of the labour movement: Workers in SMEs particularly suffered 
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from "low wages, poor working conditions, and despotic labour relations in the workplace" 
(Koo, H.G. 1993: 139). 
It was a turning point in labour movement when Chun Tai-TI, a gannent factory 
labour, burnt himself to death to publicise the miserable work conditions, shouting 'we are 
not machines'. After this, students, church leaders and intellectuals not only began to be 
concerned about conditions of labour, but helped workers learn their rights at night schools in 
churches. Moreover, some students and church activists began to involve in the labour 
movement, and in the 1970s, with their support, workers could develop critical 
consciousness. As the labour movement began to develop, Koo argues, the government's 
suppression became harsh. 
Panty as a reaction to this development, and partly as an effort to attack economic 
problems arising from its export-oriented industrialisation strategy, the regime of Park 
Chung Hee tightened control over labor and closed up all the legitimate space for 
organizing labor (ibid. p. J 39). 
This suppression continued until the late 1980s, and pushed the labour movement into 
becoming one of the most militant trade union movements in Asia. 
Next, the Chaebol-<>riented strategy resulted in a big productivity gap between big 
companies and SMEs. This became one of the most serious problems of the Korean economy 
in terms of competitiveness. As big companies relied on exploiting the low wages in SMEs, 
SMEs could not invest in the enhancement of their productivity. While SMEs were forced to 
struggle for a very small margin, compared to workers in big companies those in SMEs had 
to suffer from worse work conditions. Therefore, strikes in SMEs tended to explode in an 
extreme way, and these strikes became a driving force in building independent trade unions 
until the late 1980s. 
As seen above, Korean society was socially disciplined and tightly controlled by 
force. The engmeered society itself became a school for socializing people into commitment 
to the natIOnal project. By contrast, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) linked to social 
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movements were severely suppressed. and their informal learning programmes were also 
Wlder strict and constant surveillance in terms of national security. 
IV -3-3. Education as the major contribntor to nation-building 
To understand the role of the Korean developmental state in rapid economIC 
development and the expansion of education, it is very important to examine the relations 
between nation-building, education and the developmental state. In Korea, it is significant to 
consider the historical backgroWld with regard to the relationship between nation-building 
and the role of education. In modem Korean history, Koreans have placed considerable 
importance on education as a means of independent state formation since the enlightenment 
movement of the late 191b century, but fonnal education in Korea dates back to the foundation 
of Taehak (the Greater School) in 372, in which the youth of ruling elite were allowed to 
study Confucianism as ruling ideology. In particular, after Japan deprived Korea of full 
authority over all aspects of Korean relations with foreign countries under the Protectorate 
Treaty of 1905, education was regarded as a way towards independence and nation-building 
against imperialist aggression. In this regard, many patriotic organisations came into being 
with the aim of raising the political and social consciousness of the Korean people, and 
provided education programmes for ordinary people while championing the protection of 
Korea's sovereignty (Lee el al. 1990: 244). Further, the numerous private mission schools46 
contributed to the development of modem schooling from the 1880s, and later still a greater 
number of private schools were founded by Korean people as centres of the patriotic 
enlightenment movement. Thus, until the annexation of Korea by Japan the total number of 
educational institutions, mc1uding primary, secondary and junior colleges, rapidly increased 
and reached around three thousand, the majority of which were founded by local influential 
persons (Lee. ~1.K. 1988: 63). It is not surprising that a close nexus between education and 
66 \1ost "crc founded by Protcstant mIssIonaries. 
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nationalistic culture was strongly rooted in Korean minds (op. cit. p. 247). This seems to have 
had an influence on Koreans' respect for education and to have been the basis of rapid 
educational expansion after liberation from Japan. 
To suppress the patriotic private schools, the Japanese 'resident-general' 
introduced the Private School Ordinance in 1908, which was changed to the Education 
Ordinance for Choson (Korea) in 1911 after the annexation to Japan. The Ordinance was 
designed to socialise Koreans as loyal citizens of the Japanese Empire through the tight 
regulation of the private schools which had enlightened Korean people and encouraged them 
to have an independent consciousness. Therefore, w~en Korea was liberated from Japan in 
1945, one of the most urgent issues was the formation of a new education system for building 
an independent nation and for the eradication of the legacy of colonial occupation. 
With nationalistic passion. a popular adult education campaign against illiteracy, 
with cooperation between the government, including the MoE, the Home Office and the 
Ministry of Defence, and voluntary organisations, was very successful as a part of the nation-
building project. In South Korea, the adult literacy campaign was paralleled with the early 
universalisation of primary education, which was promoted both by Korean people's strong 
enthusiasm for education and the new government's need to socialize Korean people in the 
process of nation-building (Kim, Y.H., 2000:99). With regard to parents' enthusiasm for 
education, after the social class system was totally destroyed by the land reform and 
following the Korean War between 1950 and 1953, education was recognised as one of the 
most important factors promoting social mobility. As a result of the national literacy 
campaign, the adult illiteracy rate decreased from 78.0% in 1945 to 4.1 % in 1958 and 
primary school enrolment rate rapidly increased to 96.4% in 1959 (ibid. pp. 99-102). 
Although the high rate of adult literacy and the universalisation of primary education were 
the result of the nation-building process nurturing national identity and civic values rather 
than the dIrect results of economic forces, they became a major factor enabling rapid 
economic development after the 1 96Os. 
124 
After the Park regime came to power, state control of education was tightened as 
schools were subjected to the purposes of political stability and economic development. 
Education policies put great stress on values imposed through tight regulation, focusing on 
the justification of the military regime and the socialisation of students who were required to 
swear an oath of loyalty to the state'''. In particular, when the government launched a series of 
a Five-Year Economic Development Plans, schools were forced to be the providers of skilled 
manpower, who could endure hard work with low wages. In this regard, developmental skills 
formation "ill be discussed in the next section. 
In sum, as industrialisation was proclaimed as the major means to realise nation-
building during the Cold War, success in economic development became the most important 
legitimisation of the military regime. As a result, education was subjected to the 
government's national project, 'economic development through political stability'. This 
defined the distinctive characteristic of Korean developmental skills formation. Therefore, to 
understand this formation, at least three conditions need to be considered. First, as 
revolutionary or moderate nation-building possibilities were fundamentally weakened by the 
Korean War, anti-Communist nation-building was dominant in the political context of the 
division of Korea, which was on the frontline of the Cold War. Second, in this context, the 
military regime came to power with almost absolute political power and could engineer a 
whole society to drive industrialisation and accept its legitimacy. Third, for Korean people, 
education has been regarded as the main route to high social status, and the social demand for 
learning has rapidly expanded beyond the control of the government, parallel with economic 
development. Therefore, both the demise of the Cold War system and the rise of civil society 
have decisively forced to the modification of developmental skills formation since 1987. 
,1 For eumple, every pnmary student was forced not only to memorise the 'National Education Constitution' but 
to salute the national flag tWlee a day when it was raised and lowered. 
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IV -4. Korean developmental skills fonnation between the 1960s and the 
early 1990s 
As seen in the previous section, developmental skills fonnation can be defined as a 
part of developmental state formation, which focused on economic modernisation as a major 
means for national security at the expense of political freedom. As Green points out, in many 
countries, education contributed to nation-building, and the state apparatus played a leading 
role in the process. 
The development of national education systems in nineteenth-century Europe, Japan and 
North America, through occurring at different times, invariably overlapped with the 
process of nation-building, both contnbuting to it and as a function of it (Green 1997: 
29). 
In the process of rapid and dynamic nation-building, the role of the state was 
crucial in shaping education systems. In particular, the developmental state played a defining 
role in promoting the national education system as well as economic development in the 
name of nation-building. 
IV-4-I. The denlopmental state and developmental skills formation in the 1960s and 
1970s 
The Park regime between the 1960s and the 1970s has been regarded as a prototype 
of the developmental state. The state was an authoritarian regime based on military force, 
playing a dominant role in promoting the national education system as well as in rapid 
industriahsation justified by nation-building. In particular, it vigorously drove economic 
development by central control and planning. In this regard, Korean developmental skills 
formation has five distinctive characteristics. 
FIrst, skills development plans were closely linked to centralised economic 
plannmg. As Ibm remarks, "skill development became an integral part of overall economic 
strategy" (Ibm 1999: 311). Manpower Development Plans were proposed according to the 
Five Year Econonuc Development Plans. Moreover, as Amsden argues, government 
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intervention in education and training was strengthened to catch up with the developed 
countries, as Korea was a "late industrializer" (Amsden 1989: 118). In this regard, the 
government designed the framework of vocational education and training according to 
economic development strategies. 
In establishing the skills fonnation system, the Economic Planning Board (EPB), 
established in 1961, played a major role by controlling and coordinating the ministries 
through economic planning, budget allocation and the evaluation of programmes. The 
manpower agency of the EPB fonned Manpower Development Plans, on the basis of the Five 
Year Economic Development Plans, through consultation with the Ministry of Education, the 
Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Science and Technology (Ashton et al. 1999: 64). To 
provide theoretical support for economic policies, Korean Development Institute (KDn was 
established and carried out research. Manpower planning was focused on quantitative targets 
rather than quality control. 
The linkages between economic development and educational expansion could be 
successful due to the high demand for education as well as the implementation of quotas 
based on manpower planning during the 1970s. The increasing demand for education was 
limited and directed by the quotas system. in which the maximum numbers of student by 
level and field of study for each college and university were controlled by the government. 
The quotas were based on the predictions of manpower plans and implemented through the 
centralised control of the MoE over the school and college admission and examination 
systems. In particular, quotas for vocational and general education were implemented through 
the upper secondary examination system, and entrance quotas for universities were set 
according to the field of study. 
In addition, the skills formation system relied on the coordinating role of the EPB, 
because vocational education and training were respectively under the control of the MoE 
and the MoL. One of the main issues regarding Korean skills formation is the fact that the 
vocational school curriculum has been separated from the qualification system, because the 
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qualification system is under the jurisdiction of the Korea Technical Qualification Testing 
Agency, within the MoL. 
Secondly, industrial relations and the labour market were controlled by pervasive 
force of coercion. The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was established shortly 
before the launch of the EPB. The Park regime could directly control and mobilize the whole 
society by commanding "the twin engines of the KCIA and the EPB" (Dh, J. K. 1999: 53). 
The KCIA was far more than just an intelligence-gathering organization. It quickly 
became an extremely powerful and pervasive force of coercion and control for the Park 
regime, not only in the political arena but also in the economic sector, even including 
labour control. (ibid. p. 53) 
While the EPB was a command centre for rapid economic growth, the KCIA used 
to be a more powerful command centre for political stability and national security. The KCIA 
played a major role in domestic political manipulations. 
Many of [uncompromising] intellectuals were dealt with brutally by the KCIA. Most of 
them did not literally lose their lives, but their "principled" stances cost them their 
livelihoods as they became "released professors" or "flred journalists" or 
"antirevolutionary elements". (ibid. p. 53) 
In particular, labour movements were severely suppressed because industrial 
relations were dealt in the name of national security. In this regard, the Korean 
developmental state was modelled on the pre-war developmental state of Japan. 
The Park regime was based on the combination of developmental ism and 
militarism (Choi, J.J. 2002). However, this military regime was successful in mobilizing the 
nation. involving "groups of economists, scientists, engineers, managers, entrepreneurs, and 
others who could embrace the concrete goals of rapid economic growth" (op.cit. p. 53). 
It was not difficult to mobilize the common people, who still led subsistence-level lives -
some one-third of them were under- or unemployed in the early 1960s - to follow Park's 
"marching orders" promising them jobs and liberation from poverty (Oh, J. K. 1999: 53) 
Thirdly, the framework of VET was rapidly established as a major means to 
promote skIlls fonnation. During the 1960s and 1970s, many specialised vocational upper 
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secondary schools were established. and in the 1970s technical schools were given particular 
priority for the supply of skilled workers, with administrative and financial support from the 
government. Vocational upper secondary schools have been classified into five types, namely 
agriculture. technical, commercial, fishery and marine, and home economics. While 
commercial school students were more than half of the total number of vocational school 
students, and the majority of the schools are private, technical schools were gradually 
expanded by government policy and the majority of the schools are public. The government 
introduced many policy measures to strengthen the vocational education in the 1970s. These 
included: 
(1) Specialization oftecbnica1 high schools; (2) strengthening experiments and practices 
in vocational education; (3) initiation of the industry-school cooperation system; (4) 
establishment of certification standards for practical skill tests for vocational high school 
students; (5) compulsory certification of skill qualifications; (6) promotion of vocational 
school teachers' competency in practical training; (7) increase in scholarships for 
vocational high school students; and (8) giving incentive points in the college and 
university entrance examination to those vocational school graduates who advanced to the 
same field of study in colleges and universities as the field they studied at high school 
(Kim. Y.H. 2000: 103) 
As a result, the number of students and schools greatly increased, from 275, 015 
and 481 in 1970 to 764,187 and 605 in 1980 respectively (Statistical Yearbook of Education 
1997:317). During the same period, the proportion of technical school students of the total of 
vocational school students increased from 25.0 % to 26.4 %. In addition, the proportion of 
vocational school students of the total of upper secondary school students also increased, 
from 42.3% to 45% between 1975 and 1980. With the rapid expansion of secondary schools, 
including vocational upper secondary schools, the lower and upper secondary school 
enrolment rates rapidly increased, from 54.1 and 29.3 in 1970 to 96.0 and 66.2 in 1980 
respectively. 
Further, as the Korean economy partly moved from labour-intensive to capital- or 
sktll-intenslve industry m the 19705, the demand for middle-level technicians promoted the 
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development of junior technical colleges offering two-year post-secondary school 
programmes. In addition, during the early 1970s, air and correspondence education for upper 
secondary and two-year junior college levels was opened to working peoples, housewives and 
others who had lost the chance to have upper secondary or higher education. 
It was also during the 1960s and 1970s that the government enacted the Vocational 
Training Act and launched the public vocational training system to meet demand for 
technical skills during rapid industrialisation. By the Act, the government established public 
training centres and could offer materials and information concerning training to employers 
who provided training for their employees, but under this Act, employers were not obliged to 
provide training. However, Kim argues, "[m]ost individual enterprises did not recognise the 
necessity of such training at that time because industrial development was still in an 
embryonic stage and there was an abundance of good quality labor" (Kim, Y.H. 2000: 103). 
As most employers preferred poaching to training employees when they needed skilled 
workers during rapid economic development, the government again introduced a levy system 
for vocational training by the Special Measures Act for Vocational Training in 1974. 
According to the Act, private enterprise with above 200 employees should provide training 
for at least 15% of their employees every year, and if they failed to train, or if their training 
could not meet government regulations, they would pay a fine. As a result, during the third 
(1972-76) and fourth (1977-81) Five Year Economic Development Plans, about 310,000 and 
495,000 workers respectively were trained in public, authorised and in-plant training centres. 
However, this training was focused on initial vocational training. In addition, in 1976 the 
government enacted the Basic Vocational Training Act, which became the basis of the 
current vocational training system. 
Fourthly, values education was emphasised as a main part of skills development; 
education for "morality and national ethics" was strongly stressed in formal education and 
training (ibid. p. 113). Education of this consciousness has contributed to developmental 
skills formation. not only by fostering the collective consciousness through "emphasis on 
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sacrificing oneself and obeying the rules for the organization and the nation", but by 
uintemalising the [group] norm[ s] and attitudes to match the structure of social relationships 
of the labour market" (ibid. p. 113). Stress on anti-communism also contributed to apathy 
towards independent trade unions by linking labour movements to communist movements. In 
this regard, developmental skins formation stressed, as a way of nation-building, political 
stability as wen as economic development. This distinctive characteristic of consciousness 
education enables skins formation to be explained with regard to both economic development 
and nation-building. 
For example, to stress 'loyalty, self-sacrifice, compliance, co-operation, hard-
working, endurance and thrift', Ethics, Korean History, Physical Education and Military 
Training were compulsory in upper secondary schools. In addition, the curriculum and 
teaching activities were under strict control, and individual schools had very little autonomy 
in choosing textbooks, teaching materials, and course subjects. Even universities not only had 
to provide many compulsory subjects such as National Ethics, Military Training, Korean 
History, Korean Language, and Physical Education, but also were under constant surveillance 
in relation to student movements. Secondary schools and universities were regimented, and 
the military spirit was spread through the imposition of militarised student unions and 
military training. 
Fifthly, another distinctive characteristic of Korean skills formation was the rapid 
educational expansion with a low education budget. Compared to other countries, the level of 
public spending on education has been low in Korea. While the ratio of public education 
expenditures to GNP increased from 1.8% in 1965 to 4.2% in 1993, the ratio in other Asian 
countries (except Arab countries) increased from 3.5% to 4.3% (ibid. p. 109, Table VI). The 
Korean education system not only maintained large class sizes and high student-teacher 
ratios, but also adopted multiple shifts to overcome the shortage of school buildings. 
Moreover, the governments encouraged "the private sector to establish private schools by 
providing a coherent set of financial incentives such as tax exemption and public subsidies" 
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(ibid. p. 112). As a result, the percentage of enrolment in private schools reached 60% for 
high schools in 1995. However, the government controlled the tuition fees for private schools 
at the same level as that for public schools by providing "direct financial subsidies to private 
middle schools since 1971 and to private high schools since 1979" (ibid. p. 112). In addition, 
the government also strictly controlled the school curriculum with textbooks and the national 
examination system 
Another way to rapid educational expansion with a low education budget was to 
impose the financial burden on parents and students. For example, amongst the total 
education expenditure in 1994, equivalent to 11.8% of the GNP, parents and students had to 
pay 2.07% of the GNP in the form of tuition and fees, as well as 6.03% of GNP in the form 
of private lessons (ibid. p. 111, Table VIll). The total payment of parents and students was 
more than twice the government's budget. This means that the national system has been 
maintained by the state power based on the justification of 'equality'. 
IV-4-2. Problems facing the Korean developmental skills formation system since 1980s 
As seen in the previous section, when the framework for developmental skills 
formation was rapidly established during the 1960s and 19705, it contributed to nation-
building as well as to rapid economic development. In particular, the strong and well-
organised initiatives of the state made skills formation based on manpower planning possible. 
However, particularly since the 1980s, the vocational track has had the low reputation of 
constituting 'second class' education for those who failed to enter universities. This low 
social status of the vocational routes contributed to the drift away from vocational tracks into 
general and humanities tracks leading to universities. The drift is also related to "poor 
working conditions, lack of promotion opportunities and a distaste for menial and repetitive 
tasks, which do not necessarily require 3 years of technical education at high schools" (!hm 
1999: 312). Therefore the problems facing Korean developmental skills formation since the 
1980s need to be analysed in two levels: the VET system and the labour market. 
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The VET and qualifications system established in the 1970s significantly 
contributed to the provision of 'low wage and disciplined' workforces. However, the political 
concern with the initial VET system was weakened by the political and social pressures for 
the massive expansion of higher education during the 1980s and the 1990s (Ihm 1999: 314; 
PM I). For instance, higher education enrolment quotas were drastically expanded in 1981, 
when there were an additional 30 per cent and 15 per cent of university and junior college 
students respectively. By contrast, there were no efforts to enhance the esteem of vocational 
high schools. This shows that military governments underplayed the need for continuing 
investment in VET in dealing with rapid economic and social changes during the 1980s and 
until the early 1990s; this neglect is mainly because the initial VET system was regarded as 
providing low wage labour for the manufacturing sector, and quantity-oriented policies 
underplayed the need for quality in VET. Therefore, it is not surprising that large firms also 
became less interested in school-industry collaboration, and the division between school and 
industry increased. 
More important, the structural problems facing the Korean developmental skills 
formation system can be analysed, by focusing on the widening wage and productivity 
differentials between big companies and SMEs since 1980s. Chaebol-oriented economic 
development contributed to widening the wage and productivity differentials, between large 
firms and SMEs. As a consequence, while SMEs have suffered from a persistent shortage of 
lower-level skilled labour, a surplus of white-collar workers has become a social problem 
(ibid. pp: 314-5). The widening wage and productivity differentials have led to a crucial 
weakness in skills formation in relation to the diffusion of skills. The proportion of SMEs, 
with fewer than 300 employees, is the vast majority of the total number of enterprises and 
employees in Korea. SMEs include as many as 99.9% of the total number of enterprises and 
81.6% of total number of employees by 1994 (Kang, S.H., 1998: 4). 
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IV-4-2-I. Widening size wage differential and productivity differential 
Most important, the widening wage and productivity differentials between large 
fInns and SMEs became serious barriers to wide skill diffusion and an integrated VET 
system. Chaebol-oriented economic development resulted in widening these differentials. It 
is worth mentioning that the wage differential grew even while educational wage differentials 
played a major role in decreasing overall wage inequality in the 1980s (You and Lee 1999) 48. 
The average wage at small establishments of 5-19 employees declined to 51 percent of 
that of large establishments with 300 employees or more in 1996 from 66 percent in 
1980. . .. The anomaly of worsening size wage differential in the midst of overall 
improvement in wage distribution in the 1980s is closely tied to the peculiarities of the 
industrial structure in Korea (You and Lee 1999: 14). 
You and Lee continue by remarking on the problems of the productivity 
differential. 
Of even greater concern is the productivity differential across firm size in Korea. In 
Japan, the productivity differential between large companies and SMEs showed little 
change between 1981 and 1995, while in Korea the differential widened substantially 
from 51 percent to 38.9 percent during the period. (ibid. p. 17). 
The widened productivity differential became a crucial wealrness in skills 
formation in relation to wide skills diffusion. 
Moreover, the widening wage and productivity differentials resulted in a labour 
market heavily polarized between large firms belonging to Chaebol groups and SMEs 
subcontracting to large firms. In addition, the rapid expansion of higher education enrolment 
quotas since 1981 resulted in a "persistent shortage of lower-level skilled and temporary 
workers, and a surplus of white-collar workers" (Ibm 1999:314-5). As a consequence, while 
large firms increasingly employed highly qualified workforce, SMEs experienced difficulties 
in recruiting even low-skilled workforces. 
48 According to Fields and Yoo (1998), the Gini Coefficient continuously decreased from .355 to .287 between 
1981 and 1992. 
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The wage differential was stable only between 1988 and 1992, mainly because 
SMEs experienced a very high labour shortage (op.cit. p.l6). The shortage was mainly 
because large companies increased the ratio of subcontracting or outsourcing in order to 
resist trade unions during the peak period of union organizing and strikes. For instance, large 
finns subcontracted because of the "relatively low wages of union-free SMEs" (ibid. p.17). 
As a consequence, the ratio of subcontracting finns among SMEs rapidly increased, from 
36.5 per cent to 63.2 per cent during the same period. In addition, in the manufacturing 
sector, the rate of employment in large firms decreased from 48.9 per cent of in 1981 to 30.8 
per cent in 1996. Therefore,the duality between large firms and SMEs became a barrier to 
building an integrated skills formation system. 
IV-4-2-2. Increasing limitations of quantity-oriented manpower planning 
In this context, the issue of skills mismatch between demands and supplies was 
increasingly raised. Manpower planning by the EPB was mainly focused on the centralised 
quantity control of a qualified workforce on the basis of the prediction of national skills 
needs. However, the quantity-oriented control mechanism became problematic, because as 
the economy developed, linking skills supply with future skills demand was increasingly 
difficult and complicated. For example, although SMEs demanded many vocational school 
graduates or trainees from training institutes, labour market entrants avoided working in 
SMEs. 
More important, the polarization of the labour market contributed to the 
deterioration of vocational high schools, because they were left without appropriate 
investment for providing low wage workforces for SMEs for more than a decade. This was a 
serious VET policy failure, because as large finns were less interested in vocational high 
schools, industry-school collaboration weakened, and as a result, vocational education 
curricula were distanced from the demand of industries. The reputation of vocational high 
schools worsened and they were regarded as second-class schools for those who failed to get 
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a place in academic high schools. As a consequence, large or medium-sized firms tended to 
prefer those who graduated from academic high schools and participated in short-term 
vocational training programmes (Kim, S., 1987). Moreover, as vocational high school 
graduates lost confidence in their jobs, they would not stay long in these (Dun et al 1992) 
This seems to be a result of poor working conditions, lack of promotion opportunities and 
a distaste for menial and repetitive tasks, which do not necessarily require 3 years of 
technical education at high schools (Ihm 1999: 312). 
In this context, it is not surprising that the government's "vocationalisation" plan 
failed to reach the target of drastically increasing the ratio of vocational high school 
enrolment from 68:32 to 50:50 between 1991 and 1995. This failure shows why traditional 
manpower planning was no longer workable. There was increasing industrial demand for 
skilled workers due to persistent shortages of production workers. As mentioned above, the 
industries suffering from shortages of workforce were mainly composed of SMEs not least 
because the ratio of subcontracting rapidly increased between 1988 and 1992. However, by 
1991, the advancement rate of middle school graduates to high schools reached 97.5 per cent. 
This means that a main reservoir of cheap labour was nearly drained away, because public 
training centres recruited trainees mainly amongst those who left school earlier, particularly 
in rural areas, and provided cheap skilled labour for SMEs (Lee, J.H. 1996). 
Therefore, the vocational high schools were left to provide low-wage skilled 
workforces for SMEs. However, despite intense institutional and financial support, the ratio 
of academic to vocational enrolment was only 61 :39. This was mainly because the low 
esteem for vocational education drove parents and students into enthusiasm for higher 
education (Ihrn 1999). Parents and students preferred the academic track leading to 
universities at any cost, because they believed that it would provide better career 
opportunities. Moreover, as the school age cohort decreases, vocation high schools have 
found increasing difficulties in recruiting entrants. 
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This complicated labour market made manpower planning impractical, because it 
used to be based on initial VET on the grounds that vocational high schools graduates would 
find work if large firms or SMEs provided places, and that most of them would stay in their 
first job for all their lives. 
IV-4-2-3. Disconnection between VE and VT and qualifications 
The division between vocational education and vocational training and 
qualifications contributed to the weak connection between vocational high schools and 
industries. As seen above, vocational education and training were completely separated, 
under the control of the MoE and the MoL respectively. Moreover, the vocational high 
school curriculum was also unconnected to the qualifications system, because the latter was 
controlled by the MoL. It is not surprising that employers complained that "knowledge and 
skills acquired in vocational high schools are outdated and do not keep up with the changes 
occurring in the workplace" (Ibm 1999: 312). In this regard, the problems which have risen 
are the lack of the institutional involvement of social partners in VET policy decisions and 
the weak role of the qualifications system in enhancing the quality of VET. 
[T]here are virtually no functioning channels for the industry and labor to participate in 
major decision-making regarding vocational and technical education and training. In 
addition, the job qualification system is not effective in controlIing the quality of 
vocational education and training (You and Lee 1999: 24). 
IV-4-2-4. Confrontational industrial relations andfirm-based unionism 
As seen in the previous section, Korean developmental skills formation was built 
on the severe suppression of independent trade union movements. The suppression resulted 
in the militant trade unions. Most employers were antagonistic towards trade unions, which 
were excluded from decision-making and the implementation of training. Therefore trade 
unions showed little interest in training, because it was perceived as a means to control 
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employees. In this regard, it was almost impossible to develop functioning channels for 
industry and labour to participate in VET together. 
More important, Chaebol-oriented industrial relations and the suppression of trade 
unions resulted in enterprise unionism. This contributed to widening wage differential 
between large firms with strong trade unions and union-free SMEs. You and Lee point out 
the relation between Chaebols and firm-based unions. 
Most of these firms are unionized and pay substantial wage premiums. It seems fair to say 
the wage premium of large companies is made possible by the economic rents acquired 
by Chaebol. The enterprise unions in large companies are sharing these rents with the 
fIrms. (1999: 15) 
The enterprise unionism has prevented trade unions from participating in the policy 
decisions. The firm-based trade-unionism policies, along with industrial relations policies, 
were under the control of the MoL. 
IV -5. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined historically the characteristics of the developmental 
state and developmental skills formation in Korea. The most important characteristic is the 
combination of developmentalism and militarism in the context of the confrontation between 
South and North Korea. The military regime was successful in mobilizing the nation, driving 
rapid economic growth. However, as stressed above, rapid industrialization was driven on the 
oppression of political dissidents and trade unions. In this respect, the developmental 
mechanism was based on the combination of "economic planning" and "political 
manipulations". Centralized political control and economic planning and stress on moral 
education and discipline were the main characteristics of developmental skills formation in 
Korea. Therefore, in this model, the characteristics and capability of the government strongly 
defined the direction of educational policies. In an authoritarian developmental state, other 
valuable purposes of education, including critical thinking and democratic participation, are 
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likely to be underestimated. Therefore it is not surprising that the phenomenon of 
"economization of education" was also prevalent in relation to economic planning49 . 
The Korean skills fonnation system has several distinctive features. First, the 
distinctive division between education and training still remains: vocational education and 
training are the responsibility of the MoE and the MoL respectively. Secondly, the divisions 
between vocational education and general education are more complex: particularly, key 
policies relating to vocational education have been strongly affected by economy-related 
Ministries. Thirdly, the division between formal education and infonnal education has not 
been overcome: liberal adult education and political adult education (in Korea, it is called 
'democratic citizenship education' or 'political education') are the responsibility of the MoE 
and the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs respectively. Fourthly, 
because the local education system has been directed by the MoE and has been separated 
from corresponding local government institutions, residents' participation in the process of 
educational policy-making has been prevented. 
In addition, as this chapter has analysed, there are other structural problems facing 
the Korean developmental skills formation system since 1980. In this regard, the next chapter 
will examine why the developmental state and developmental skills formation have been 
changing under the pressure of democratisation and economic globalisation. 
49 I am indebted to Bemstein, B. for this concept. During his reading group seminar at the Institute of Education in 
1999, he used the word when he described the phenomenon in which decisions and implementation of 
educational policies are carried out according to the primary economic development strategies. 
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Chapter V. Changing skills formation, mobilised civil society and 
economic globalisation 
V-I. Introduction 
This chapter explores why developmental skills formation started to change in the 
late 1980s. It stresses changing relations between the state and civil society under the 
pressure of democratisation and economic globalisation. In relation to the changing roles of 
the state and mobilized civil society, different definitions of civil society, which derive form 
Marxist, liberal democratic and anti-authoritarian approaches, are analysed. Finally, this 
chapter discusses how such factors as mobilized civil society, globaIisation, ICT and 
demographic change affect developmental skills formation. 
V -2. Changing relations between the state and civil society under the 
pressure of democratisation and economic globalisation 
Korean society has moved from a military authoritarian regime towards a 
democratic regime since 1987. The June people's movement of 1987 became the turning 
point for political democratisation in that it paved the way for democracy-building and 
brought the revival of direct presidential elections in December 1987. After the movement, 
independent labour union movements expanded, and many civil associations were 
established. In 1993, a civilian government came to power after three decades of military 
rule. Since then, as the previous government made active participation In 
Segyehwa[globalisation] a priority on its policy agendas, economic liberalisation was 
accelerated. 
The developmental state mainly rested on "doubled-edged, relative autonomy", 
namely "relative autonomy vis-a-vis the global economy" and "relative autonomy vis-a-vis 
society" (Castells 1999: 325). Therefore both economic globalisation and democratisation 
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gave critical blows to the developmental state. Moreover, as they happened almost at the 
same time, they strongly influenced each other. In this context, the issue of education reform 
has been put high on governments' political agendas for coping with rapid changes in the 
global economy. 
In this section and the next chapter, this thesis will examine how economic 
globalisation and democratisation have weakened the controlling power of the developmental 
state, and how the developmental skills formation systems have changed. 
V-2-1. The demise ofthe Cold War system and globalisatioD 
The demise of the Cold War system in the late 1980s became the major geopolitical 
context for the end of military rule in Korea. As mentioned above, the Cold War system was 
the main cause of the division of the Korean peninsula and defined the condition in which the 
Park military regime came to power in the name of anti-Communist nation-building. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the following demise of the Cold War system provided a 
changed situation in which for the developmental state it was difficult to suppress or control 
civil society, including social associations, by force. 
The fundamental change in the geopolitical context was one of the main causes of 
change in the Korean developmental state and the skills formation system. The demise of the 
Cold War system decreased of the military tension and paved the way for peaceful co-
existence between South and North Korea. In addition, economic globalisation has been 
accelerated by the demise of the Cold War system, as well as by the revolution in ICT. Such 
significant changes, as well as economic globalisation and political democratisation, have 
changed the nature of developmental state and the skills formation system. 
In the process of economic liberalisation, while independent trade unions were 
again vitali sed by the struggle to protect their job security, Chaebols also increased their 
economic power by borrowing funds from foreign financial market directly. In particular, the 
process of financial liberalisation was not carefully planned, but was distorted by the 
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influence of Chaebols on the government as well as by international financial institutions 
such as the OEeD and the IMF. As a consequence, the Korean economy was rapidly exposed 
to the volatile global economy. 
As part of its radical economic reforms, the previous government abolished the 
distinctive features of the Korean developmental state, including the Economic Planning 
Board which had been the main body regarding economic planning and coordinating since 
the early 1960s. In addition, the government "placed great emphasis on joining the OECD" as 
one of the so-called Segeyhwa (globalisation) strategies, and the "OECD made financial 
openness a condition of membership" (Wade and Veneroso 1998: 9). Chaebo/s also 
influenced the government to open up the financial market without any appropriate 
monitoring system, because they knew that they "could borrow abroad half as cheaply as they 
could at home" (ibid. p.1 0). As a result, the government 
loosened controls on companies' foreign borrowings, abandoned coordination of 
borrowings and investments, and failed to strengthen bank supervision (Wade and 
Veneroso 1998: 9). 
In this context, the government could no longer exercise strict control over business 
with "foreign currency allocations", which used to be "its decisive tool for implementing 
industrial policy" (Johnson 1982: 25). This caused the crisis of the economic regulatory 
system of the Korean developmental state. Foreign debt, most of it private and short-term, 
ballooned "from very little in the early 1990s to roughly $160 billion by late 1997" (op. cit. 
p.IO). The carelessly planned economic liberalisation by the previous government, including 
the loss of control of foreign currency without a new and appropriate regulatory system, was 
the main cause of the financial crisis in 1997. 
V -2-2. The rise of civil society and democratisation 
As mentioned in the previous section, the reduced military tension in the Korean 
peninsula and the global economy based on ICT weakened the controlling power of the 
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developmental state in relation to civil society. Moreover, the rise of civil society accelerated 
the speed of this weakening. Therefore the relations between the state and civil society have 
been changing, from the state's direct control representing the dominant power of the military 
regime and Chaebols towards state-coordinated partnership resting on the balance between 
the forces of civil society, including business, the working class and professional groups. 
The main issue arising now is how the changing roles of the state and civil society 
can be explained. For this, controversial definitions of civil society need to be examined. 
There are different definitions of civil society. First, the concept of civil society is defined as 
the sphere of private egoism or self-interest. This classic definition of civil society originated 
in 18th century and was developed by Hegel and Marx (Keane 1988:31). Hegel defined civil 
society in this way; he regarded the bureaucracy in the modem state as the means to realise 
the universal interest and argues that the state can secure the common interest of all its 
citizens instead of the war of each against all (Jessop 1982: 4-5). 
Marx also regarded civil society as the sphere of egoism. However, in his early 
writings, he criticised Hegel's analysis, arguing that state power and the bureaucracy are used 
to protect private property and class interests rather than the universal interest, which is a 
pure abstraction (ibid. pp. 4-5). Marx and Engels argued, in The German Ideology, that "the 
state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests" 
(ibid. p.12)so. In addition, the form of the state is a reflection of the economic base of society 
and of the balance of class forces (ibid. p. 9). 
By contrast, Gramsci defined civil society as the sphere in which power struggles 
between different forces take place. He argued that civil society is "ethical or moral society" 
in which the "hegemony of the dominant class has been built up by means of political and 
ideological struggles" (Simon 1982: 69). Moreover, Gramsci insisted that the state rests on a 
balance between the forces of civil society rather than simply reflecting interests of the ruling 
class. Simon tries to explain Gramsci's view with the concept of relative autonomy. 
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Although a hegemonic class predominates in the state, it cannot use the state simply to 
impose its interests on other classes. The life of the state has a 'relative autonomy' from 
the ruling class, because it is the outcome of the balance offorces (ibid. p. 67). 
Second, somewhat distinct from the European tradition, is the American tradition 
of liberalism and democratic localism, where civil society is defined as a sphere in which 
civil associations "foster patterns of civility in the actions of citizens in a democratic polity" 
(Foley and Edwards 1996: 39). Probably the most prominent proponent of this perspective 
was Alexis de TocqueviUe who, in his book entitled Democracy in America. emphasised the 
positive role of civil associations for governance (ibid. p. 39). In this perspective, Putnam 
emphasises the importance of "networks of civic engagement" within which members cut 
across social cleavages for the sake of wider cooperation (Putnam 1993). He also suggests 
that "to the extent that social capital is of a 'bridging' sort - then the enhanced cooperation is 
likely to serve broader interests" (Putnam 1995). In this 'liberal democratic' approach, 
politicised organisations, including political parties, are excluded from the civic networks. 
However, as Foley and Edwards argue, how can such civic networks successfully shape 
political participation unless, in some form, they are engaged in political issues? (Foley and 
Edwards 1996: 41). By contrast, broad civic engagement may positively contribute to good 
governance in the particular context that such civic networks have been built on the 
democratic political system, including political parties. 
Third, another definition of civil society is that is a "counterweight to the state", 
although this definition seems to be part of the Tocqueville tradition. (ibid. p. 39). This anti-
authoritarian' approach has been credited by civil movement in Latin America, Eastern 
Europe and Asia that struggle or have struggled against the authoritarian state (ibid. p. 42). 
As in the democratic transition in these contexts, autonomy from the established political 
system has been important for wide civic engagement, because established political parties 
have failed to get wide support from people. Therefore, civil society is regarded as an 
However, they also talk of the 'relative autonomy' of the state in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon. 
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"autonomous sphere of social power" which can democratise the society from below (ibid. p. 
46). However, the problem is that when a democratic government came to power, the 
established interest groups could resist the reallocation of social resources by the 
government, asserting the autonomy of civil society, and thus undermine the power of the 
government. Also, "social blocs" may provoke conflicts between regions or professions to 
protect their own interests or to "battle for control of the state" (ibid. p. 46). 
As seen above, Marxist, liberal democratic and anti-authoritarian approaches 
emphasize the conflict between the state and civil society in different ways. However, their 
approaches are also very different with regard to the boundary of civil society as well as the 
relationship between civil society and democratic governance. Whereas the liberal approach 
regards civil society as requiring good governance based on broad networks of civil 
engagement independent of political associations or movements, the anti-authoritarian 
approach stresses civil society as a counterweight to the authoritarian state, focusing on the 
role of civil movements. Foley and Edwards succinctly point to the limits of these two 
approaches. 
The civil society argument binges on the virtues of association and of organized society 
per se; it cannot confront the conflictual potential thereof by definitional sleight of hand, 
but neither can it ignore the conflict at the heart of the modem "organizational society" 
(ibid. p. 43). 
In the recent democratic transition in Korea, the Marxist, the liberal and the 
anti-authoritarian approaches have been used together, without a precise definition of civil 
society in this more complex context. Since the Democratic Movement of June 1987, 
citizens' movements such as the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), the 
Korean Federation of Environmental Movement (KFEM), the People's Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and YMCA have rapidly become influential, differentiating 
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themselves from so-called minjung movements (Kim, S.H. 1996; Kim, H.R. 2000il. Whereas 
minjung movements have rapidly lost people's support due to their clinging to a class-based 
theory and a militant struggles against the state and Chaebols, the citizens' movements have 
increased their influence on government policies as well as their support from the general 
public, insisting on peaceful demonstrations based on suggesting policy alternatives. 
Moreover, the citizens' movements have rejected the class-based theory, and have 
emphasized the importance of civil society as a basis for building democracy, and then 
differentiate civil society from the state and market. More important, since the civilian 
government came to power in 1993, regulations regarding the establishment and operation of 
civil organisations have changed. For example, in 1994 the registration system for civil 
associations changed, from requiring registration upon establishment to allowing it after 
establishment. The Act of 1963 has been criticised as a weapon to "suppress anti-government 
activities" by active civil associations (Kim, H.R. 2000: 601). As a result, the number of 
various civil organisations has rapidly increased under the auspices of the autonomy of civil 
society. 
Since 1987, more than 70 per cent of the total number of existing Korean NGOs, 
selected by the criteria of being non-state (state includes state-patronised) and non-profit, 
have been established (ibid. p. 603)52. Since then, citizens' movements, particularly those led 
by former leaders of student or minjung movements, have rapidly expanded, "differentiating 
themselves from the class-based militant, so-called 'minjung' movements" (ibid. p. 600). By 
contrast, the militant minjung movements, which represented the working class, have lost 
public support, as the public prefers peaceful reforms to revolutionary transformation, 
particularly since the civilian government came to power in 1993. Therefore, citizens' 
movements, based on the middle class and professionals rather than the working class, started 
51 These three representative NGOs except YMCA (Seoul YMCA was established in 1903) are established after 
the 1987 movement. For example, the CCEJ in 1989, the KFEM (created by the Korean Anti-Pollution 
Movement Association established in 1988) in 1994, the PSPD in 1994. 
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to represent public opinion and lead on social issues. In this context, fonner leaders of 
student or minjung movements or active members of citizens' movements, particularly those 
with professional jobs such as professors and lawyers, have participated in political parties, 
led by the previous or the present President, and in governments. 
More important, in 2000 the previous government introduced the Non-Profit 
Voluntary Organisation Act, in order to promote the voluntary sector. As a consequence, the 
state-patronised organisations have lost their privileges, which had been provided by the 
military regime to control them, and the government subsidy for them has decreased. By 
contrast, NGOs have been granted a significantly increased amount of public fund. In 
conclusion, particularly since 1993, the relationship between the state and civil society has 
rapidly changed. Regulations have been changing, from the state-directed mobilisation 
towards the state-supportive mobilisation of civil society. 
However, as mentioned above, the imprecision definition of civil society tends to 
focus on the conflict between the state and civil society, and this seems to contribute to 
weakening the power of the state. Therefore, for the institutionalisation of the partnership 
between the state and civil society in the transition to a democratic society, the relations 
between the state and civil associations and trade unions and business need to be analysed. At 
the same time, as recent political conflicts regarding economic and social refonns indicate in 
Korea, effective political institutions, including well-rooted political parties, are very 
important for successful reforms based on civil society. Therefore, the relations between the 
state and active civil society need to be cooperated on the basis of partnership between 
stakeholders. 
Choi, 1.1. argues in his book entitled Democracy after democratization (2002) that 
after democratisation, the focus of conflict has changed from 'state versus civil society' to 
'conservative civil society versus active civil society' (Choi, 1. 1 2002: 193). This means that 
S2 Kim analysed 730 NGOs selected from the total 3, 899 organisations in the Directory of Korean NGOs. 
according to his analysis, using criteria for NGOs such as being non-state (or non-state patronised) and non-
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for democracy, government has a role in promoting the participation of active social 
associations, reducing the influences of Chaebol and conservative civil society on the basis of 
regulation. 
V-3. The impact of mobilised civil society and globalisation on 
developmental skills formation 
With regard to changing skills formation, it is important to analyse the impact of 
mobilised civil society and globalisation on the institutions for developmental skills 
formation such as the developmental state, employers, labour and VET providers. Amsden 
points to the importance of "institutions of late industrialisation" (1989: 8). An 
"interventionist state, large diversified business groups, an abundant supply of competent 
salaried managers and an abundant supply of low-cost, well-educated labour" have played 
major roles in rapid economic development. 
Until 1992, authoritarian governments drove skills formation on the basis of 
economic and manpower planning. As mentioned above, the Economic Planning Board drew 
up the Five-Year Economic and Social Development Planss3 in which economic growth 
targets were set on the basis of employment expansion policies reflecting the growth rate of 
the economically active population (Lee, J.H. 1996: 36-7). Performance standards based on 
the economic growth targets were then imposed on big companies in return for subsidies and 
the provision of low-cost and well-disciplined labour. In addition, education quotas and 
training targets based on manpower demand projections were imposed on schools and 
training agencies, in return for funding and provision of teachers or instructors. Briefly 
speaking, the developmental state directed the whole process of skills formation from 
planning to implementation, controlling employer organisations, trade unions and VET 
profit (Kim, H.R. 2000: 598, 611). 
S3 The Five-Year Economic Development Plan was replaced by the Five-Year Economic and Social Development 
Plan after the fourth Five-Year Plan in 1977, reflecting societal demand for a balance between economic and 
social development. 
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providers. Therefore, to look at changes in skills formation, it is very important to investigate 
how the roles of the developmental state and VET providers have been challenged by 
employers and trade unions under the pressures of democratisation and globalisation, 
accelerated by the development of lCT. On the basis of this investigation, this thesis will 
analyse the emerging framework of VET and lifelong learning in relation to changing skills 
formation, focusing on regulations. 
The financial crisis became a turning point with regard to the emerging framework 
of VET and lifelong learning as well as to changing skills formation. Lifelong learning has 
been freshly recognised as a main means to cope with rapid change in the employment 
system as well as with the social demand for higher education. As the Faure Report (1972) 
emphasised, changes in the socio-economic context and technological revolution have been 
very important factors in promoting lifelong learning. 
Changes in socio-economic structures and the scientific and technological revolution 
make it [renovation in education] imperative (Faure et al. 1972: 105, emphasis in 
original). 
Therefore, with regard to the increasing social demand for lifelong learning, the 
impacts of mobilised civil society, globalisation and lCT on lifelong learning need to be 
examined. In this respect, this chapter will examine how these pressures affect institutions for 
skills formation and regulations for VET and lifelong education. 
Moreover, it will try to explain the characteristics of changing skills formation, 
compared to other East Asian developmental states such as Singapore or Taiwan, pointing 
out that the representation of labour has been institutionalised since the late 1990s on the 
basis of mobilised civil society. For example, the Tripartite Commission was set up to cope 
with conflicts over employment adjustment issues caused by the economic crisis. As 
experienced in the Tripartite Commission, the democratic transition contributed to 
institutionalising the representation of labour and moreover to the changes in skills 
formation. In addition, Korea has already become one of the most Web-connected countries 
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in the worlds4• The rapid development of the IT infrastructure has dramatically promoted 
lifelong learning, coinciding with the mobilisation of civil society and the pressures of 
globalisation. It was not only rapidly increased the social demand for IT-related education 
and training, but also itself provides a significant condition that promotes the participation of 
civil society in lifelong learning in practice. In this context, this chapter will investigate how 
the nature of the state, Chaebols and trade unions is changing in relation to changing skills 
formation and lifelong learning. 
V-3-1. Globalisation 
Up to the mid-1980s, rapid economic development was mainly ascribed to the 
success of the industrial policy based on selective protection and the state control of finance. 
However, the economic success of the developmental state model resulted in changes in 
political and economic circumstances after the late 1980s. The pressures of economic 
globalisation prompted a "shift from bureaucratic discipline towards a greater reliance on 
market discipline" (You and Lee 1999: 7). In addition, You and Lee point out, the "decline of 
the potential growth rates in the 1990s" makes "modifying the institutional mechanisms" 
necessary for continuing economic success (ibid. p. 7). 
The recent Presidential Commission on Education Reform (PCER) Reports, 
Education Reform for the 2Ft Century, stress the concept of 'globalisation' (segyehwa) and 
the 'information society' as the main background for the proposal of an 'open and lifelong 
education society' which allows everybody equal access to education at any time and place 
(PCER 1997: 12-16, 20). The PCER reports proposing reforms dramatically addresses 
globalisation as one of the most notable features of the change to come . 
... the world has become a "world without economic borders." Globalization should be 
taken into account in designing a national survival and development strategy to meet the 
challenges of the next century. Without a proper plan to counter the challenges of the new 
54 See Time (Asia) December II, 2000. http://www.time.com!asialmagazine/20001l211/coverl.html 
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civilisation and era, we would be condemned to fall behind the rest of the world in 
history. (peER 1997: 12). 
This quotation clearly explains that the challenge of 'national competitiveness' is 
the major reason for adopting a new education system for 'open and lifelong education'. Its 
approach to globalisation seems to stress, to great extent, borderless economic competition 
and economic liberalisation. In other words, globalisation is regarded as the major 
phenomenon which justifies neo-liberal approaches to restructuring the developmental 
mechanism. However, it is worth mentioning that whilst there has sometimes been an 
automatic equation between economic liberalisation and democracy, particularly amongst 
neo-liberals, we should beware of this equation because many countries, such as Chile and 
the Philippines under Marcos, have liberalised under authoritarian regimes. 
The Reports point out that some educational problems should be overcome in order 
to sharpen the nation's competitive edge in the era of information technology and 
globalisation. However, they focus on the problems of formal education: the education 
system oriented to university entrance examinations, that results in a lack of creativity; the 
heavy burden of spending on private tuition which in 1994 reached 5.8 percent of GNP and 
exceeded the government's budget for education, which was 3.8 percent of GNP; the 
government's strict regulation of school administration, with standardised textbooks and the 
tight application of the national curriculum, which has made it impossible for schools to 
provide diverse educational programmes; and the weakening of the moral perspective in 
education, which has resulted from the present system of learning by rote memorisation 
(peER 1997: 17-19). 
In this respect, the Reports suggest the need to transform the Korean burning 
passion for education into constructive energy by building an open and lifelong education 
system to redirect this enthusiasm. They emphasise the directions of globalisation 
(liberalisation), devolution (democracy) and privatisation. However, they not only tend to 
separate education from training, but link lifelong education mainly to access to higher 
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education, addressing lifelong 'education' rather than lifelong 'learning' which would 
include education and training together. In this respect, suffice it to say here that whilst the 
Reports suggest a direction toward 'lifelong education' or a 'learning society', their proposals 
are still narrow and supply-driven, focusing on 'solving fonnal education problems' rather 
than overhauling the whole education and training system. As a result, they seem to fail in 
attracting the attention of main social stakeholders such as employers and employees. 
However, since the financial crisis of 1997, the focus of lifelong learning policies 
have been moving from solving fonnal education problems to building a new framework for 
vocational education and training with regard to rapid changes in the labour market system 
such as increasing "flexibility" and the serious level of unemployment. In this respect, the 
concept of 'human resource development (HRD)' suddenly has become important in relation 
to a new framework for VET and lifelong learning, and later the Ministry of Education was 
replaced by the Ministry of Education and HRD in 2001. There is a real possibility of 
narrowness in the implementation of lifelong learning, although in the knowledge economy a 
new broad framework for lifelong learning is required, to build on the basis of a holistic 
approach to knowledge, skills and attitude. 
As the Korean economy depends absolutely on foreign trade, globalisation is, to 
some extent, an inevitable challenge. Since the economic crisis, it has become a crucial issue 
for education and training to cope with the effects of economic liberalisation on social 
cohesion as well as on national competitiveness. In return for the rescue fund from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), economic liberalisation has been accelerated under the 
pressure of the IMF. In this context, the government has emphasised the importance of 
hannony between 'democracy' and 'a market economy' in overcoming the economic crisis 
(see the inaugural address of Kim Dae-Jung). This means that the financial crisis may have 
provided the momentum for the Government to restructure the Chaebol-oriented economy 
into an entrepreneurial and flexible one. With the lack of a transparent system in the financial 
market, the dirigiste economy started to reveal structural problems resulting from the 
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collusion between the government and Chaebols after the 19808. Chaebols had become 
stronger by increasing their control over financial agents under the policies of economic 
liberalisation in the 1980s. When the civilian government came to power, they were so 
powerful that they distorted the liberalisation process and created "vulnerability in the 
financial system" (You and Lee 1999: 8). 
Although the Korean economy has rapidly recovered from the crisis, it has been 
fully exposed to the fluctuating global economy. For example, the Korean economy has 
increased its transparency, opening financial market after reducing the rate of banks' debt 
with public funds. However, the IMF structural adjustment programmes increased the gap 
between the well-off and the poor, by increasing irregular jobs and benefiting the few 
Chaebols at the expense of the many SMEs. The rate of atypical jobs has rapidly increased 
again, since the Asian economic crisis (Shim, S.W. 1999). As a consequence, the economy 
has recently shown fast growth, while many Asian economies, including Japan and even 
Singapore, are still in difficulties due to the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis. 
Therefore, it is very important to understand how the dynamics of democratic transition have 
contributed to economic reform as well as to rapid recovery and growth. These might be 
partly because the government could build a consensus on economic reform in urgent 
circumstances by bringing stakeholders together, as in the case of the Tripartite Commission. 
'Consensus building' has changed, from the exclusion to the inclusion of labour. This signals 
changing skills formation 
Moreover, since the economic crisis, there has been a broad consensus that the 
state-directed rapid economic growth strategies resulted in structured corruption linking 
politicians and Chaebols, and these strategies are no longer effective in Korea. As a result, 
Korean society has undergone restructuring at unprecedented levels (Lee, J.S. 1999). The 
direction of reform has been focused on the changing role of the government, including its 
being "confined to setting rules and monitoring activities of agents" with regard to the market 
economy (Kim, C.S.1999). Moreover, the President called for "private initiative and public 
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involvement" based on partnerships between civil society and the state with regard to 
democracy. (Kim, Dae-Jung, 1999). 
On the other hand, rapid cultural changes resulting from globalisation and ICT are 
giving rise to increasing friction and tension between old and new generations as well as 
between oriental and western cultures, particularly in a 'compressed growth' society. As 'the 
transformation of time and space' has propelled social life away from the hold of traditional 
culture and values, cultural 'self-identity' becomes problematic, as pre-modem customs and 
pre-established precepts co-exist with modem life-styles within the industrialised economic 
context (Giddens 1991: 14-21). The traditional culture and value system has lagged behind 
society's increasing material prosperity. In this respect, as well as the adaptation to rapidly 
changing economic circumstances, the ability to cope with a set of tensions reSUlting from the 
breakdown of traditional social ties and 'to play an active part in envisioning the future of 
society', has became increasingly important in the present-day world (UNESCO 1996: 61). In 
relation to the implications of the new era of globalisation for education, the PCER Report 
points to the importance of new citizenship based not only on the strengthening and 
deepening of the understanding of cultural heritage, but also on open minds, a multi-cultural 
perspective and the principles of autonomy and decentralisation (PCER 1997: 15-6). In 
particular, as Korea has been a mono-ethnic country for a long time, developing an 
intercultural perspective and cross-cultural communication skills has become important in the 
globalisation age. 
V -3-2. Mobilised civil society 
It is the varying relationship between the state and civil society that makes different 
responses to the globalisation pressure. As mentioned above, since the civilian government 
came to power, civil society has been rapidly mobilized, and its influence on VET and 
lifelong learning policies has significantly increased. In particular, trade unions, NGOs, and 
employers' organisations have played major roles in changing the relationship between the 
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state and civil society and their influence on policy-making and implementation has 
dramatically increased. As a result, the framework of skills formation has changed an 
institutional environment which is conducive to the rapid growth of VET and lifelong 
learning. For example, since the 1987 Democratic Movement, more than 70 per cent of the 
total number of Korean existing NGOs has been established (Kim, H.R. 2000: 603). In the 
process, the registration system for civil associations changed, from requiring registration 
upon establishment, which had been introduced to "suppress anti-government activities" after 
the enactment of 1963, to allowing it after establishment since 1994 (ibid. p. 601). The 
change has resulted in a rapid increase in the number of NGOs, which have increasingly 
contributed to the mobilisation of civil society by expanding in public space. 
[NGOs] have extended the scope of their activities in diverse social issues to ensure an 
environment conducive to the enlargement of public space, the expansion of citizens' 
rights, and the diffusion of pluralistic social life. ... Korean NGOs outside the formal 
apparatus of the state have come of age in dealing with diverse social issues in the public 
domain (ibid. p. 608). 
Moreover, the role of NGOs has rapidly increased because they have been 
"credited with providing social services, formulating public opinions, monitoring and 
criticizing social corruption, and suggesting creative alternatives to government policies" 
(Chung, S.B. 1999). For example, the government has entrusted 44 Women's HRD Centres 
(replaced Working Women's Houses in 2001) to Women's NGOs such as YWCAs or 
Women Workers' Associations since 1993. In particular, many NGOs provided education 
and training programmes for the unemployed with the support of government funds after the 
financial crisis in 1997-8. 
However, there was serious tension between the Kim Young-Sam government and 
active civil society when the government tried to pass two controversial laws in the National 
Assembly, suppressing opposition from trade unions and opposition parties (Shin, D.C. 1999: 
10). One was the National Security Planning Agency Act, which was to revive "[the NSPA's 
(former KCIA)] domestic political role of spying on Korean citizens", which was outlawed 
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after the civilian government came to power (ibid. p. 10). The other was the New Labour Act, 
which was intended to weaken trade unions by making "it easier for companies to dismiss 
workers, hire replacements for striking workers, and adjust working hours" in 1996 (ibid. 
p.lO). However, the mobilised civil society led by trade unions, NGOs, student groups and 
opposition parties resisted the government and finally annulled these two Acts. This event 
increased the momentum towards a new stage of democratic transition, because, with the 
political impacts of the financial crisis on voters, it paved the way for the opposition party to 
win in the coming presidential election for the first time for almost five decades. Since the 
Kim Dae-Jung government came to power, despite many conflicts between the Government, 
NGOs and trade unions, NGOs were regarded as partners in the process of democratisation, 
and trade unions have started to be represented as stakeholders in dealing with employment 
adjustment. 
More important, one of the most fundamental changes is the representation of trade 
unions as stakeholders in policy-making and implementation, reflecting the changing 
relationships between workers, employers and the government. As a result, the range of 
legislation regarding the participation of labour in vocational training has rapidly expanded 
For example, companies employing more than 30 full-time employees, except some 
companies prescribed by the Presidential Decree, are obligated to establish a 'Labour-
Management Council' in each business or workplace by the Workers' Participation and 
Cooperation Promotion Act of 1997. The Council has the status of a "consultation body" to 
'improve the welfare of workers and to ensure the sound development of business through 
participation and cooperation between workers and employers" (The 1997 WPCP Act). 
Although employers are still not enthusiastic about managing the Councils, the legislation 
paved the way for the participation of labour in promoting welfare and training at the 
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workplace.55 The councils are legally empowered to consult, resolve or report on important 
matters regarding workers' welfare and training every three months, irrespective of collective 
bargaining with a trade union. With regard to training, the main functions of the councils 
include 'consultation' regarding "recruitment, placement, education and training of workers", 
as well as 'resolutions' regarding the "establishment of employees' education and training 
plans and skills development schemes" (ibid.). In addition, a Central Consultative Body of 
Worker, Employers and the Government was established to "consult on main labour 
problems such as industrial relations, employment, workers' welfare relating to national 
industry, economy, and social policy, consisting of those who represent workers, employers, 
public interests and the Government" (ibid.). 
The Tripartite Commission was set up to build the 'Labour-Management-
Government' partnership mechanism for restructuring the employment system and the labour 
market after the financial crisis. Although it has mainly focused on industrial relations and 
employment issues, it has started to play a role in promoting the participation of labour in 
vocational training. It reached basic agreements entitled "agreements on the direction of 
improvement in the vocational training system" in July 200256• As it acknowledges, the 
agreements aim to deal with "changes in the structure of the labour market and invigorate 
development of workers' job skills". The objectives of the agreements include encouraging 
"participation by both Labor and Management in policy-making concerning development of 
job skills and the operation of related systems", enhancing "the efficiency of operation of 
systems" regarding finance from employment insurance for job skills development, and 
promoting "workers' voluntary education and training". Finally, the three parties agreed to 
"look for ways to form' financial resources for workers' voluntary education and training', to 
alleviate their burden". In addition, the Commission also reached an agreement on the 
SS In an interview with a member of staff of the Korea employers Federation (KEF), he described that although 
almost 99 percent of legally demanded companies established the 'Labour-Management Council', they are not 
seen to be enthusiastic in the management of the Council. 
S6 See http://www.lmg.go.kr/eng (24/02/2002) 
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"creation of employment for the youth" in April 2002. In this agreement, labour, management 
and the government agree to do their best to establish a regulatory mechanism supporting a 
smooth transition from education to the labour market. Although the role of the Commission 
is still a controversial issue between trade unions and employers, it is evident that it is a 
peculiar experiment in the transition of the Korean developmental state after the rise of the 
trade union movement and the financial crisis. 
The experiment of the Tripartite Commission was successful in "maintaining social 
stability and labour peace in the midst of massive deterioration in employment and social 
conditions" (You and Lee 1999: 28). However, the system has still some crucial institutional 
limitations, including the enterprise trade union system and confrontational industrial 
relations. 
The Vocational Training Promotion Act allows more choices for employers and 
employees in choosing types of training or course (standard or other training), teaching 
materials (state-edited or employer-edited). The government provides support directly to 
employees as well as employers for training expenses, facilities, tuition fees and expenses for 
qualification tests. As a result, participants in further training programmes dramatically 
increased, from 679,000 in 1997 to 1,239,000 in 2000, while those on initial training 
programmes declined from 78,000 to 61,000 during the same period (MoL 2001: 44). 
V -3-3. Development of information and communication technologies 
Korea has become one of the most Internet connected countries in the world, on the 
basis of the Broadband Internet Service Provision. By 2002, 15 cyber universities, which 
become a part of the higher education system by the Lifelong Education Act, more providing 
higher education programmes for 17,200 persons57 • The development of information and 
communication technologies (lCT) is not only a prerequisite for the implementation of 
57 The number of students is number of projected enrolment. See Jung. IS 2002: 27) 
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lifelong learning, but a major factor in expanding the social demand for lifelong learning. As 
Deleon (1985: 32) argues, the response to the expanding social demand may be a crucial 
element in the necessary transformation of educational systems and the learning process. In 
this connection, the development of ICT has been seen as a catalyst for the recent 
'compression of time and space' across the world and as a prerequisite for the 
implementation of educational reform to cope with the challenge of globalisation as well. 
Thus, most industrialised countries have made efforts to apply ICT in educational reform, 
focusing on raising learning standards and widening learning opportunities, and reflecting the 
rapidly changing mode of production, from so-called Fordism to post-Fordism. In this 
respect, it is not surprising that the PCER report argues that "continuing education and 
lifelong education are integral parts of an information society" and "the introduction of 
multimedia information technology into education will trigger revolutionary changes in the 
management of education systems, contents and teaching methods" (PCER 1997: 14). 
However, the purpose .and strategies of educational reform and the need to harness 
the potential of ICT are different according to the social, economic and cultural context. For 
the analysis of the role of ICT in educational reform, Guile identifies four perspectives on 
reform: economic, democratic, equity and developmental (Guile 1998: 5). He insists that each 
perspective offers a partial approach to any particular issue, and that it is the critical issue for 
the educational policy maker that all learners are to be "encouraged to develop their 
intellectual capability by using ICT as a resource to reflect, analyse and conceptualise" (ibid. 
p. 8). Furthermore, he distinguishes media (i.e. CD-ROMs) and integrated learning systems, 
primarily based on undertaking pre-set tasks through access to information from Computer 
Mediated Communication (CMC). The latter stresses communication and interaction between 
individuals, organisations and societies and increases "the scope for collective analysis, 
critical reflection and the production of new knowledge" (ibid. p. 11). The CMC approach, as 
he points out, emphasises the importance of "inquiry-based learning", reconceptualising the 
relationship between learning and ICT as a new pedagogic process. 
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Further, infonnation and communication technologies are regarded as a main 
locomotive for the "institutionalisation of lifelong education" (ibid. p. 14). The idea of an 
open learning society as the objective of the reform is mainly based on the utilisation of new 
infonnation technology in education. In particular, it seems to focus on making education 
accessible at any time and in any place through multimedia and an integrated education 
system (ibid. p. 15). However, this access-oriented approach based on the development of 
leT could have complex effects on education, in that technology cannot be a panacea. For 
example, those who stress the opportunity for equal access to leT often fail to pay attention 
to "how certain educational uses of leT may result in the emergence of new forms of social 
and educational divisions within societies" (Guile 1998: 7-8). In this context, despite the idea 
of lifelong learning for all, new technology could make the gap between information-rich and 
information-poor persons wider. In addition, whilst the access-oriented approach is likely to 
provide the underprivileged with a 'less expensive' alternative to formal education, the 
middle class or those above may still opt for formal education, providing better opportunities 
for the close interaction and dialogue with teachers and peers on which human social 
networks mainly depend. In this respect, as Young argues, the 'access model' could be 'a 
way of legitimating reduced spending on public education and therefore becoming a basis for 
new social division and inequalities' (Young 1998: 147). Therefore, the peER report seems 
to be too optimistic about access and outcomes in relation to the implications of new 
technologies for education and training. 
Moreover, as communication and interaction have been increasingly stressed with 
regard to leT, one of the main issues is how successfully cultural differences are addressed. 
In particular, as global networking becomes unencumbered by time and space and promotes 
mutual communications and collaboration, leT -oriented education trends to make the 
cultural perspective increasingly important. The media through which people communicate in 
a society condition their approach to space and time and have enormous effects on the 
formation of cultural and political views. 
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Therefore, in the information society, the re-formation of cultural identity and 
citizenship in cyber space is seen as a critical challenge to the promotion of participation in 
ICT -based interaction and learning. While ICT may playa crucial role in realising a learning 
society based on a new framework of learning and work, the trans-national free flow of 
information could undermine "the hegemony of the nation-state which has historically 
provided the basis of citizenship, national identity, nationhood, and party-political 
interests'''(Guile and Young 1996: 7). As Young argues, our understandings of change in the 
state, civil society and new citizenship are required: 
new concepts of connnunity, self-identification and social action emerging in the 
infonnation society are in the process of restructuring our common understandings of 
civil society and the role of the citizen" (ibid. p.8). 
Next, the rapid development of leT has resulted in fundamental changes in the 
industrial structure and work patterns. For the 'capitalist restructuring' of the international 
market, capitalists employed 'all the new telecommunications technology to place investment 
and situate production wherever they could achieve the best returns on investment' (Allman 
and Wallis 1995: 30). Rapid technological alteration affects the industrial, occupational and 
skill structures of the labour market. An DECD report (1996) points out that "among the 
white-collar workers, the highly skilled experienced the largest employment growth, 
including the continuing high demand for qualified workers" (OECD 1996:33). Also in 
Korea, IT industries have rapidly increased since the 1990s. For example, the average 
increase rate of IT industries reached 23.9 percent between 1991 and 1999, compared to 5.9 
percent of the real GDP of national industries during the same period (The Bank of Korea 
2000). As a result, the IT industries' contribution to the GOP growth dramatically changed, 
from 3.6 percent in 1991 to 45.9 percent in the first half of 2000. In addition, the number of 
PCs and the population of Internet users rapidly increased from approximately 4.5 mil. and 
0.1 mil. to 10.3 mil. and 10.8 mil. respectively (ibid. p. 4). 
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Therefore, these dramatic changes in the economy and in Internet use have 
stimulated the social demand for continuing learning. In this regard, adult and lifelong 
learning institutions, including the Open University, cyber universities and university extra-
mural institutes and private learning institutes have rapidly expanded their learning markets, 
on the basis of linking the new Credit Bank system with distance or informal learning at the 
workplace. Further, since the financial crisis, the increasing insecurity of employment has 
expanded the social demand for lifelong learning, partly because employees would like to 
upgrade their skills not to be left behind from their colleagues, and partly because they would 
like to prepare for moving to other jobs. 
Whilst preparation for globalisation and the information society is stressed as the 
major background to educational reforms in the global perspective, the serious side effects of 
the college-entrance examination system have been the key issue in the crucial debates over 
educational reform. 
V -3-4. The demand for reform of the college-entrance examination system 
The university entrance examination system has been criticised as the main reason 
for the excessive economic burden on parents, as well as for promoting rote learning, and has 
been a major issue whenever educational reform has been discussed. The PCER Reports 
point to the need for fundamental reform of education, in that Korean education will 
otherwise not be able to produce persons who possess high levels of creativity and moral 
sensibility in the era of information technology and globalisation (PCER 1997: 17). The 
abolition of the secondary school entrance examination created 'a narrow bottleneck' into 
higher education under the quota system for college students' numbers. As the university 
entrance examination is regarded as the decisive screening process for children's future life, 
it has become a most important issue for parents. 
In this respect, the PCER Reports suggest the ideal of 'an open lifelong learning 
society', focusing on widening access to higher education. Three basic policies promoting a 
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lifelong learning society can be identified. Firstly, the Credit Bank system is emphasized, to 
widen access to higher education and to meet the enthusiasm for higher education degrees. 
The Credit Bank system has played a major role in promoting work-based or informal 
learning, emphasising credit accumulation at various formal or informal learning institutes. In 
this respect, the Lifelong Education Act replaced the Social Education Act in 1999, and 
provides a legal framework of lifelong learning on the basis of the Credit Bank system. 
Secondly, vertical linkages between vocational and technical education institutes 
are suggested, to widen higher education opportunities for graduates from vocational high 
schools. The PCER Report proposes vertical linkages between vocational high schools and 
Junior Colleges or Polytechnic Universities "to ensure that graduates of vocational high 
schools will be given a chance to continue their higher education" (PCER 1997 :61). It 
suggests a system in which "high schools can choose to merge their curriculum of the second 
and third years with that of the vocational college (2+2) or polytechnic university (2+4)" 
(ibid. p.62). 
Thirdly, as a way towards the integration of vocational education and training, 
horizontal linkage in vocational education and training is suggested. Horizontal linkage is 
based on the two groups of institutes supervised by the MoE and the MoL. The MoE is in 
charge of formal vocational and technical education based on schools or junior colleges, 
while the MoL is in charge of initial and further training based on public or private training 
centres or polytechnic colleges. As informal learning of adults, including in-plant training, is 
becoming important in lifelong learning policies, a co-operative relationship between the 
MoE and the MoL is crucial for implementing these policies. 
V -3-5. Demographic change 
Though ageing is less rapidly than in western countries, the population of Korea is 
nevertheless ageing. The proportion of 5-19 year-olds declined from 28.4 per cent in 1990 to 
24.0 per cent in 1995, whereas, the population of 35-70+ year olds increased from 34.3 to 
163 
39.9 per cent during the same period (National Statistical Office 1997: 90-1). To some extent 
this trend explains the rising demand for adult education and continuing vocational training. 
The index of ageing, that is the division of the population of those aged 65 years old and over 
by that of those aged 14 years and under, rapidly increased from 7.2 per cent in 1970 to 28.3 
per cent in 1997. It is expected that this will reach 49.9 and 76.5 per cent in 2010 and 2020 
respectively (ibid. p. 92). 
As the ageing of the population and workforce becomes an important social issue, 
'the need for retraining will be particularly important if countries are to make the best use of 
their available workers' (McRae 1994: 105). However, not all retired or aged people will 
need to be retrained in relation to paid work. These people can become part of the voluntary 
workforce, since, as McRae argues, 'many of the new jobs - in particular those involved with 
caring for other old people - will have to be done by people who are prepared to donate their 
time' (ibid. p. 105). In Korea, to increase the female rate in the economically active 
population is seen as a way to solve the ageing problems, because this rate is still low 
compared to many other developed counties. For example, while the rate in Korea is 45.9 
percent, in the US and Japan it is 61.8 and 50.4 in 1997 respectively (ILO 1999). 
The effects of the ageing of the population and the workforce on education systems 
have been increasing, as ageing is becoming manifest. The declining size of the population of 
0-14 year olds has put pressure on school systems to rationalise school places. These changes 
may allow governments the options of reducing class sizes in primary and secondary schools 
and of increasing participation rates in post-compulsory education. Whilst universities in 
Seoul are still crowded with applicants, more than a few universities, particularly local 
universities, are already under pressure in competing for the recruitment of students. 
Moreover, demographic changes could be a catalyst for diversification in lifelong learning. 
Companies have to emphasise teaching more specific skills to the in experienced workers 
rather than teaching the basics to the young. Learning institutions, also, will need to become 
more learner-friendly and to offer sophisticated programmes on networks of education and 
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training for adults. More importantly, the ageing of the population and workforce has 
increased demands for learning such as the re-training of employees and education linked 
with social services for the growing population of retired and aged people. As the speed of 
increase in the dependency ratio of the aged has risen, the role of education linked with social 
services has also become important. While compared to western countries, the issue of ageing 
has not been emphasised, the increasing social demand for lifelong learning partly reflects the 
recent demographic change. 
V -4. Conclusion 
The demise of the Cold War system and the rise of active civil society paved the 
way for the transition to democracy. Democratisation weakened the controlling power of the 
developmental state in relation to civil society. Moreover, as economic globalisation has been 
accelerated by the post-Cold War system, it has changed the context in which the 
developmental state plays a role in promoting economic development and skills formation. 
Therefore this chapter pointed out that both democratisation and economic globalisation 
made critical impacts on the demise of the developmental state and on developmental skills 
formation in Korea. It also explained that mobilised civil society, globalisation, leT and 
demographic change all demanded lifelong learning in the Korean context. 
Effective political institutions and the active involvement of social partners are 
required for successful democratic reforms based on mobilised civil society. In this regard, 
the nature of the new framework for skills formation depends on how the partnership 
between the state and civil society in the transition to a democratic society is 
institutionalised. The role of the state and active civil society has changed, and they need 
each other in the process of the institutionalisation of any new framework for skills formation 
and lifelong learning. 
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In the next chapter, the new framework for skills formation and lifelong learning 
will be examined in detail. 
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Chapter VI: New framework of VET and lifelong learning in post-
developmental skills formation 
VI-I. Introduction 
The main components of developmental skills formation can be identified as 
policies for trade and industry, "super ministries" and a strong central control over the 
education and training system (Ashton et al. 2002:23). Therefore, to examine the transition of 
developmental skills formation in Korea, this chapter investigates how the government's 
institutional structures have changed under the pressures of globalisation and 
democratisation; the focus is on the regulations for VET and lifelong learning. With regard to 
the regulations58, this chapter concentrates on funding, the framework of qualifications, and 
the labour market, because these can clearly show the characteristics of changes in the 
institutional structures. In addition, it investigates the need for a holistic approach to lifelong 
learning during the transition of developmental skills formation, examining the increasing 
demand for high skills and social cohesion in the global and knowledge economy. 
VI-2. New regulations for VET and lifelong learning 
Since the mid-1990s, a new framework for VET and lifelong learning has been 
developed to introduce new skills formation and thus to cope with the challenges of 
globalisation and the information society (later, the knowledge-based economy). Therefore, 
in this section, the new regulations for VET and lifelong learning will be analysed by 
comparing them with former developmental skills formation, focusing on funding, a 
qualifications framework and the labour market. The new framework for VET and lifelong 
learning will be discussed on the basis of explaining the transition from the developmental 
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skills formation shown in Figure V-I to the new skills formation shown in Figure V-2 on 
later pages. 
The direct state coordination of the supply and demand for skills was given up with 
the replacement of the Economic Planning Board (EPB) by the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy (MoFE) in 1994. This means that manpower planning is no longer a characteristic 
of skills formation in Korea. As shown chapter IV, the EPB had played a major role in 
deciding the demand for and supply of skills by drawing up manpower plans based on targets 
for economic growth and job creations9• For example, in the 1970s the quota system for 
university enrolment was introduced to coordinate the "forecasted skill demand of industries" 
with the "projected student demand for higher education" according to economic planning 
(Ihm 1999: 314). This was possible because the EPB had overarching control over other 
Ministries, having the power of budget allocation, economic and social planning, the 
coordination of economy-related policies and the evaluation of policy implementation. 
However, after the roles of EPB were divided between two Ministries, namely the Ministry 
of Planning and Budget (MPB)60 and the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MFE), economic 
policy coordination by the MFE was separated from the budget control of the MPB. Since 
then, there has been no vertical coordination system and education and training have been 
more autonomous. 
As a consequence of these developments, three significant changes in skills 
formation can be identified. First, the government almost abandoned the college enrolment 
quota system after 1995. Since then, except national universities and private universities in 
Seoul and the surrounding area, universities and colleges have been allowed to decide the 
numbers of their intake (MoEHRD 2002). Secondly, the government also gave up the plan to 
S8 In educational research, regulations normally deal with the four institutions of funding, inspection, evaluation 
and a qualifications framework. 
S9 The government's Economic Plan started in 1962. However, the title of the Plan changed from the 'Five Year 
Plan of Economic Development' into the 'Five Year Plan of Economic and Social Development' in 1977. 
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expand the enrolment ratio of vocational high school students (Ibm 1999: 315). Thirdly, with 
the increasing flexibility of the labour market, the focus of the vocational training system has 
changed, from initial to continuing vocational training, particularly since the economic crisis 
in 1997. In this context, skills formation has expanded from fonnal learning to informal 
learning in the light of the need for lifelong learning. More important, government 
intervention in VET and lifelong learning has been changing from direct control based on 
standardisation to 'steering at a distance' based on diversification. 
By contrast, the Ministerial Meeting on HRD, for which the MoEHRD is mainly 
responsible, was established to coordinate Ministerial cooperation for HRD at the central 
government level. For the coordination, the Minister of the MoEHRD became the Deputy PM 
for Education, and the HRD Policy Bureau was established under the MoEHRD61. The main 
aim of the Ministerial Meeting is to coordinate VET and HRD policies, stressing the 
importance of human resources in the knowledge-based economy. However, as the 
Ministerial Meeting has not been given the power to decide the HRD-related budget 
allocation, its role in this coordination is very limited. More important, in the context of 
economic liberalisation and political democratisation the government itself no longer has 
much power to control the demand for and supply of skills. Therefore, although drawing up a 
pan-governmental 'manpower plan' was proposed as one of the major roles of the Ministerial 
Meeting, this activity is different from manpower planning by the EPB. 
In this regard, it is necessary to understand the new framework for VET and 
lifelong learning in the light of a new approach to skills formation in the context of economic 
globalisation and political democratisation. This issue will be discussed in detail in the next 
sections, which will explain the move from the developmental skills formation system shown 
in Figure VI-l to a new framework of the skills formation system shown in Figure VI-2. 
60 When the EPB was abolished in 1993, the jurisdiction over planning and the budget was directly subject to the 
Office of the President. Since the Kim Dae-Jung government came to power, the Ministry of Planning and 
Budget has been established. 
61 For the organisational chart of the MoEHRD, see http://www.moe.go.kr/English/ 
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Figure VI-I. Developmental Skills Formation System in Korea 
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Figure VI-2. New framework of the skills formation system in Korea 
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VI-2-1. Changes in the funding system 
The systems for funding vocational education and training need to be examined 
separately because their major sources of funding are different. Two major sources of public 
educational finance are governmental support and private contribution such as payments for 
students' tuition; these are respectively equivalent to 4.07 per cent and 2.96 per cent of GDP 
in 1998. The major portion of the government budget for education and training depends on 
the general budget corning from taxation and from government-run funds, managed mainly 
under the responsibility of the relevant Ministries. The governmental education budget, 
equivalent to nearly 20 per cent of the government's total budget, is mainly dependent on the 
government budget. 
By contrast, the larger portion of the governmental training budget is from the 
Employment Insurance Fund (ElF); for example, in 2000 only 31 per cent came from the 
government budget, whereas 69 per cent came from the Elf (KLI 2000: v). In particular, the 
allocation of funding is normally defined on the basis of the specific purposes of funding. 
Therefore the Elf is allocated only for training defined by the Employment Insurance Act of 
1995. The funding mechanism strictly divided between education and training, has 
contributed to preventing education and training from linking together. In this context, as 
many Korean academics point out in interviews, the coordination between the Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry of Labour is likely to be very limited unless the Ministerial 
Meeting has the power to allocate all the related government budget. 
VI-2-l-l. Vocational Education 
Vocational education is provided by vocational upper secondary schools and junior 
colleges. Expenditure on vocational education in the governmental education budget was 
only 2.7 per cent of the general account (excluding the special account) in 1999 (KEDI, 
2000). This was a very small portion of the general account, compared to 80.1 per cent and 
15.8 per cent respectively on primary and secondary education, and junior college and 
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university education. More important, 142 out of 158 junior colleges were private, whereas 
319 out of 764 vocational high schools were private in 2000. 
Therefore, as junior colleges become the main providers of vocational education, 
this tends to be driven by the labour market rather than manpower planning or social 
partnership. By 2000, 42 per cent of vocational high school graduates entered tertiary 
education; the majority of then proceed to junior colleges. Compared to 19.2 per cent in 
1995, the rate of entering tertiary education is dramatically increasing (KEDI, 2000)62. 
Therefore, the role of vocational high schools is rapidly changing, from preparation for a job 
to preparation for tertiary education. This results in significant changes in VET and lifelong 
learning. 
First, as vocational high schools are marginalized, investment in vocational high 
schools has gradually decreased compared to that in academic high schools or even junior 
colleges. Since the establishment of provincial education councils (PEes) in 1995, the 
majority of the school budget is allocated by the central government to provincial education 
offices (PEOs). By 1999, 83.4 per cent of the total education budget was distributed through 
the PEOs mainly for primary and secondary school education (KRIVET 2000: 47). Although, 
the largest section ofthe allocated amount, such as teachers' salaries, are mainly fixed by the 
MoEHRD, the new funding system makes a difference between provincial education offices, 
depending on superintendents and local education councillors. For example, until the mid-
1990s, a significantly weighted amount was allocated to vocational high schools, because 
they need extra facilities and equipments for practical work63. But, since the late 1990s, the 
rate for this weighting has been lower, and moreover this rate is left to superintendents' 
discretion. Therefore the funding level of vocational high schools varies, and the gaps 
between different vocational high schools according to superintendents' support for 
vocational education. 
62 See http://210.122.126.4Ihtmllframe2.html(1 Ju12002) 
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Secondly, since the main sites for vocational education have moved from the high 
school to the junior college level, main investment in vocational education has been focused 
on junior colleges. As a consequence, this policy tends to threaten the survival of some 
vocational high schools rather than leading to 'parity of esteem' between academic schools 
and vocational schools. Some successful vocational high schools are encouraged to convert 
themselves into 'specialised vocational high schools', with more freedom to choose their own 
curriculum. By contrast, some vocational high schools with difficulties in recruiting their 
intakes may convert themselves into comprehensive-style 'integrated' high schools if they 
choose. Because, the governments seem not to be less enthusiastic over raising the social 
status of vocational education as a whole, the majority of vocational high schools are 
experiencing more difficulties in recruiting pupils. 
Thirdly, as vocational education is moving towards the junior college level, initial 
vocational training is also moving from the vocational upper secondary to the junior college 
level. In 1999, twenty polytechnic colleges, which had been amongst 40 public vocational 
training institutes under the KOMA were allowed to award Industrial Associate Degrees as 
they had been placed under the Korean Foundation for Polytechnic Colleges in 1998. The 
rest of 40 institutes also provide training programmes, equivalent to the junior college level, 
with short courses. In addition, eight vocational training institutes under the Korea Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) provide 2-year public training programmes equivalent to 
the junior college level, and most of their graduates can get an Industrial Associate Degree 
with the support of these institutes. As the rate of entering upper secondary schools reached 
99.5 per cent in 2000, it is very difficult for initial training institutes to recruit trainees for 
vocational upper secondary level programmes. Even many public training institutes providing 
junior college level programmes no longer find it easy to recruit trainees for traditional 
manufacturing occupations although the programmes are free, compared to 4.2 million won 
63 In an interview in 2000, a fonner director of the vocational education department in the MoE told me that the 
weighted rate had been 170% or 200%, but it was reduced to 130% a few years ago. 
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(about £2,100) per year of private junior colleges. Polytechnic colleges provide associate 
degree programmes for a fifth of the tuition fees of private junior colleges. They have 
gradually increased their tuition fees under pressure from their competitors. 
V/-2-J-2. Training 
As mentioned above, there are two major sources of finance for training. One is the 
government budget, which is mainly for the operational costs of COMA and training for the 
unemployed amongst the uninsured. The other is from the Employment Insurance Fund for 
initial training, further training and training for the unemployed amongst the insured. By 
2000, funding from the general budget was less than half of funding from the Employment 
Insurance Fund. After the financial crisis, the funding for training was sharply increased, 
from about 643 billion won in 1998 to 805 billion won in 1999. However, as the rate of 
unemployment declined,S per cent of this funding was cut in 2000 (MoL 2001). 
One of the most significant changes in the funding system for VET and lifelong 
learning is the move from the training levy system, focused on initial training for school 
leavers, to the Employment Insurance System (EIS) emphasising further training for the 
employed or the unemployed. With the enactment of the Vocational Training Promotion Act 
of 1997 and the annulment of the Basic Vocational Training Act enacted in 1976, the training 
levy system was completely replaced by the Employment Insurance System in 1999. The 
Employment Insurance Fund pays for three different components, namely employment 
security, vocational training and unemployment benefits, and is raised by way of social 
contributions (KRNET & NCVER 2000: 59-60). The contribution rate to the EI Fund is 
different according to the components. For example, while 0.3 per cent of the payroll is paid 
for the Employment Security Fund, a varying percentage of the payroll, between 0.1 per cent 
and 0.7 per cent, depending on the size of the finn, is paid for the Vocational Training Fund. 
These two payments are made by the employer only for the employed. By contrast, for 
unemployment benefits the employer and the employee go halves; each paying I percent of 
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the payroll. For employers, the total contribution rate of the three components add up to a 
maximum of 2 percent of the payroll, except in special economic circumstances, in which it 
can be increased to 3 per cent. 
Compared to the levy system based on the Basic Vocational Training Act, the EIS 
based on the Vocational Training Promotion Act has many significantly distinctive 
characteristics. First, the main focus of the EIS is to encourage employers and employees to 
undertake further training on a voluntary basis (KRIVET 2000: 74). This focus reflects 
significant changes in the labour market. For example, the rate of graduates from lower 
secondary and upper secondary schools who advance to the higher school level dramatically 
increased, from 84.5 and 27.2 to 99.6 and 68.0 respectively between 1980 and 2000 
(Statistical Year Book of Education1980, 2000). 
As a consequence, compared to further training, the demand for initial training in 
basic skills for early school leavers rapidly declined in the 1990s. For example, the rate of 
initial public training and in-plant training declined from 90.5 per cent and 30.3 per cent in 
1993 to 41.8 per cent and 16.3 per cent in 1997 respectively (KLI 2000:24-5). However, 
while public training under the levy system focused on basic skills training for early school 
leavers without any basic skills or qualifications, it lacked incentives "for existing employees 
to improve their technical knowledge and skills to enabling them to attain higher-level 
technical certificates" (KRIVET 2000: 73-4). By contrast, the EIS provides incentives for 
employers or employees undertaking training, as it gives them financial support in the name 
of the vocational competence development scheme (ibid. p.7S). As a result, the focus of 
training has rapidly shifted towards further training. For example, 98.8 per cent of employees 
who completed in-plant training in 1999 underwent further training (ibid. p. 25). Since then, 
the VT system has been situated as the main part of the lifelong learning framework 
Secondly, particularly since the enactment of the Vocational Training Promotion 
Act in 1999, the main driving force of further training has shifted, from public to in-plant 
training. The EIS assumes two forms of training, namely public and in-plant training, 
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depending on the training institutions (ibid. p. 26). Public training institutions include the 
Korea Manpower Agency (KOMA), the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(KCCn, government agencies, autonomous local institutions and the Korea Employment 
Promotion Agency for the Disabled (KEP AD). The KOMA is the biggest public training 
provider, with 40 institutions, including 20 polytechnic colleges. By contrast, in-plant 
training includes three different ways of training: independent training at an in-plant training 
institution; cooperative training with other employers; and commissioned training through a 
training institution run by a third party. While initial training is still driven by public training, 
further training has been mainly provided by way of in-plant training. 
Thirdly, with regard to training for vocational competence development, the budget 
IS mainly allocated to employers or employees rather than public training centres. For 
example, in 2000 80 per cent of the vocational competence development budget from the EI 
Fund was allocated to employers who provided in-plant training, external education and 
training and paid study leave for employees. In addition, when employers invest in training 
facilities or equipment, they can apply for a loan or subsidy. Particularly in the case of SMEs, 
joint vocational training on the basis of close locations or similar occupations is encouraged. 
By contrast, in 2000 20 percentage of the vocational competence development budget was 
allocated to employees as training incentives, particularly for the elderly, and as tuition loans 
for studying at the level of higher education. 
Fourthly, the system for authorizing specific training providers was abolished, 
instead, any education and training institutes can now apply for 'approval' to provide 
government-sponsored training programmes on a project basis, if they provide the required 
facilities and instructors64• Therefore, private training providers have to compete with each 
other to provide programmes for the government or employers. In this context, some NOOs, 
such as the YWCA and CCEJ, have been providing government-sponsored training 
programmes. In particular, since the Kim, Dae-Jung government came to power, many NOOs 
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have increasingly been allowed not only to provide various programmes for local residents or 
the unemployed, but to manage public training or welfare facilities with financial support6S • 
For example, 44 Women's HRD Centres are managed by several NGOs, including the 
YWCA, and the Korean Women Workers' Association, with support from central 
government. 
VI-2-2. Changes in the qualifications system 
As a part of the Education Reform, a new vocational education system was 
proposed to smooth the school to work transition on the basis of a new qualifications system. 
Three characteristics of the new qualifications system should be identified. First, it is 
designed to build a lifelong learning framework for vocational school graduates or workers to 
enter tertiary education. In the new framework, vocational school graduates are given priority 
in entering colleges for a relevant field of study (KRIVET 2000: 72). In this regard, a 'two 
plus two' programme was introduced to link the curriculum of the second and third years of 
vocational high schools with that of the junior colleges. 
Junior college graduates have been awarded Associate Degrees since 1996. In 
addition, for industrial workers, polytechnic college graduates have been granted Industrial 
Associate Degrees since 1998. These two-year vocational degrees are a response to the strong 
public desire for higher education degrees, as well as a contribution to high skills formation 
in the knowledge-based economy. Those who hold Associate Degrees can either enter a 
university or go to work. To establish the lifelong vocational education system, governments 
have not only reduced the regulations of junior colleges, but invested a great amount of 
money in junior colleges rather than vocational high schools. 
64 For standard training, minimum requirements are more than 60m2 facilities and more than 20 hours training. 
65 For example, in an interview with a staff member of PSPD, she mentioned that the organisation provided some 
programmes for civil servants for more than one year, with financial support from a local government. 
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Secondly, the system tries to link qualifications with fonnal education through the 
Credit Bank system. National qualifications holders are given a limited numbers of credits for 
a Bachelor's or Associate Degree (ibid. p. 34). For example, professional engineers, master 
craftsmen, engineers and industrial engineers are given 45,39,30 and 24 credits respectively. 
If a qualifications holder has 2 or more qualifications in an identical item, the highest 
qualification's credits are granted, and the rest of qualifications are granted 3/4, 1/2, 114 of 
the credits in order of the qualification grade. However, the highest number of credits avail 
through the acquisition of qualifications is 110 out of 140 for a bachelor's degree and 65 out 
of 80 for a two-year associate degree. 
Moreover, the Credit Bank system has also contributed to recognising the value of 
work-based learning for lifelong learning because it has provided an alternative route to an 
associate or BA degree through the accreditation of informal learning. For example, since 
1998, 2,269 BA degrees and 5,694 associate degrees have been awarded66• The number of 
degrees awarded has gradually increased, and only during the second half term of 1998, 717 
BA degrees and 572 associate degrees were awarded. However, for the success of the CBS, 
it needs to be recognised by the labour market, because the degree certificates are different 
from the certificates of ordinary higher education degree courses. 
Thirdly, qualifications have been regarded as the major means not only to move 
from an academic clique-oriented to a capability-oriented society, but to attract the attention 
of industrial as well as education sectors to vocational education67 • The national technical 
qualifications system (NTQS) has been controlled by the KOMA. Qualifications are divided 
into two groups, namely the technical and the service group. Technical qualifications are 
classified into 5 grades, namely Professional Engineer, Master Craftsman, Engineer, 
66 http://edubank.kedi.re.kr/kedieng.htm, 5 September 2002 
67 In an interview with a former director of vocational department, the MoE, he points to three main motives of 
vocational education reform: to reduce the burden of private lessons for vocational qualifications; to overcome 
the side-effects of overheated competition for the university entrance examination; and to move from an 
academic clique-oriented to a capacity-oriented society. He also mentioned that the reform of the qualifications 
system was emphasised to build the new vocational education system in which the government, industry and 
the education sector were involved together. 
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Industrial Engineer and Craftsman. By contrast, the service group consists of Business 
Management (class I-III), Professional Business (class I-II) and Other Services (Master 
Craftsman, Industrial Engineer and Craftsman) (KRNET 2000: 30). The NTQS is mainly 
focused on technical occupations, and has limitations in emerging or rapidly changing 
occupations such as finance or IT sectors. In addition, as the KOMA has been the state 
awarding body and, at the same time, the biggest public training provider, the NTQS has 
lacked a suitable cross-check mechanism. While the system was very effective for quantity-
oriented manpower planning, it has shown serious limitations in raising quality and 
flexibility. Most important, the NTQS has been not only completely separate from vocational 
education or academic qualifications, but confined to technical qualifications under the 
responsibility of the MoL. 
In relation to this, the KRIVET, established under the KRIVET Act in 1997, was 
proposed by the PCER Report of 1996 as the main institution to playa major role in building 
a new qualifications system. The main role of the KRIVET is not only to conduct research on 
VET and HRD and advise government on policies, but to be in charge of government-
approved private qualifications (GAPQs). The GAPQs aim to reduce the rigidity of the state 
qualifications system by challenging the monopoly of state qualifications. The KRIVET 
assesses GAPQs every three years, and permits satisfactory awarding bodies to provide the 
qualifications for a further three years. In addition, it supports two Ministries, namely the 
MoEHRD and the MoL, and the VET Policy Commission in the process of policy-making 
and implementation regarding VET and qualifications68 • 
Private qualifications awarding bodies can apply for government approval VIa 
related ministries. By February 2002, the government had approved 65 qualifications for 35 
occupations with regard to 8 Ministries, including the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the 
Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Information and Communications69 • Compared to the 
68 With regard to key functions ofKRIVET. see Appendix 4. 
69 http://www.krivet.re.kr/cgi-bin/ngua1.cgi. 5 September 2002 
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NTQS, this results in significant changes in private qualifications. As government approval is 
regarded as a kind of quality mark, many awarding bodies are competing for recognition. As 
a consequence, this recognition has contributed to enhancing the reputation of approved 
private qualifications. Therefore it seems to promote the role of the private sector in the 
national qualification framework and to affect national qualifications which reflect the 
demands of the workplace. However, the new framework may also result in another dual 
system of vocational qualifications, because whereas the KRIVET is in charge of the 
government approval of private qualifications, the KOMA is in charge of the national 
technical qualifications system. Therefore, the MoEHRD is preparing for new legislation 
regarding 'an integrated qualifications framework', including state qualifications and 
government-approved private qualifications together. 
The KRIVET is now directly governed by the Korea Council of Humanities and 
Social Research (HSRC) 70, which was established under the Act on the Establishment, 
Management, and Promotion of Government-sponsored Research Institutes in 1999. The 
HSRC was specially created to supervise research institutes involved in the fields of the 
humanities and social sciences. The directors' board of HSRC is composed of one chairman 
and less than 15 directors, who are appointed by the Prime Minister. By 2002, the board 
members are composed of I minister and 4 deputy ministers from related ministries, 6 
academics, I journalist, 2 representatives of employers, and one accountant. As this 
composition shows, the board is intended to "promote, foster and systematically control 
government-sponsored research institutes" on behalf of the government. 
VI-2-3. Changes in the labour market 
Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the high rate of unemployment has been 
one of the most serious issues. The unemployment rate soared to 6.8 per cent in 1998. This 
70 With regard to organisation and responsibilities ofHSRC, see Appendix 3. 
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was a real shock, because the rate had been less than 3 per cent for a decade. The most 
vulnerable victims were people with low levels of educational achievement. For example, the 
unemployment rate of those who were at least junior college graduates increased from 3.0 per 
cent to 5.7 per cent between 1997 and 1998, while that oflow and upper secondary graduates 
increased more sharply from 1.5 and 3.3 per cent to 5.8 and 8.2 per cent respectively. In 
addition, the need for flexibility in the labour market became a serious issue. The layoffs, that 
were delayed to take effect in 1999 after the labour struggle against them in 1996, were 
introduced soon after the crisis. Lifetime employment in large firms is no longer allowed. 
Workers in SMEs were the hardest hit by the financial crisis. In 1998, "the average nominal 
wage in SMEs decreased by 2.5 per cent, whereas that in large firms was reduced by only 1.1 
per cent" (You and Lee 1999: 19). 
The rate of temporary or part-time employment soared dramatically from 43.3 per 
cent in 1996 to 53 per cent in 1999 and this become a serious issue for social cohesion (Lee, 
Y.H. and Kim, Y.S. 2001: 45). Normally have temporary or part-time workers been 
discriminated against, in wages and welfare services provided by firms, but the majority of 
them have been excluded from the benefits of major social insurances (Shim, S.W. 1999). 
With the increased rate of unemployment since the financial crisis, in 1999 the application of 
Employment Insurance was extended to temporary or part-time workers as well as to firms 
employing less than 5 employees (op.cit. p. 45). However, Employment Insurance still 
covered only 55.1 per cent of total wage employees in 2000. Therefore, training has been an 
important issue, particularly for the increasing numbers of temporary or part-time workers 
employed in large firms as well as for workers employed in SMEs. 
The establishment of the Tripartite Commission was the one of the most significant 
experiences in the transition of the labour market in relation to developmental skills 
formation. After the economic crisis, the whole society was in shock, and there was huge 
pressure for economic and political change. In this context, the Tripartite Commission was 
set up, on the basis of the request of labour, in January 1998. Its main aim was to empower 
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labour to negotiate with government and management in return for allowing flexibility of 
labour. On a 9 February 1999 labour, management and the government reached the first 
tripartite compromise on social agreement; this is regarded as one of the major contributors to 
overcoming conflicts in industrial relations at that time. Also, at the request of labour, the Act 
for the establishment and operation of the Tripartite Commission was promulgated on May 
1999, and the tripartite system was institutionalised on a legal basis as the Presidential 
advisory body. 
This Commission contributed to agreement being reached between labour, 
management and the government on the adjustment of industrial structure and the labour 
market. There is no doubt that it contributed to the rapid recovery from the crisis. At the same 
time, the Tripartite Commission paved the way for the institutionalisation of trade unions' 
participation in making and implementing policy regarding industrial relations and training 
issues at the company and national levels. Since the legalization of the Tripartite 
Commission, the representation of labour has been recognized as an important issue in 
relation to VT. Although the mechanism is still vulnerable, because some representatives of 
labour and management are suspicious of the role of the Tripartite Commission, it has 
reached a basic agreement on training7!. 
This tripartite mechanism is a unique experiment in East Asia. As Sung, J. (1998) 
conceptualises 'developmental corporatism' with reference to Singapore, the absence of 
labour representation or its subordination to the state in the state-capitalist-labour relationship 
has been recognised as a main characteristic of 'developmental corporatism' in the East Asia. 
Particularly in Korea, as in Taiwan, the authoritarian state played a major role in capital 
71 See papers presented at the "Conference on the Development of the Labour-Management-Govemment 
Corporatist Model", January 25, 2002, Seoul. At the Conference, representatives of the Tripartite Commission 
expressed their perspectives and discussed the ways to develop it. However, the representative of the National 
Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions, which is the progressive one of two leading national confederation 
of trade unions and suggested the legalisation of the corporatist model, argued for the dissolution of the 
Tripartite Commission. There are two extreme perspectives about the Commission. While a part of the 
progressive labour criticise it as justifying the neo-Iiberal structural adjustment, some employers criticise it as a 
collectivist intervention counteracting a market economy. 
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accumulation and skills formation on the basis of the suppression of labour. Therefore, the 
establishment of the Tripartite Commission paved the way for state-coordinated partnership, 
particularly in relation to the labour market and training. 
The Tripartite Commission is seen as a distinctive example of the effect of 
changing relations between the state and civil society on regulations for VET and lifelong 
learning under the severe pressures of globalisation and democratisation. In addition, this 
agreement seems to promote the engagement of trade unions in decisions on the Training 
Plan at the company level. By the Workers' Participation and Cooperation Promotion Act of 
1997, an employer should establish a 'Labour-Management Council', which it should make a 
decision on the 'basic plan for education and training and competence development for 
employees' at the company level. Therefore the agreement of the Tripartite Commission on 
training can influence the contents of these basic plans. 
However, it should be mentioned that there are several weaknesses to be tackled 
compared to the traditional corporatist model. First, enterprise unionism places limit on the 
Tripartite Commission. In terms of the organisation style of trade unions, national 
confederations of trade unions are mainly based not on industrial unionism, but on company-
based unionism. Second, although unions have been legitimised and have played a role in 
setting up the Commission, they have focused on wage bargaining and political struggles, and 
have not been prepared for negotiation on training issues. This means that it takes time to 
build trust between labour, capital, government and, social institutions. 
As the issue of unemployment was put high on the political agendas, various active 
labour market policies were introduced to tackle the issues. For example, public training for 
the unemployed dramatically expanded until the rate of unemployment started to decrease. 
This paved the way for the rapid expansion of further training and lifelong learning. In 
addition, as social demand for a 'social safety net' has rapidly increased with the increasing 
flexibility of the labour market, particularly since the economic crisis, lifelong learning has 
been recognised as a means not only to prepare for the knowledge-based economy, but also to 
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tackle unemployment issues in the name of 'productive welfare'. In this context, new 
approaches to skills formation were introduced under the framework of National HRD, which 
emphasises the coordination between ET -related Ministries. 
VI-3. Changing skills profile and skills requirements 
It is well known that the rapid improvement in the skiIls profile has significantly 
contributed to the success of the Korean economy. As seen below in Table VI-I, the rates of 
advance in upper secondary school and higher education increased from 84.5 per cent and 
27.2 per cent to 99.6 per cent and 68.0 per cent respectively between 1980 and 2000. In 
particular, as university enrolment quotas increased by 30 per cent in 1981, advance rate to 
upper secondary school suddenly increased from 27.2 to 35.3 in the same year. This change 
continued the academic drift towards mass higher education, while vocational education 
became marginalized. 
Table VI-1.Rate of Entering Higher Schools 
(%) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Lower Secondary School 95.8 99.2 99.8 99.9 99.9 
Upper Secondary School 84.5 90.7 95.7 98.5 99.6 
Higher Education 27.2 36.4 33.2 51.4 68.0 
.. Source: MIDlStry of EducatIOn & Human Resource Development, StatistIcal Year Book of Education 
By 2001, the rate of enter to higher education was more than 70 per cent, while 
more than 40 per cent of vocational high school graduates continued to higher education. The 
trend is supposed to continue, on the grounds that the 2000 survey of the expected level of 
education by expected students revealed that 96 per cent of registered students wanted to go 
to two-year junior colleges (12.8%) or universities (61.3%) or graduate schools and over 
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(21.9%) (National Statistical Office, Population & Housing Census 2000). In particular, 
since the government proposed moving the main vocational education from vocational high 
schools to two-year junior colleges, the nature of vocational high schools has been changing, 
from preparation for work to preparation for two-year junior colleges. In addition, initial 
public training has changed, from mainly training primary or lower secondary graduates to 
the level of vocational high school graduates to training upper secondary school graduates to 
the level of two-year college graduates. 
The Korean economy has been seen as successful in reducing wage differentials in 
the midst of rapid economic development, on the basis of the rapid expansion of higher 
education. The expansion of higher education played a major role in narrowing wage 
differentials until the rapid economic liberalisation of the early 1990s (You and Lee 1999: 
14). In other words, the rapid growth of higher education graduates contributed to the 
decrease of the HE degree premium. However, this process is reversing, as the demand for 
the highly educated, particularly in the financial and insurance sector, has increased under the 
process of economic globalisation (ibid. p. 14). For example, the demand for finance, 
insurance, real estate and business services contributed to 30.2 per cent of the total 
employment increase between 1992 and 1996, compared to 18.4 per cent between 1988 and 
1992. Meanwhile, lower qualified labour became the main victims of the financial crisis. 
Therefore, priority has been given to VET policies to raise employability, or to build a safety 
net for the unemployed or the vulnerable in the liberalised economy. 
One of the most serious structural problems is that Chaebols have exploited 
relatively low wages and union-free SMEs as a major means to maintain competitiveness. As 
a result, the productivity differential between large firms and SMEs considerably widened, 
from 51 per cent to 38.9 per cent between 1981 and 199572 (You and Lee 1999). According to 
You and Lee, the rate of subcontracting firms among SMEs drastically increased from 36.5 
72 The differential is an average labour productivity of SMEs as a percentage of average productivity of large firms 
employing 300 and more employees. 
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per cent in 1988 to 63.2 per cent in 199273 • This means that large enterprises employed 
SMEs as a "union avoidance strategy" under the pressure of active trade union movements 
since the Labour Movement between July and September 1987 (ibid. p. 27). 
The strategy was possible not only because trade unions are based on enterprises, 
but because the influence and membership of trade unions is mainly dependent on the size of 
firms. For example, in the manufacturing sector, the unionisation rates of only 0.9 and 5.4 per 
cent in companies employing 10-29 and 30-99 workers respectively is starkly contrasted with 
that of 62.1 and 76 per cent in companies with 5000-15000 and more than 15,000 employees 
respectively (ibid. p. 15). In this context, the wide wage gap and unfair subcontracts between 
large enterprises and SMEs has widened the productivity differential between them. For 
example, the productivity differential sharply declined, from 51.0 in 1981 to 38.9 in 1995 
(ibid. p. 17f4. 
As shown above, the mobilisation of trade unions has significantly influenced the 
demand for skills as well as the nature of the labour market. The number of trade unions and 
the union membership rate increased from 2,658 and 16.8 per cent in 1986 to 7,861 and 19.8 
per cent in 1989 (MoL, Year Book of Labour Statistics). Moreover, the majority of trade 
unions which had been subordinated to the state or employers started to be replaced by 
independent or active trade unions, in spite of political repression. As a result, as seen in 
Table VI-2, between 1987 and 1992 monthly wages in the manufacturing sector sharply 
increased more than 15 per cent every year while weekly average working hours declined 
from 54.7 to 48.7. 
73 According to You and Lee, a subcontracting firms is defined as "more than 80 per cent of its total sales consist 
of sales to other firms, with less than 20 per cent of its sales going to end consumers" (1999: 16). 
74 Average labour productivity of SMEs as a percentage of average productivity of large enterprises employing 
more than 300 employees. 
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Table VI-2. Cbanges in wages and working hours· 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Year Rate of Increase Wages (%)** 9.8 16.1 16.1 15.5 17.4 17.3 
Weeldy Average Hours Worked 54.0 52.6 50.7 49.8 49.3 48.7 
* Based on comparues employmg more than 10 persons 
** Wages include regular payment, overtime payment and special payments 
Source: National Statistics Office; Ministry of Labour, Year Book of Labour Statistics 
In this context, the composition of persons employed by industry has significantly 
changed. As seen below in Figure VI-3, the proportion of workers employed in 
manufacturing declined from 27.8 per cent, the peak of this proportion of employed persons, 
to 20.2 per cent between 1989 and 2000, whilst the proportion in the utilities and services 
sector increased from 52.1 to 68.9 per cent during the same period. In addition, the numbers 
in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors declined sharply from 19.6 to 10.9 per cent, 
during the same period, although the rate of decrease rate gradually declined after 1980. 
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The surge in trade union movements and the sharply increased wages of workers 
put pressure on employers to move towards skill-intensive manufacturing as well as 
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subcontracting or outsourcing. The pressure to increase wages originally resulted from the 
end of the unlimited supply of young and low-wage labour from the agricultural sector in the 
late 1960s and from the urban traditional sector in the mid-1970s (Lee, lH 1996). In this 
context, the developmental state tried to suppress the workers' demand for wage increases or 
improvements in the working environment through the political repression of trade union 
movements in the name of 'national security'. However, ironically, the severe repression of 
trade union movements resulted in the mobilisation of the militant trade unions based on 
large firms belong to Chaebols. 
In this context, with the increase of subcontracting, employers have tried to 
introduce new human resource management (HRM) since the late 1980s. This focused on a 
shift from a seniority-based system to an ability-based one. A survey conducted by the Korea 
Employers' Federation in 1995 shows that 283 firms out of about 3,000 with over 50 
employees introduced new HRM practices, and some of the remaining companies were 
considering introducing them (Bae 1998:95). More firms will be seen to introduce new HRM 
practices in the future. The characteristics of traditional HRM, as Bae points out, have been 
'seniority-based systems, rank-based grade systems, limited lifetime employment and 
confrontational employment relationships' (ibid. p.93). However, the limitations of 
traditional HRM systems have been recognized, particularly by large companies, as both 
internal and external economic environments have dramatically changed with severe global 
competition and the rapid development of technology. Therefore, particularly in relation to 
HRM, many companies have tried to replace traditional dual grade and post-centred systems 
with single grade and skill-grade systems focusing on employees' development of skill and 
knowledge (ibid. p. 94). The dual grade systems are based on separate promotion tracks for 
managerial/administrative and production employees. Neither the dual grade nor the post-
centred systems could provide much motivation for the workers' skills development that is 
crucial in the move to value-added production. In this regard, large firms now emphasise the 
importance of further training rather than initial training. This change is also very important, 
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because they need more specialised skills and knowledge than before as well as continuously 
updated skills under the flexible production system. 
As rapid technological changes require the new HRM approach, recruitment policy 
is moving to an emphasis on individual ability in relation to skills and knowledge already 
acquired, as recently in Japan (in relation to Japan, see Sakamoto-Vandenberg et al. 1998). 
Some Korean companies have started recruiting all year round rather than once a year, 
focusing on job-related ability. These shifts imply that companies tend to reduce investment 
in training; instead, work experience or qualifications will be more important. Such a trend 
has already been seen in some large companies since the economic crisis in 1997, focusing on 
employees' flexibility and skills development. In particular, as even Chaebols have become 
less committed to lifetime employment, lifelong learning policies are required to "construct a 
systematic mechanism for this life-long learning for the emerging diversified learners" 
(Sakamoto-Vandenberg et al. 1998:35). 
However, as Bae points out, many companies are finding it a challenge to introduce 
a new HRM policy, because the seniority-based culture of the workplace that is deeply rooted 
in Confucian tradition is not congruent with such changes in HRM (Bae 1998:95). This 
problem seems to be closely related to the dilemma of HRM, which Green identifies in 
relation to industry in Japan: 'it wants creative and autonomous workers with specialised 
skills; who are also co-operative workers with a high level of general skills' (op.cit. p. 30). 
Therefore, to promote skills development at the company level, it is important to overcome 
the tensions between individuality, based on specialised skills, and collectivism based on co-
operative working relations. In this respect, it is also required to encourage the role of trade 
unions in promoting skills development and lifelong learning. 
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VI -4. Current issues in VET and lifelong learning 
As seen in the above sections, since the civilian government came to power 
institutional structures for VET and lifelong learning have been in transition. Some major 
issues facing the VET system have arisen in the process of transition: 
fIrst, whether to continue to use a centralised manpower projection approach to decision-
making that reflects a generally interventionist stance on matters concerning education 
and training; second, problems in keeping vocational education and training institutions 
relevant in a rapidly growing and changing economy; and third, deeply rooted social 
factors, e.g. high social demand for university education. (Ihm 1999:318) 
As this writer points out, main challenges for policy making have been how to deal 
with these issues in the rapidly liberalised economic context. In this regard, lifelong learning 
policies seem to focus on building an 'innovative' skills formation system to modify or 
replace the developmental skills formation system. The sudden emphasis on national HRD 
policies needs to be understood as a way to deal with these issues. 
Therefore, the changes mentioned in the above sections can be analysed in this 
perspective. First, the most significant change is the abandonment of enrolment quotas. This 
means that the social demand for university education should be encouraged as a catalyst for 
building the innovative skills formation solving the problems of continuously upgrading the 
education and training system. A shift is seen in the regulatory regime, from demand-oriented 
planning to supply-oriented coordination, with stress on the 'knowledge' economy. In this 
regard, central government is required to playa major role in creating an infrastructure to 
facilitate lifelong learning, mainly depending on 'information networks'. Social partners are 
also encouraged to playa role in delivering education and training, mainly on the basis of 
'voluntary partnership'. Finally, individuals are expected to be 'lifelong learners' with the 
major responsibility to participate in and pay for higher education. 
Lifelong learning seems to be regarded as a panacea for both social and economic 
troubles. However, it is worth questioning how long the social demand for university 
education can continue to be a driving force to build a high skills society without a proper 
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return for learning. In 2000, the rate of employment of university graduates was only 55 per 
cent, while almost 68 per cent of upper secondary school graduates were enrolled in higher 
education. 
More important, lifelong learning policies need to be based on a more holistic 
rather than a narrowly divided approach, which separates adult vocational training from 
liberal adult education. While educationalists tend to emphasise liberal adult education, 
industry or economists are likely to stress vocational training in the name of HRD in the 
Korean context. This is partly because, as seen above, education and training have been 
completely divided in terms of the funding systems. It is partly also because the meanings of 
education and training have been narrowly and separately defined. For example, while 
education deals with knowledge or values at schools or universities, training is confined to 
the narrow meaning of technical or vocational skills used at a workplace or training centres. 
Therefore, education has been identified as rewarded by an 'academic diploma' and highly 
educated people are respected. By contrast, training has not been recognised in terms of a 
'diploma' and has been less valued than education. However, this problematic division 
between education and training is now challenged, not least because the boundary between 
education and training is becoming blurred in the information age. Thus, a broader approach 
to lifelong learning is required, and it would contribute to reducing the side-effects of the 
overheated competition in the university entrance examinations. 
In addition, the stress on values in schools has been mainly skewed towards 
'loyalty to authorities' or 'conformity', without encouraging critical thinking or democratic 
citizenship. Therefore democratic citizenship education is now required in the transition of 
developmental skills formation. It is worth mentioning that lifelong learning has started to 
playa role in promoting local participation in building new local societies for the 21 51 century 
in Korea (Kwangmyung-Si 2001). Kwangmyung-Si has been one of the forerunners of 
building lifelong learning cities by proclaiming itself a 'lifelong learning city' in 1998, and 
investing in building an infrastructure according to its "Five-year Lifelong Learning Plan". 
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The Lifelong Learning Institute built according to the Plan is expected to encourage residents 
on the basis of democratic citizenship, to participate in 'local society building' as well as in 
learning or training. 
As local societies need more democratic and active citizens since the establishment 
of elected local governments, citizenship is also required for new skills formation, 
particularly in the transition from an authoritarian society to a democratic society. As Green 
argues, East Asian skills formation includes such key features as "[c]entral control, planning, 
and stress on values and core skills" (Green, A. 1999a: 257). This means developmental skills 
formation requires "situational nationalism", with stress on values as well as the 
"developmental state" for central control and planning (Castells 1992). In this regard, 
education plays a major role in perpetuating and instilling situational nationalism in people's 
minds. Therefore, in the Korean context, changing skills formation seems to go along with 
the new 'values' required for consensus building, as well as the new 'institutional structures' 
required for coordination. Moreover, suitable knowledge, skills and attitudes all are seen to 
be essential for work as well as a richer life in post-industrial society. This is the reason way 
the approach to lifelong learning needs to be holistic, bringing education, training or 
vocationalism and liberalism together on the basis of democratic citizenship in Korea. 
The emerging issues facing changing skills formation can be summarised in four 
points. Firstly, the institutional structures for central control and planning have changed since 
the mid-1990s. The Economic Planning Board (EPB) for central control and planning was 
demolished. Since then, the enrolment quota system based on the interests of economic 
planning nearly disappeared. As a result, the 'vertical' mechanism of manpower planning, as 
the main driving force of VET system under the EPB, needed to be replaced by a more 
'horizontal' mechanism for coordination at the central government level. At the same time, as 
the civilian government emphasised the deregulation of the VET system, private or voluntary 
organisations were encouraged to participate in the delivery of VET and lifelong education. 
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However, it is still unclear how the new mechanism for coordination can promote the 
participation of social partners in making and implementing policy. 
Secondly, the VT system has changed, from initial training-oriented to further 
training oriented, emphasizing client-centred VT and more choice for employers and 
employees. The Employment Insurance System, with the enactment of the Vocational 
Training Promotion Act in 1999, has substantially contributed to a rapid increase in further 
training for employees. As a consequence, the VET system has become placed as the main 
part of the lifelong learning policy framework, focusing on the establishment of a lifelong 
VET system. However, as the VET is failing to encourage SMEs to participate in training, 
the gap between big firms and SMEs become gradually deeper. 
Thirdly, the representation of labour has been recognized as an important issue in 
relation to VT, particularly since the legalization of the Tripartite Commission. The 
Commission was designed to build consensus between labour, management and the 
government in 1999. This tripartite mechanism is a unique experiment in the East Asia. The 
Tripartite Commission is a distinctive example of the effect of changing relations between 
the state and civil society on regulations for VET and lifelong learning under the pressures of 
globalisation and democratisation. The commission reached a basic agreement on training. In 
which seems to promote the engagement of trade unions in decisions on training plans at the 
company level. By the Workers' Participation and Cooperation Promotion Act of 1997, an 
employer should establish a 'Labour-Management Council' which should make decisions on 
the basic plan for education and training for employees at the company level. Therefore the 
agreement of the Tripartite Commission on training is increasingly important in promoting 
training at the company level. However, the tripartite mechanism is still vulnerable because a 
part of representatives of labour and management are suspicious of the role of the Tripartite 
Commission. Another serious issue regarding the prospect of the Commission is the fact that 
national confederations of trade unions are based not on industrial unionism, but on 
company-based unionism. 
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VI-So Changing institutional structures of VET and lifelong learning 
As argued above, the shift in the regulatory regime of developmental skills 
formation can be analysed as follows7s• Firstly, the university enrolment quota system has 
been almost abandoned, and direct state coordination of the demand for and supply of skills 
was significantly weakened. The Government also had to abandon the plan to expand the 
enrolment ratio of vocational upper secondary schools. As a result, higher education was 
suddenly put in the market place, and experienced a dramatic expansion during the 1990s. 
For example, the higher education enrolment rate of high school graduates in 2000 was more 
than double that in 1990, and reached 68 per cent. Moreover, that of vocational high school 
graduates dramatically increased, from 8 per cent to 42 per cent during the decade, with most 
of them enrolling in junior colleges. By contrast, the mismatch between the demand for and 
the supply of university graduates has been a serious social issue regarding skills formation. 
The rate of employment of university graduates was only 55 per cent in 2000, which was very 
low compared to that of junior college graduates, 77% in the same year. 
Secondly, the training levy system was replaced by the Employment Insurance 
System (EIS) which depends on financial contributions from employers and employees. 
Since then, with the enactment of the Workers' Vocational Training Promotion Act of 1997, 
the focus of training has moved from government-led initial vocational training (NT) to 
continuing vocation training (CVT) at the workplace. The EIS has contributed to the rapid 
increase of employer-led training on a voluntary basis. In this context, the driving force for 
vocational training has changed from public training to employer-led training. 
Thirdly, institutional structures or networks for social partnership have gradually 
been built to replace the state coordination system. For example, the VET Policy Commission 
was legitimised to institutionalise the participation of social partners, particularly in 
promoting the new framework of qualifications. New government-coordinated private 
qualifications were introduced, to complement the rigid state-driven qualification system. 
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More important, the Tripartite Commission was set up to promote social partnership in labour 
market reform. Recently it started to be interested in training, and reached basic agreements 
on the participation of trade unions in training. In addition, since the establishment of 
provincial education councils as well as elected provincial and local governments in 1995, 
the delivery of education and training has been gradually devolved to provincial education 
offices or local governments. 
Fourthly, the Ministerial Meeting on HRD was established to coordinate policies 
on human resource development, emphasising the more indirect and horizontal coordination 
of the supply-side of education and training76 • According to the Basic HRD Act of 2002, the 
main role of the Ministerial Meeting is to discuss and decide the "Five-year Basic Plan for 
HRD", Ministerial annual action plans and their implementation. However, the Ministerial 
Meeting is not allowed to allocate the budget for coordination. Therefore, the mechanism 
seems to depend on the evaluation system, information networks, and networking between 
research institutes and education providers and HRD-related organisations 77. More important, 
the role of local governments is emphasised in relation to implementing HRD policies. Also, 
non-governmental experts are allowed to participate by setting up "Sector Professional 
Committee" under the Ministerial Meeting, in reviewing agendas for deciding policies. 
For a more systematic analysis, the shift in regulatory regime can be explained by 
using a table, as seen below in Figure VI-4. 
75 For the changing education system in Korea, see Appendix 2. 
76 The Ministerial Meeting on HRD was later legitimized by the Basic HRD Act, when the Act was passed by the 
National Assembly in 2002. 
77 See, http://www.MoE.go.kr/English/. 2 September 2002. 
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Classification 
Funding 
Figure VI-4. Shift in regulatory regime 
Developmental State-
Skills coordinated Effects Regulations 
Formation Partnership 
Enrolment 
quota 
(The EPB) 
Abandonment of Marketisation 
Training levy 
enrolment quota 
Employment 
Insurance 
and dramatic 
expansion of HE 
Transition from EI Act of 1995, 
state-led 
employer-led 
CVT 
to VT Promotion 
Act of 1997 
National Government- Dual system of Basic 
Qualifications approved private state & private Qualifications 
Qualifications System qualifications qualifications Act of 1997 
Labour 
market 
~------------------~~~--------=-~-r=-~~~--------~~~~----~~ KOMA VET Policy Participation of VET Promotion 
Commission social partners in Act of 1997 
Oppression of Tripartite 
labour Commission 
Surveillance of Labour-
trade unions Management 
Council 
workplace 
policy 
Participation of Tripartite 
social partners in Commission 
labour policy Act of 1999 
Legitimisation of Workers' 
role of trade Participation 
at unions 
training 
in and 
Cooperation 
Promotion Act 
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VI-6. Conclusion 
This chapter explored how skills formation had been changing from the 
developmental to the state-coordinated partnership model since the early 1990s, mainly 
focusing on changes in the regulatory regime of developmental skills formation. In Korea, 
developmental skills formation used to include such key features as the enrolment quota 
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system based on manpower planning, training levy and stress on discipline, and oppression of 
trade unions. Under the pressure of democratisation and globalisation, skills formation has 
moved through two different phases. First, as seen in the PCER Reports, the Civilian 
Government between 1993 and 1997 emphasised the transition from the developmental to the 
liberal skills formation system (pCER 1997). The government gave up manpower planning 
based on the quota system and encouraged diversity and competition between providers in 
the light of c1ient-centeredness. 
Secondly, the People's Government between 1998 and 2002, paved the way for 
state-coordinated partnership in tackling the Asian economic crisis. For example, the 
Tripartite Commission was established in response to the pressure of the IM:F for the labour 
market flexibility. The new framework for skills formation can be characterized by state-
coordinated partnership, because it emphasises the role of the state in promoting the 
involvement of social partners in education and training. 
However, with regard to this transition in skills formation, some current issues 
arise. First, the division between vocational education and qualifications and the labour 
market prevents holistic approaches to lifelong learning from being implemented. For 
example, as the role of the MoE and the MoL is pivotal in promoting partnership between 
vocational schools and employers, a cooperative administrative system of VET is prerequisite 
for this partnership. Second, the Ministerial Meeting without funding allocation power may 
find it difficult to coordinate different Ministries when their interests are in confrontation. 
Therefore, to secure a broad partnership across Ministries' boundaries, the Ministerial 
Meeting should have a means to influence each Ministry. Third, with the rapid economic 
liberalisation after the economic crisis, social cohesion has become a major issue in relation 
to skills formation and lifelong learning. 
Therefore, in building the framework for new skills formation, the holistic 
approach to lifelong learning needs to be emphasised. Knowledge, skills and participatory 
citizenship all have to be recognized as essential for maturing democracy as well as preparing 
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for the knowledge-based economy. In this regard, the approach to lifelong learning is 
required to bring liberal education, training and democratic citizenship education together in 
Korea. 
In next chapter, the change from the developmental to the state-coordinated 
partnership skills formation will be explored on the basis of the analysis of interview data. 
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Chapter VII: Developmental skills formation in transition: Towards 
the state-coordinated partnership model in Korea 
VII-I. Introduction 
This chapter analyses the interview data collected in preliminary and final 
fieldwork undertaken in Korea during the periods between 27 June and 14 August 1999 and 
between 5 September and 30 September 2002. Before analysing the collected data, the 
research methodology and theoretical framework will be briefly explained, to address the 
theoretical basis of the systematic analysis. With regard to research methodology, which was 
partly addressed in the research design section of Chapter I, several considerations are 
discussed, mainly focusing on the advantages of using qualitative research with semi-
structured interviews in my work on my thesis. As for the theoretical framework, the concept 
of 'state-coordinated partnership' is suggested to explain the moving direction of skills 
formation and the emerging framework of lifelong learning. 
The main part of this chapter is designed to provide more concrete evidence on the 
state-coordinated partnership in skills formation which has been theoretically conceptualised 
in the previous chapters mainly on the basis of the document analysis. Particularly, the 
chapter points out that the Tripartite Commission is a distinctive example of how the Korean 
economy has successfully responded to the challenges of globalisation and democratisation 78. 
Although its social foundation is still weak and fragile, it is certain that the institution paved 
the way for social partnership in industrial relations and skills development. Moreover, the 
Tripartite Commission is expected to play an active role in skills formation as well as 
industrial relations because the President, Roh, Moo-hyun, has showed his emphasis on its 
role since he was elected in December 2002. 
78 See OECD (2001), The World Economy: A millennial perspective. "Korea has a history of successful 
accommodation to external shocks, and in 1999 per capita income bounced up by 9.6 per cent" (P.148). 
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In addition, the chapter points out that changes in skills formation in Korea are 
undergone in the context of political and economic change, and the approach to lifelong 
learning is likely to be increasingly holistic, including political and educational as well as 
economic, than narrowly skills- or economy-oriented. 
VII-2. Research methodology II: qualitative research and semi-structured 
interviews 
As explained in the introduction chapter, this study adopts a qualitative research 
method, and is mainly based on documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews. 
VII-2-1. Semi-structured interviews 
The interview as a research technique is used to gather information through direct 
verbal interaction between interviewer and interviewee. As Cohen and Manion indicate, the 
interview serves three purposes: as "the principal means of gathering information having 
direct bearing on the research objectives"; and as a device "to test hypotheses or to suggest 
new ones"; as a method to triangulate "with other methods in a research undertaking" (Cohen 
and Manion 1994:272-3). With regard to my study, interview data are independently 
informative, as well as valuable in conjunction with the method of document analysis. 
As mentioned in the research design section of the introductory chapter, this 
research employed semi-structured interviews based on open-ended questions to gather 
information clarifying the research questions, as well as to collect important data that are 
very difficult to obtain by other methods. The semi-structured interview is attractive and 
widely used because it can "supply a frame of reference for respondents' answers" with "a 
minimum of restraint on answers and their expression" (Cohen and Manion 1994: 273), 
Compared to the semi-structured interview, the structured interview allows the interviewer 
little freedom to modify the content, sequence and wording of the questions, because they are 
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detennined in advance. By contrast, an unstructured interview is an open situation without 
any restraint on answers. In a semi-structured interview, interviewees are allowed to express 
their viewpoints "in a relatively openly designed interview situation [rather] than in a 
standardised interview or a questionnaire" (Flick, U. 1998: 76). It is also regarded as the 
"more economic way", if the main aim of the interview is to collect data including "concrete 
statements about an issue" (ibid. p. 95). 
In particular, in my research, the semi-structured interview allowed deeper 
understanding, within a limited period of preliminary and final fieldwork, of the different 
positions of social partners or groups regarding the emerging framework of lifelong learning 
than any other method of data collection. The method was appropriate because the main aim 
of the empirical study was to provide the concrete evidence to explain changing modes of 
regulation, which have been analysed in the previous chapters on the basis of documents. 
The preliminary interviews were carried out to understand different groups' 
perceptions of the emerging framework of lifelong learning, as well as to collect documentary 
data on the lifelong learning policies and practice in which interviewees were involved. The 
25 interviewees were mainly composed of policy-makers, NOOs and academics. The 
interviews were noted without tape-recording, to encourage open discussion. The interview 
notes and documentary data collected from interviewees were important sources in preparing 
for the final fieldwork as well as in writing the chapters of documentary analysis. 
On the basis of the preliminary interviews, the final interviews were designed to 
gather deeper infonnation, required not only to provide evidence regarding the changing 
modes of regulation of VET and lifelong learning, but to deepen my interpretation. In 
particular, a set of interview questions was focused on the cases of the KRIVET and the VET 
Policy Commission, which were established by the Education Reform Acts of 1997. 
However, other interview questions were adjusted to the different groups of interviewees, to 
gather relevant infonnation, as well as to explore the different positions or viewpoints about 
the emerging framework of lifelong learning. 
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The 25 interviewees can be classified into 5 groups: composed respectively of 4 
policy-makers, 3 representatives of trade unions, 3 senior members of staff (2 from 
employers' organisations, 1 from one of the largest firms in Korea), 6 researchers in research 
institutes, 6 senior members of staff of public or private training providers, and 3 academics. 
In the interviews, I attempted to examine and compare different social partners' demands for 
lifelong learning policies and their different approaches to lifelong learning in this time of 
transition in skills formation. Therefore, interviewees were carefully selected to represent 
policy makers, various social partners and institutions. 
First, four policy-makers were chosen from the Presidential Office and the two 
Ministries of Education and Labour, the main Ministries regarding education and training. 
Two were from the Presidential Office and the MoL, two were from the MoE(HRD). 
Secondly, three trade union leaders were from the FKTU and the KCTU, which are 
rivals; one was from the headquarters of the FKTU, two from the Korean Teachers' Union 
(KTU) , Chunkyojo, which is one of the biggest trade unions of the KCTU. In addition, two 
interviewees from the vocational education committee, the KTU, were representatives of 
commercial high school teachers and technical high school teachers respectively. 
Thirdly, three senior staff members of enterprises were from the Korean Employers 
Federation (KEF), the biggest employers' organization, and the headquarters of the SMEs' 
association and Samsung Electronic Co. respectively. 
Fourthly, six researchers from government-sponsored research institutes were from 
the KRIVT, the KLI and the KEDI, which are the main institutes for education, training and 
industrial relations. Three of the KRNET researchers were interviewed. The KEDI is the 
oldest education-related government research institute and is in charge of lifelong education 
centres; the interviewee is in charge of the Credit Bank system. By contrast, the KLI is the 
government research institute regarding industrial relations and training. 
Fifthly, the six interviewees who are training providers included public, voluntary 
and private training providers. Thus, while two were from the KOMA (the government 
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training provider and qualifications awarding body), two were from the KCCI, the largest 
employers' organization and public training provider. In addition, two were from one of the 
Women's HRD Centres, which are publicly funded voluntary organisations, and from a 
private training provider. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Internet was very helpful for following up 
sources related to the interviews. These kinds of sources were used in preparing for the 
interview, understanding and interpreting what people had to say, and triangulating interview 
data. 
VII-2-2 The collection and analysis of data: validity and triangulation 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the main purpose of this empirical study 
is to analyse, historically, why and how developmental skills formation has changed under 
the challenges of globalisation and democratisation. The data for this empirical study have 
been gathered through two methods. 
One was the use of documentary and electronic materials, including policy 
documents, papers on the proceedings of conferences, journals and books, as well as web-
based articles. Korean government resources were mainly obtained from the policy makers or 
members of research institutes who were interviewed. In addition, access to government 
documents has become easier, due to the enactment of the Open Information Act, which 
allows open access to government documents, and later the launch of the virtual government 
in November 2002. 
The other method was the conduct of interviews to collect data regarding current 
policies and their implementation, mainly on the basis of two periods of fieldwork. The semi-
structured interviews undertaken during the preliminary fieldwork were very open, with little 
restraint on answers, and without tape-recording, because they were designed to provide a 
comfortable situation for interviewees to express their viewpoints. By contrast, 17 out of 25 
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semi-structured interviews during the final fieldwork were tape-recorded as well as noted79• 
Eight interviews were not tape-recorded because five interviewees wanted not to be recorded, 
whilst three were interviewed by telephone. It is worth mentioning that among the 17 
interviewees, all the four interviews with policy-makers were tape-recorded. Trade unions 
leaders also cooperated in interviews, and kindly provided their own documentation. 
All interviews were transcribed in Korean. In addition, one transcript of the 
interview was completely translated in English and other transcripts were partly translated in 
English for quotations. The analysis of interview data was based on transcripts and 
triangulated sources. 
To enhance validity, the triangulation method was adopted. First, in collecting and 
analysing data, I compared a variety of data sources such as academic papers, government 
policy documents, Internet website articles and interviews. Secondly, the different 
perspectives or positions of social partners were triangulated to construct an accurate multi-
dimensional explanation of how they interrelated. Thirdly, it is worth mentioning that the 
rapidly developed Internet sites of the government, trade unions, research or training 
institutions and mass media have been helpful for the comparison of the different views of 
social partners, as well as being additional sources of information. 
VII-3. Theoretical framework for interview data analysis 
While the previous chapter examined the transition in developmental skills 
formation and its effects on the framework of lifelong education and learning mainly on the 
basis of documents, this chapter will investigate the transition and its effects on lifelong 
learning by analysing interview data. In the dramatically changing context, how has the 
developmental skills formation system in Korea been changing? Does this research suggest 
that skills formation is moving towards the market-driven AnglO-American model? Or it 
79 In fact, I interviewed 26 persons, but one researcher agreed to have a meeting with me for one hour on the 
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suggest that skills formation is moving towards another East Asian model, reflecting 
changing relations between the state and civil society under the severe pressures of 
globalisation and democratisation? To look at the transition, it is very important to examine 
how the regulations of VET and lifelong learning have changed, focusing on the actual 
mechanism of skills formation in Korea. 
The interview data analysis mainly examines whether the state-driven planning 
model has been changing into a state-coordinated partnership model in Korea; analysis is 
focused on changes in the regulations of VET and lifelong learning since the civilian 
government carne to power in 1993. This government proposed unprecedented broad 
blueprints for Education Reform, entitled PCER Reports, and launched the structural reform 
of VET systems, stressing the advent of "globalisation" and an "informational society". 
The reform proposals may be characterized by the key concept of 'client-oriented' 
education and training. They emphasized deregulation, pointing to the problems of the rigid 
education and training systems which resulted from state-driven planning and centralized 
control. In addition, the main purpose of VET reform was to overcome academic drift, by 
providing access to higher education for vocational high school graduates. Lifelong education 
policies were also proposed as the main means for curing the diploma-disease by providing 
various alternative routes to higher education, such as the Credit Bank system. As a 
consequence, the main bases for vocational education moved from vocational high schools to 
junior colleges and the advancement rate to higher education has dramatically increased. 
Compared to European countries, the rapid expansion of higher education may be 
the main distinguishing characteristic of Korean lifelong education policies at this stage. This 
may be characterized by 'humanistic or liberal approach' to lifelong education, reflecting the 
academic-oriented education system. Government policies to expand vocational education at 
the secondary level were given up in the mid-1990s because it was impossible to prevent an 
increasing social demand for higher education. As a consequence, the focus of vocational 
condition of not being included as fonnal interviewees. 
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education reform changed, from building partnerships between vocational high schools and 
enterprises to linking vocational high schools and junior colleges, as well as to building 
partnerships between junior colleges and enterprises. The government stressed the role of 
junior colleges, emphasising the importance of vocational higher education in the advent of 
the information society. The policies contributed to the rapid expansion of higher education 
in the 1990s. 
By contrast, the nature of vocational education at the high school level has 
increasingly changed, from 'vocational education for job' to 'preparatory education for 
vocational higher education'. In this context, educational policies to develop partnerships 
between vocational high schools and industry were unsuccessful because enterprises were not 
enthusiastic about long-term relationship with vocational high schools. For example, when 
the 2+ 1 system, in which vocational school students study at school for 2 years and are 
trained at enterprises for their final year, was introduced, it soon confronted the criticism that 
employers regarded it as a means to exploit cheap labour rather than as training. Therefore, 
for successful VET reform, it is prerequisite to build a social basis which supports the new 
framework. This is the reason why approaches to lifelong learning in Korea should be 
holistic, including political and educational as well as economic approaches. 
However, the financial crisis in 1997 was another turning point in skills formation 
and lifelong learning because of drastic changes in the labour market. Under the pressure of 
the IMF's structural adjustment programmes, the process of economic liberalization was 
accelerated and the rate of unemployment soared. As a consequence, the government was 
engulfed in solving urgent issues of economic restructuring and unemployment. The 
government did its best to develop the leT industry in order to create jobs, and enhance 
economic competitiveness. Investment in human resources was also emphasised as the main 
driving force to cope with the challenges of the knowledge-based economy. Since then, 
lifelong learning has been emphasized as a main means to promote economic development as 
well as social development or personal fulfilment. In particular, government played a major 
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role in bringing social partners together to participate in economic reform and prepared the 
way for the new framework of skills formation and lifelong education. 
From this stage, lifelong education started to be recognized as the main means to 
build the new framework of skills formation as well as participatory civil society. While 
humanistic or liberal approaches to lifelong education had been dominant in a discourse on 
lifelong learning until the mid 1990s, a vocational approach to lifelong learning has also been 
emphasized, with the concept of national HRD, since the late 1990s. However, different 
approaches to lifelong learning have been rarely connected in a divided education and 
training system, which may be characterized by the division of the MoE and the MoL. This 
means that the divided system has contributed to the prevention of holistic or comprehensive 
approaches to lifelong learning. 
After the analysis of interviews and documents mainly collected from interviewees, 
this chapter suggests the term "state-coordinated partnership" in order to characterize the 
transition of the developmental skills formation in Korea. In my thesis, the concept of state-
coordinated partnership is defined as a way of organising skills formation on the basis of both 
the role of the central government as the strategic planner and institutional coordinator and 
the increasing role of stakeholders in policy-decision and implementation. With regard to the 
state-coordinated partnership model, two major factors will be examined: the central 
government and the social partners. The main characteristic is that the role of central 
government has changed from the direct control of the whole process to strategic policy-
decision and coordination. In this regard, it plays a major role in institutionalising 
partnership, in three main areas: first, determining the roles of partners through regulations; 
second, creating intermediary bodies for partnership such as the Tripartite Commission; third, 
providing incentives for key parties to participate in implementation. The state-coordinated 
partnership is also characterized by the increasing role of social partners, particularly in the 
process of implementation. Because capital and labour have increased their influence on 
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policies in the context of globalisation and democratisation, the support of social partners is 
essential for the successful implementation of policies. 
This chapter examines both policy and practice levels of VET and lifelong learning, 
focusing on the changes in the regulations of funding, the qualifications framework and the 
labour market. It mainly investigates changes in institutional structures of developmental 
skills formation, such as commanding institutions, the centralised education and training 
system, and a labour control mechanism. The institutional analysis will contribute to a 
systematic understanding of transitional skills formation in Korea80• As a consequence, it is 
necessary to examine the weakness as well as the strength of the developmental state 
approach to skills formation under the severe pressure of globalisation and the highly 
mobilised civil society. In this relation, this study tries to examine the dynamic power 
relations between the state and other stakeholders, in order to analyse the driving force of 
new skills formation without neglecting the conflicts between stakeholders, including capital 
and trade unions. 
To investigate the changes in the regulations of VET and lifelong learning, the 
interview data analysis addresses in more detail what the central government has abandoned 
or established, and the effects on VET and lifelong learning. The interview data analysis is 
categorized into three main parts: dealing with qualifications, funding, and the labour market. 
In the first part, the new qualifications framework is explained on the basis of the KRIVET 
and the Credit Bank system. Secondly, the Employment Insurance System is discussed, 
chiefly as a replacement of the training levy system. Thirdly, the Tripartite Commission is 
critically examined, and it is claimed as the main characteristic of the emerging state-
coordinated partnership model. 
80 Recently, western academics have started to point to the weakness of the development state and of 
developmental skills fonnation since the financial (or economic) crisis in south-east Asia. See Castells (1998), 
Brown, Green and Lauder (2001). 
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VII -4. Analysis of changes In the regulations of VET and lifelong 
learning in Korea 
This section explores challenges facing the VET system since the 1990s, and 
examines the new regulations for VET and lifelong learning designed to cope with these 
challenges, on the basis of the analysis of interview data. It shows that the focus of VET and 
lifelong learning policies have been moving from developmental skills fonnation to 
increasing the involvement of social partners. As mentioned in Chapter V, the Kim, Young-
Sam government paved the way for the demise of developmental skills fonnation, 
emphasizing the challenges of globalisation. By contrast, while the Kim, Dae-Jung 
government was struggling to overcome the Asian economic crisis, it laid the cornerstone for 
state-coordinated partnership on the basis of involvement of social partners and civil 
associations. This is partly because government needs the support of social partners and civil 
associations in continuing democratic reform as well as overcoming the economic crisis. It is 
also partly because particularly trade unions and active civil associations started to recognize 
the role of democratic government in relation to social cohesion and institutionalisation of 
social partnership. This means that government and social partners and civil associations 
have been increasingly changing their relations in response to challenges of democratisation 
and globalisation. 
Therefore, interview data analysis is focused on how regulations of qualifications, 
funding and the labour market have been changing on the basis of changing relation between 
the state and civil associations. 
VII-4-1. Changes in the regulations for qualifications in VET and lifelong learning 
Analysis of the interviews on regulation of qualifications will be focused on 
investigating how the national qualifications system and delivery mechanism have changed 
with regard to skills fonnation and lifelong learning. In addition, problems over qualifications 
will be discussed mainly with regard to the "mismatch between the qualifications an 
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employee actually possesses and the qualifications that are required for the performance of a 
specific job within a specific labour organization" (Brandsma 1999:74). Moreover, the 
problems will be analysed in terms of the demand side as well as the supply side. 
VIJ-4-J-J. Challenges facing the VET and vocational qualifications system 
The government and social partners have come to agree that the national 
qualifications system has serious problems, although their stresses are different. For example, 
large firms have been complaining about the low quality of VET and vocational 
qualifications in relation to rapidly changing technologies. 
Although the national technical qualifications system is still valid, they have had serious 
problems regarding their qualities. Re-education or continuing education has been 
required when qualifications holders have been employed. Moreover, some 
qualifications, such as bookkeeping, are no longer necessary due to technical changes. 
However, they still remain as national qualifications. (EM3) 
This complaint is related to the mismatch between the qualifications which a labour 
market entrant possesses and the qualifications which a large firm demands for a specific 
position. The senior manager from the largest company in Korea continued to criticize the 
low quality of the public training system. 
The huge amount of money from the Employment Insurance Fund has been wasted. For 
example, a lot of money is spent on training the unemployed. However, because the 
quality of training is low, it does not contribute to employment or enhancing the 
competitiveness of enterprises. (EM3) 
As seen above, the criticism by large firms has been mainly focused on the low 
quality of VET and rigid NTQs, stressing the changing demand for high skills. In this regard, 
compared to SMEs, large firms tend to recruit a highly qualified workforce and to invest in 
long-term on-the-job training because they can employ overqualified labour with only a small 
f 81 amount 0 extra pay . 
81 According to a document of the MoL, entitled "Imgeum[Wages)", by 2000, the wages of two-year college 
graduates were only 3.4 per cent more than those of high school graduates (MoL 2002). 
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By contrast, SMEs complain of the difficulties in recruiting a young workforce 
regardless of their qualifications, let alone the quality of VET. An interview with a member 
of staff of the SME employers' organization showed the serious situation. 
SMEs fmd it difficult to recruit employees amongst trainees from public training because 
trainees are likely to get a job in large flrms. . .. Particularly, in case of three D 
[dangerous, dirty, difficulty] industries, they mainly depend on foreign industrial trainees 
or migrant workers. It is difficult to recruit a young workforce with advertisements. 
(EM2) 
While SMEs are eager to employ graduates of public training institutes or technical 
high schools, they tend to avoid SMEs even when it is very difficult for them to find a 
position in a large firm. Briefly speaking, the polarization of the labour market is one of the 
most serious problems facing the Korean skills formations system. 
More seriously, as the esteem of VET worsens due to the impression that it leads to 
a 'low wages and hard work' job, youths increasingly avoid VET programmes. In addition, if 
young people get work as soon as they graduate from a vocational school, their status seldom 
changes, although they may later get a first degree on the basis of part-time study. This is one 
of the main reasons why the advancement rate of vocational school graduates is so high. In 
this context, the government changed the centre of vocational education from the high school 
to the junior college level, emphasizing the lifelong VET system. The policy has contributed 
to accelerating the advance of vocational high school graduates to higher education. 
Therefore it is not surprising that a vocational high school teacher criticized the lifelong 
education policy focusing on the expansion of higher education. 
Lifelong education is likely to be misunderstood as advancing directly from vocational 
high schools to higher education (TU2). 
The emphasis on junior colleges resulted in a reduced investment in vocational 
high schools, and the esteem for vocational high schools has deteriorated (TV2; TV3). As a 
technical high school teacher argued, the majority of technical high school graduates hope to 
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continue to study at a junior college or a university, avoiding the lowest and hardest 
employment. 
The reason why the advancement rate of vocational schools is so high is that educational 
attainment [or a degree] is a major factor in deciding the salary level or promotion, as 
well as decisions on marriage or the evaluation of an individual (TU3). 
In this context, it is not surprising that the purpose of the vocational high schools has been 
gradually changing, from preparing for work to the last resort for access to higher education. 
In addition, as the rate of advancement to higher education reaches nearly 70 per 
cent, the public training institutes have experienced difficulties in recruiting trainees, because 
these institutes have mainly targeted those who left school earlier. For instance, as a teacher 
at a public training institute said, trainees are ashamed to take a vocational training course, 
although it allows them an opportunity to get an associate degree almost free of charge. 
Vocational training institutes are facing difficulties in recruiting trainees, because trainees 
feel shame about the lower prestige or social reputation of vocational training compared 
to formal education. (PUP4) 
Policy-makers also admitted the problems of VET and national technical 
qualifications, although their focuses are different depending on their ministries. For 
example, policy-makers from the MoE or the Office of the President pointed to the rigidity of 
the NTQ system, stressing the need to combine vocational education curriculum and NTQs. 
The national technical qualifications were regarded as very exclusive and problematic in 
adapting to the changing demand of industries. Therefore, the private qualifications 
system was introduced to vitalize the NTQ system. (PMI). 
Setting up the mechanism to relate vocational education, and qualifications to the labour 
market has been more important than anything else. (PM2) 
The main purpose of the qualifications reform was to cope with the rigidity of the 
national technical qualifications system. (PM3) 
These policy-makers were mainly focused on the supply side of VET and 
qualifications. On the other hand, a policy-maker from the MoL emphasized on-going 
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training reform, changing from standardized training to a client-oriented training system in 
response to the changing demand of employers. 
Until the late 1980s, vocational training had been something like making the same 
products according to standardisation. But now, tailored or client-oriented training is 
more required than standardised training. (PM4) 
However, he also focused on the supply side of training, and addresses the dilemma 
of matching the vocational curriculum with employers' demands in relation to qualifications, 
explaining the case of IT -related occupations. 
During the updating of vocational curricula, qualifications become obsolete (PM4). 
It is interesting that while employers or policy-makers stress the problems of VET 
and qualifications mainly in the light of provision, trade unions or providers seem to stress 
the problems of the labour market and lower esteem for VET. Therefore, both the supply and 
the demand side of skills formation need to be considered in order to understand why the 
VET and qualifications problems have become so serious. 
More important, since the Asian economic crisis, even large firms are likely to 
reduce investment in long-term training and prefer experienced workers to inexperienced 
labour market entrants. During the period of rapid economic development, in return for 
governmental support for large firms they had been under pressure to "take considerable 
responsibility for the social welfare of their employees", including investment in long-term 
training (Stiglitz 2002: 10). For example, while the government provided initial training 
based on broad basic skills and disciplines, large firms provided long-term employment as 
well as long-term specific job training. However, the enforcement of the IMF structural 
adjustment programmes released firms from that responsibility, without promoting alternative 
social welfare systems to cope with the problems posed by a market system (ibid. p.36). As a 
consequence, there was a sudden dramatic increase in atypical jobs and in unemployment, 
and the transition from school or university to work became difficult. 
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V//-4-J-2. Three Vocational Education Acts 
In explaining the purpose of refonns in qualifications, a senior researcher of a 
government-sponsored research institute pointed to the limitations of developmental skills 
fonnation in the changed economic context. 
Five Year Economic Development Plans were based on a developmental model of 
catching up with developed countries through compressed development within a short 
period. Therefore, it is certain that providers played a crucial role. However, the state-
driven model started to reveal limitations. Therefore, private sectors are encouraged to 
participate in the qualifications system (RE 1 ) 
The main problems of the state-driven qualifications system have been inflexibility 
of national qualifications and the quality mismatch between provision of and demand for 
qualifications. In this context, the three Vocation Education Acts - the VET Promotion Act, 
the KRJVET Act and the Basic Qualifications Act - were enacted to cope with problems of 
the state-driven VET system, on the basis of partnership with industry. However, under the 
previous governments, the partnership had slowly been institutionalized to involve social 
partners. For example, although trade unions were allowed to participate in policy decisions 
by the VET Promotion Act, institutions for social partnership were established very late. 
Korean experience shows that, in the democratic transition, while the process of deregulation 
is comparatively fast, developing partnerships based on a new consensus is very difficult and 
takes a long time. Therefore the Roh Moo-hyun government has recognized that the state has 
an essential role, not only in reducing the rate of atypical jobs, which has soared since the 
structural adjustment under the pressure of the IMF, but also in involving social partners in 
labour market refonn and skills formation. This partly explains why the government 
acknowledged its direction as an "effective and enabling government" when it came to 
power, and why it struggles to attract the attention of social partners in building new 
framework for skills formation. 
As the peER Report acknowledges, the main purpose of the VET refonn has been 
to build a 'lifelong VET system' based on the connective vocational qualifications system. In 
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this regard, the VET Promotion Act was intended to promote 'school to work transition' and 
'work-based learning', building a new framework for vocational qualifications on the basis of 
the VET Policy Commission and local VET Committees at the central and local levels. In 
addition, the KRIVET was established by the KRIVET Act and the Basic Qualifications Act 
has broadened the qualifications framework, including GAPQs. Therefore the VET policy 
Commission, the KRIVET and GAPQs will next be examined, to explain how the vocational 
qualifications system has changed. 
1) The VET Policy Commission 
As mentioned above, the qualifications issue has been at the heart of VET reforms. 
In this regard, the VET Policy Commission was proposed by the VET Promotion Act as the 
main body to lead the qualifications reform. 
As an organization to govern the whole VET system, in 1997 the VET Policy 
Connnission was proposed ... to build the new VET system, taking the initiative in the 
qualifications reform (PMl). 
The VET Promotion Act, which replaced the Industrial Education Promotion Act of 
1963, proclaimed the direction of the new VET reform. The Industrial Education Promotion 
Act not only increased investment in industrial education, but paved the way for school-
industry collaboration on the basis of placements with firms. By contrast, the VET Promotion 
Act covers broader issues of VET reform, including the VET Basic Plan based on 
cooperation between the MoE and MoL, connection between VET providers, school-industry 
collaboration, the central VET Policy Commission and local VET Councils and the 
evaluation of VET providers. 
The VET Policy Commission was established by the VET Promotion Act in order 
to deliberate on issues regarding VET policies. The Act states that the Commission mainly 
deals with the VET Basic Plan, important policies regarding the qualifications system, and 
VET policies regarding administrative and financial support by central and local 
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governments. The VET Policy Commission consists of no more than 25 members: 10-13 
seats for cabinet members, three seats for chairmen of local VET Committees, three seats for 
each representatives of VET providers, industry and labour. In addition, according to the 
Basic Qualifications Act, the VET Policy Commission deliberates and decides whether 
qualifications match the criteria of GAPQs. It is significant that social partners are allowed to 
participate in decision-making in VET at the local as well as the central level. More 
important, the Commission, which is under the responsibility of the Office of the PM, 
coordinates the MoE(HRD), the MoL and other ministries in relation to VET and skills 
formation. 
However, as a policy-maker involved in the legislation admitted, the Commission 
could play an only very limited role in VET reform. As a result of the Asian economic crisis, 
the launch of the VET Policy Commission was delayed until 1999. By 2001, the VET Policy 
Commission had been convened only twice, and no local VET Committees had been set up. 
As a consequence, in 2001, the Office of the PM decided to make the VET Policy 
Commission a responsibility at the ministerial level. Its main roles are supposed to be taken 
over by the Ministerial Meeting on HRD, or by a newly proposed qualifications-related 
Commission (PM2; PM3). 
The jurisdiction of the VET Policy Commission is supposed to move from the remit of 
the office of the PM to the Ministerial Meeting on HRD. (PM2) 
The Ministerial Meeting has already taken over the major role regarding VET 
policies. It is important to examine why the VET Policy Commission was unsuccessful, 
although the MoE was enthusiastic during the process of legislation. This examination will 
help to understand the transition from the developmental to the state-coordinated partnership 
model, with the changes in the process of policy-making. 
There may have been several reasons why the VET Policy Commission has not 
played a major role. For example, this may be partly because the long-term VET reform plans 
could not attract the attention of social partners, due to the urgent issue of training for the 
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unemployed or those who needed to change their jobs after the financial crisis (PMl). It is 
also partly because of poor cooperation between the MoE and the MoL at the governmental 
level. Most researchers and academics who were interviewed pointed to the division between 
the two Ministries as the main reason. 
In Korea, coordination or cooperation between vocational education and vocational 
training is not possible while the MoE and the MoL are separated. This is because of the 
budget. What I have felt while I have been working for the President Advisory Council is 
that cooperation is unlikely without a merger. (PR2) 
This succinctly explains why cooperation between the MoE and the MoL has been 
difficu1t, and why such cooperation is vital in VET reform. 
The poor coordination between the two Ministries also had a negative effect on the 
process of establishing local VET Committees. The establishment of these committees was 
mainly suspended because they were not provided with appropriate financial support due to 
the lack of cooperation between the two ministries (KRNET 1999). 
As the result of a survey, local governments stated that they could establish the local VET 
Committees if related authorities devolved and relevant funding was allocated, but it 
might be difficult to set them up if they had to do it with their own budgets. (RE I) 
However, local governments have played a role in coordinating VET -related 
associations or committees at the local level because there have been demands for the local 
partnership between stakeholders, irrespective of the VET Promotion Act. For example, in 
Inchon, the fourth biggest city, the 'Vocational Education Development Committee' was 
established, and academics, teachers and employers have discussed the issue of vocational 
education (TU2). This shows that ministerial cooperation can contribute to building a wider 
partnership between social partners in VET at the local as well as the central governmental 
level. 
More important, as a policy-maker said, it is mainly because a few political elites 
were dominant in the process of legislation, underplaying the involvement of social partners 
in the legislation and implementation. 
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Most important, if the VET Policy Commission had been established on the basis of the 
demand of employers and labour, it could have played a role according to the plan 
despite the economic crisis or the change of goverrunent. (PM 1) 
This shows the problems of state-driven refonn without encouraging the 
involvement of social partners during the period of the Kim Young-Sam government. It is not 
surprising that social partners felt they were not allowed to take an active role in the 
Commission. However, the mention also shows that policy-makers started to recognize the 
importance of involving social partners in the policy-making and implementation of VET 
refonn as political relations between government and social partners have changed since the 
Asian economic crisis. 
It is worth mentioning that partnership-oriented refonn is more difficult and takes a 
longer time than market-oriented refonn in changing developmental skills fonnation. This is 
because partnership approaches are based on compromise between social partners, as well as 
on ministerial cooperation. An academic interviewee addressed the point well from his 
experience. 
When some people82, including me, suggested [vocational] educational reforms, they 
considered getting the balance between the introduction of the market and the 
development of school-industry networks right. '" However, whilst marketization was 
workable with deregulation only, networking had to be carried out with various kinds of 
catalytic roles. (PR 1) 
He continued to explain why partnership or networking is so difficult to develop in 
the democratic transition of developmental skills formation. He ascribed the main cause of 
the underdevelopment of networks to the inertia of the past state-driven developmental 
model. 
When regulation becomes loose after the authoritarian state has been driving economic 
development, the market mechanism tends to work easily. This is because during the 
period of rapid economic development, the goverrunent performed the function of the 
market. By contrast, it has not developed networks. . .. Therefore, it seems to be the 
82 They were members of the Presidential Commission on Education Reform (PCER) during the Kim Young-Sam 
government (1993-1997). 
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inertia of the past economic development period that prevents networks from developing. 
(PRl) 
His remarks imply that partnerships or networks are not voluntarily built by the 
demise of the developmental state. This partly explains why the VET Policy Commission was 
not successful when it was not accompanied by active participation of social partners as well 
as ministerial cooperation. In this regard, later, the role of the Ministerial Meeting on HRD 
and the Tripartite Commission needs to be examined in tenns of ministerial cooperation and 
the involvement of social partners 
Social partners, particularly enterprises seem to feel that their voices have not been 
heard in making decisions on education and training policies despite of the involvement in 
various policy commissions. For example, an interviewee from a large company was very 
critical of perfunctory policy commissions. 
There has been no systematic mechanism for enterprises to participate in policy-making 
concerning education and training, and the government has unilaterally decided. Policy 
commissions, including the VET Policy Commission are mainly for display. (EM3) 
This means that social partners' demands for the active involvement in making 
policies become stronger. Compared to the senior manager of a large firm, an interviewee 
from a teachers' union said confidently that their negotiating power had increased because 
the power relations between the state and social partners have changed. 
The participation of trade unions has been guaranteed by the increasing power of trade 
unions. Although I have participated in seminars organized by the KRIVET or the MoE 
since legalisation of Chunkyojo [Korean Teachers' Union], the situation of vocational 
education has not been improved, due to budgets and the limitations of the policy 
decision process. However, as the influence of Chunkyojo has increased, its negotiating 
power has become stronger (TU2). 
This shows that the political power of trade unions has increased particularly since 
the Kim Dae-Jung government took office in 1998. This means that the 'developmental 
partnership' without the active involvement of trade unions no longer work in Korea. 
Therefore, the government has been under pressure to establish a systematic mechanism for 
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state-coordinated partnership. In this regard, while the establishment of the VET Policy 
Commission was significant in providing a legal institution for the state-coordinated 
partnership, the Commission was not enough to develop a systematic mechanism on the basis 
of ministerial cooperation. Therefore, the Commission should work in cooperation with the 
Tripartite Commission as well as the Ministerial Meeting on HRD. 
Finally, as an academic interviewee said, it is necessary that active civil 
associations can playa role in a move towards institutional reform. 
As the merger of the MoE and the MoL is one of the most important issues [in relation to 
VET reform], active civil associations are required to concern themselves with the issue 
(PR2). 
A policy-maker also admitted that civil associations had been increasingly 
influential in policy-making and in the monitoring of policies. 
From now on, the voices of the clients will be very important in policy decision, as well 
as in monitoring the implementation of policies. (PMl) 
The above assumptions suggest that the social and political influence of active civil 
associations has significantly increased in the process of democratisation. This change has 
been possible in a context where bureaucrats and existing political parties have been 
distrusted by people over democratic reform. This issue will be discussed with regard to the 
Tripartite Commission again. 
2)KRNET 
The KRNET was established to build a new national qualifications framework, 
including the system for government-approved private qualifications. According to the Basic 
Qualifications Act of 1997, the KRNET carries out investigations and research regarding 
qualifications on the request of the VET Policy Commission, and manages the GAPQ system. 
Its original purpose was 
"to unify the vocational education and vocational training system, as well as to develop 
vocational school-industry networks" (PRJ). 
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The academic quoted above, who is involved in making the PCER Reports, pointed 
out that it had been proposed that the KRIVET should have merged with the Korea 
Manpower Agency (KOMA) 83. 
Originally, the merger of the KRIVET and the KOMA was proposed because the 
KRIVET was supposed to carry out the role of the KOMA. The KRIVET was thought to 
be unable to playa role properly if the KOMA existed separately because the KOMA was 
in charge of qualifications and vocational school-industry collaboration. (PR I) 
The KOMA had set standards and also had been the only body awarding national 
technical qualifications since the launch of the national technical qualifications system. 
Therefore, the KRIVET was proposed on the grounds that it took over the KOMA on the 
basis of the merger of the MoE and MoL. However, the economic crisis prevented the two 
ministries from being merged, because training for the unemployed was in an emergency. In 
addition, the MoL was against the merger of the KOMA and the KRIVET because the MoL 
worried about losing its own control of the KOMA (PR1). 
In this context, the KRIVET was established with the contribution of the MoE and 
the MoL in 1997, and has played a major role in implementing GAPQs. Its mission is "to 
conduct research and carry out projects in support of government policies on TVET and 
HRD, and thereby foster the development of the vocational skills of the people through the 
provision of lifelong learning for a11,,84. The KRIVET has maintained a close partnership with 
the two ministries by advising them regarding TVET and HRD policies, and supporting their 
implementation. In addition, it has been designated as one of UNESCO's Regional Centres of 
Excellence in Technical and Vocational Education and Training since 2000. 
However, the role of the KRIVET in VET reform has been limited because of the 
divisions between VE and VT, and between the KRIVET and the KOMA. First, the 
continuing separation between VE and VT has prevented it from connecting the vocational 
high school curriculum and national vocational qualifications; this connection is one of main 
83 The Korea Manpower Agency is also named as the HRD Korea. See http://www.hrdkorea.or.kr. 
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aims of VET reform. Second, the coexistence of the KRIVET and the KOMA has made it 
difficult to promote industry-school collaboration in the context where the VET Policy 
Commission could not enforce VET reform. It also resulted in the dual system of national 
qualifications, because the GAPQs and the NTQs are separately based on the National 
Technical Qualifications Act and the Basic Qualifications Act respectively. 
With regard to partnership, as mentioned above, the VET Promotion Act requires 
the involvement of VET providers, industry and related organizations in setting the standards, 
methods and procedures of examinations. In this regard, a researcher of the KRIVET stressed 
the involvement of industries in qualifications. 
When the KRIVET conducts occupational analysis or develops the qualifications 
examination system, it emphasizes the involvement of related industries (REI). 
He also explained the difficulties in involving industries. 
Industries seldom think that initial training is their task. Because they have a strong sense 
of workplace operation first, it is very difficult to bring them into participation in 
qualifications (RE I). 
However, employers tend to think the KRNET has its main partnership with the 
MoE(HRD). This view may make them less interested in cooperation with the KRIVET. 
The KRJVET was established on the basis of collaboration between the MoE and the 
MoL. However, as the MoL is mainly driving it at the moment, the MoL rarely pays 
attention to it (EMl). 
Therefore, the KRIVET needs to be seen as having a close partnership with both the 
MoEHRD and the MoL. In this regard, cooperation between the two ministries is a 
precondition for such a partnership. 
Moreover, employers are likely to feel they are substantially excluded from 
decisions on policy and from the implementation of VET reforms. 
Employers are excluded from substantial involvement. In the case of the VET Policy 
Commission, only a first invitation letter was delivered and since then there has been no 
contact for a few years. The HRD Policy Commission also invited the KEF [Korean 
84 See the KRIVET website, http://www.krivet.re.krlkrivet-htmleh/index.html(26 March 2003) 
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Employers Federation] to attend meetings several times at first; since then there has been 
no contact. The process is very superficial (EM 1). 
In this context, it may be difficult to persuade employers to involve themselves in the refonn 
of qualifications. 
In conclusion, on top of the increased opportunities of participation in seminars and 
meetings, the involvement of social partners needs to be institutionalised at the policy-
deciding level of the KRIVET and the MoEHRD. 
3) The Basic Qualifications Act 
The Basic Qualifications Act of 1997 was enacted to decide the basic framework of 
the qualifications system in order to meet the various demands for qualifications. It 
introduced the system of government-approved private qualifications (GAPQs) in order to 
pave the way for the new national qualifications framework. 
The private qualifications system was introduced to vitalize the national technical 
qualifications system The NTQs were regarded as very exclusive and problematic in 
flexibly adapting to the changing demands of industries (PM I). 
In other words, the original purpose was the replacement of the NTQ system by the 
GAPQ system as the NTQ system started to reveal limitations. 
Therefore, private sectors are encouraged to participate in the qualifications system. The 
Qualification Basic Act is one of the reform Acts (RE 1). 
According to the Act, the VET Policy Commission deliberates and decides whether 
qualifications are suitable to the criteria of GAPQs. By contrast, the KRIVET conducts 
investigations and research regarding qualifications on the request of the VET Policy 
Commission, and manages the GAPQ system. In addition, the Act states that the 
administrative body for national qualifications "should consider how to involve VET 
providers, industry and related organizations in setting standards, method and procedures for 
examinations" (The Basic Qualifications Act, 9-2). 
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However, the application of the Act is restricted in the case of the "creation, 
improvement or abolition of national qualifications". Instead, the National Technical 
Qualifications Act still regulates the implementation of national technical qualifications. This 
position is the result of negotiation between the MoE and the MoL, because the MoL worried 
whether its authority to control national technical qualifications might be lost. 
As the MoE proposed the Act unifying qualifications-related Acts in terms of vocational 
refonn. the MoL was strongly against the legislation. The MoL regarded it as initiating 
competition between the two ministries not only because qualifications used to be under 
the responsibility of the MoL, but also because the MoL was facing pressure for the 
merger of the two ministries. (PMl) 
As a consequence, the enactment of the Basic Qualifications Act resulted in the co-existence 
of the NTQs and the GAPQs. 
The GAPQs system has contributed to challenging the rigidity of the national 
technical qualifications system. As a consequence, the KOMA may have been under pressure 
to enhance the quality of national technical qualifications in order to meet the industrial 
demand. 
Since the introduction of the government-approved private qualifications system, 
competition between two qualifications systems has contributed to improving the service 
of the KOMA and the KCCI8s that are responsible for the operation of national technical 
qualifications. (TU2) 
However, it is questionable how the GAPQs will be recognized In the labour 
market. Particularly, large firms seem to be sceptical. 
The GAPQs rarely contribute to enhancing the competitiveness of enterprises. Enterprises 
need qualifications having a quality and public reputation at least at the level of Nom usa 
[a recognised professional qualification regarding industrial relations]. IT-related 
qualifications lack competitiveness (EM3). 
By contrast, awarding bodies or training providers seem to believe that it will be a 
long time until the labour market recognizes their values. 
85 The KCCI is responsible for a few IT-related qualifications on the basis of delegation from the KOMA. 
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As even national qualifications are not well recognized at the moment, it will take a long 
time for the GAPQs to be valued (PRP 1). 
The possibility of success of the GAPQs depends on whether qualifications holders are 
recognized or not when they are employed, as well as whether the publicity is successful 
or not. The results have to be seen yet (PUP3). 
Therefore, private awarding bodies have been encouraged to involve themselves in 
the new qualifications system, with some privileges of national technical qualifications being 
also allowed for GAPQs. 
National technical qualifications have been allowed some privileges. For example, by 
related Acts, national technical qualification holder(s) are treated preferentially, 
particularly such in industries as architecture, civil engineering and boiler making. Next, 
national qualifications are accredited according to the Credit Bank system ..... However, 
at the end of this year, such privileges are also expected to be allowed for government-
approved private qualifications. (PUP3) 
Recently, many private or voluntary organizations have applied for such approval, 
and by February 2003, private qualifications in 39 subjects were authorized as government-
approved qualifications86• For example, in 2001, the KCCI became the awarding body of 
GAPQs for 15 subjects. 
However, there are some worries about the over-issue of qualifications in order to 
make profits. 
Recently, with a boom in the GAPQs, in an extreme case, they tend to be regarded as a 
business to make profits. This never happened in the case of previous national 
qualifications (RE 1). 
Qualifications tend to be over-issued. If the GAPQs become the means to make profits, 
qualifications can be over-issued to make recruiting trainees or examinees easy. However, 
they will be likely to disappear in the long run. (PUP3) 
More important, as the education-industry-research partnership is increasingly 
pivotal for high skills formation in the knowledge-based economy, the government is still 
under pressure to cooperate in strengthening the social foundation for the partnership. In 
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other words, ministerial cooperation is required as the prerequisite for the connective lifelong 
learning system. For example, the government should solve the problems resulting from the 
division between the MoE and the MoL. As a government officer admitted, the world of 
education is seriously separated from the world of work. 
Although it is easy to talk about VET, the division between VE and VT is very serious 
for the implementation of VET. Vocational high schools are separated from public 
vocational training institutes and they are not linked at all (PM3). 
In this regard, the unification of the qualifications system is increasingly important, 
and the need for a new unified qualifications Act has been raised. 
VII-4-J-3. The Credit Bank system and the Lifelong Education Act 
With the labour market being flexible, the role of the government in VET has 
expanded from initial VET to the areas of continuing VET and lifelong learning. As a 
consequence, VET and lifelong learning policies have strengthened the link between 
vocational education and vocational qualifications and access to higher education. For 
example, the Credit Bank system has also provided a new framework for lifelong learning, 
focusing on access to higher education on the basis of the accumulation of credits at informal 
learning institutions. Since the enactment of the Accreditation Act of 1997 and the Lifelong 
Education Act of 1999, the Credit Bank system has been the main driving force to promote 
liberal or humanistic approaches to lifelong education. This was confirmed by an interview 
with one of the leading academics who is one of the pioneers of lifelong education in Korea. 
The main motivations for participation in lifelong education based on the Credit Bank 
system are to get a degree, and the majority of participants are studying because of their 
desire to learn rather than for a job. The Credit Bank system is working well. (PR3) 
The Lifelong Education Act, which replaced the Social Education Act, has 
contributed to the rapid expansion of the CBS. The Act makes it easy for private or voluntary 
organisations to provide various informal education programmes, allowing them to provide 
86 See the KRIVET website, htm:llwww.krivet.re.kr/web-applkrivet-applkclkcOOOO.jsp. 
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programmes without needing the governmental 'approval' of these programmes. The 
approval system used to function so as to prevent civil associations from providing critical 
adult education. 
In addition, distance education started to play a role in providing various 
programmes on the basis of the CBS, and may become another driving force to build the new 
lifelong education system. By 2002, 15 cyber universities had been established and many 
people are participating in programmes to obtain higher degrees through the accumulation of 
credits. The total authorized number of new students was 16,700 persons, but only a slightly 
more than a half of this were registered in the second term of 200287• 
The KEDI has played a major role in setting standards for the CBS-related modules 
and in the assessment of providers and programmes. As the CBS accredits a variety of 
education and training programmes at diverse informal education organisations, the number 
of education and training providers, formally evaluated by KEDI, has rapidly increased. With 
the introduction of the CBS, even graduates from vocational training centre are allowed to 
apply for a two-year associate diploma when they graduate from a two-year course with the 
completion of the necessary requirements of 80 credits. Those who have the two-year 
associate diploma tend to come back to study at a university for a BA degree, requiring a 
minimum 140 credits for the application. Therefore, the CBS is seen as successful in 
providing diverse paths to degree acquisition and has significantly contributed to promoting 
lifelong learning by linking work and learning. 
The Credit Bank system has worked well. As Korea becomes a highly educated society. 
those who are without a degree get marginalized. As a consequence, the system seems to 
be regarded as the alternative system to achieve a degree. (PRl) 
However, the labour market value of the degree obtained through the CBS is still an 
issue. Although, as mentioned above, the main motivations of participation are to get a 
87 However, in the interview with the researcher in charge of the CBS in the KEDI, he points out that cyber 
universities are in financial difficulties because they were established in separated institutions, like new 
universities and have to compete with established higher education institutions in recruiting students. 
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degree rather than a job at the moment, there is a question about how far the social demand 
will continue if the labour market undervalues the degree88• In addition, as the researcher in 
charge of the CBS pointed out, there is still a need to develop a more proper exchange 
mechanism between vocational qualifications and credits for the combination between work 
and learning. 
When the Credit Bank system accredits qualifications, a proper exchange mechanism has 
still not been settled. (RE4) 
In spite of these limitations, the CBS is seen as laying the cornerstone for the 
lifelong learning system. As a consequence, the Lifelong Education Act is becoming the 
foundation for discussing the new framework of lifelong learning. This framework includes 
the diversity of lifelong education providers and of assessment and recognition systems such 
as the CBS. Moreover, the assessment and the accreditation systems may pave the way for 
the lifelong VT system, when they are linked to the financial support system of the 
Vocational Training Promotion Act89 • More important, as seen in the discussion about the 
study leave system at the level of the Tripartite Commission, the lifelong VT system can 
encourage a mobilised civil society. For example, trade unions can playa part in promoting 
democratic citizenship, providing democratic (or active) citizenship programmes on the basis 
of the CBS. 
Vl/-4-1-4. The Ministerial Meeting on HRD and the Basic HRD Act 
After the economic crisis, the Ministerial Meeting on HRD was established in 2001 
to coordinate education and training in terms of national HRD. At the same time, the Minister 
of the MoEHRD, the Deputy PM for Education, has been responsible for the management of 
the Ministerial Meeting which makes policy decisions for VET and lifelong learning issues. 
88 It might sound strange to western people, but a higher education degree means more than ajob in Korea. For the 
meaning of a deree in East Asia, see Dore, R. (1997) The Diploma Disease: Education. Qualification and 
Development (2n edn.), London: Institute of Education, Univ. of London. 
89 I would like to acknowledge the support of Dr Lee, B.H. He allowed me to discuss impending lifelong learning 
issues with him for one and a half hours, instead ofa formal interview. 
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As a result, the MoEHRD has become the main ministry coordinating the broad framework of 
skills formation. This change seems to reflect the fact that the paradigm of skills formation 
has changed from initial VET based on a division between education and training to 
continuing VET based on the combination of education and training. As a consequence, 
government policies on VET have increasingly focused on broadened access to higher 
education and lifelong learning. 
The main roles of the VET Policy Commission, except government-approved 
private qualifications, have been taken over by the Ministerial Meeting. 
The replacement is inevitable because VET policies have been the main agenda of the 
Ministerial Meeting ... The role of the VET Policy Commission should be a part of the 
Ministerial Meeting in order to implement VET policies effectively. In other words, VET 
policies should be in line with national HRD policies (PM2). 
This statement shows that government is supposed to playa major role in guiding a 
broad partnership across the boundaries of each ministry. In addition, VET policies are 
supposed to be treated as a part of national HRD policies. The concept of NHRD is officially 
defined as a broad concept, incorporating the three elements of "manpower development, 
cultural as well as social capital, and entire system efficiency related to education and 
training" (MoEHRD). However, in reality, the concept can be regarded as a narrow meaning 
of lifelong learning because it tends to be economy-oriented, being distinguished from the 
concept of lifelong education, which is favoured by the world of education. Therefore the 
economic approach to lifelong learning is still separated from the liberal approach to it. 
In addition, social partners and VET providers are allowed to consult by 
participating in Professional Committees established under the Ministerial Meeting. 
However, representatives of social partners are excluded from the process of making 
decisions on policy at the highest level (REI). 
The Ministerial Meeting on HRD is to promote central Ministerial cooperation. (RE 1) 
The decisive point is that representatives of private or voluntary sectors are not allowed 
to participate in decision-making. (PM2) 
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The government is playing a major role in policy decisions at the highest level, and 
encouraging the participation of social partners mainly in the process of implementation. An 
interviewee from the MoEHRD says that the ministry is interested in the role of the Tripartite 
Commission in relation to HRD. However, the approach seems to be very pragmatic. 
What particularly concerns the MoEHRD is to seek the cooperation of the Tripartite 
Commission in relation to HRD at the company level. ... If the Tripartite Commission is 
well operated, it can play an important role. It seems to be a very good mechanism 
because labour, management and government can proclaim together when they agree with 
any efforts of the special Committee. (PM2) 
The establishment of the Ministerial Meeting paved the way for ministerial 
cooperation in relation to VET and lifelong policies. However, the coordination of policy by 
the Ministerial Meeting is significantly limited. The Ministerial Meeting is managed on the 
basis of agreement between all related ministries, and policies are mainly implemented under 
the responsibility of each ministry. Moreover, in spite of the passage of the Basic HRD Act 
of 2002, the Ministerial Meeting was not allowed to gain control of HRD-related budgets, 
because the Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB) was against it. As a result, the role of 
the Ministerial Meeting is mainly focused on policy coordination based on evaluating the 
'investment effect' ofHRD projects implemented under the responsibility of each Ministry. 
Irrespective of budget control, each Ministry has to be responsible for projects .... The 
main task of the future is to build a proper evaluative system (PM2). 
This means that the main role of the Ministerial Meeting is to coordinate loose 
cooperation between Ministries on the basis of evaluation. In this regard, the role of the 
central government in VET seems to have changed, from planning and direct control of 
implementation to shaping a national framework within which networks of stakeholders can 
contribute to skills formation. However, as an academic interviewee said, there is still 
scepticism about the role of the MoEHRD in the coordination of VET because the MoEHRD 
tends to be regarded as a political compromise to avoid the merger of both ministries. 
The MoEHRD is formed by the expansion of the function of the MoE and it is not a 
merger of the MoE and the MoL. ... Without merging the two ministries. even the 
231 
MoEHRD may fmd it difficult to coordinate VE and VT. Unless it is allowed to control 
the budget, there will be no way of enforcing the coordination. CPRl) 
A researcher also argued that merging both ministries is the prerequisite for a 
unified qualifications Act. 
As long as the MoE and the MoL are not merged together, the unified Act may not work, 
although the National Technical Qualifications Act will be unified with the Basic 
Qualifications Act. ... The merger of the MoE and the MoL is the prerequisite for the 
unification of the two Acts. (RE2) 
Why is the merger of the two ministries so difficult? Many academics and 
researchers interviewed point out that bureaucracy and the ministries' self-interest have 
prevented the merger. A researcher at one of the government-sponsored Research Institutes 
argued: 
The ministries' orientation to self-interest is mainly related to the fear of the reduction in 
posts resulting from restructuring the government administration. (RES). 
By contrast, officers from two ministries pointed to the problems of the merger. An 
officer explains the unique relations between training and industrial relations. 
In Korea, the MoL has been responsible for industrial relations as well as vocational 
training. The MoL can control industries because of its responsibility for industrial 
relations. Under such a system, vocational training policies can be implemented 
effectively. (PM2) 
He, also, worried about the possibility of a new gigantic Ministry. 
If the MoE and the MoL had been merged, the new ministry might have been gigantic, 
due to the inclusion of industries within its boundary. Such a huge organization has been 
unprecedented in Korea. (PM2) 
On the other hand, another officer stressed the different roles of both ministries, 
drawing a distinction between education and training. 
The government has separated the ministries because they have different perspectives and 
functions. It may be wrong to look at education from the perspective of training and vice 
versa. They have their own respective roles and functions. (PM4) 
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Considering the opposition of both ministries, a political detennination might have 
been decisive. However, previous government is said to have lost the opportunity to merge 
the two ministries, due to the financial crisis and because training for the unemployed was 
one of the most urgent issues during the period (PR2). Here, it is worth mentioning that 
according to the Constitutional Act, no second tenn for a President is allowed, for fear of 
long-tenn dictatorship. Therefore, unless government starts to implement refonn during the 
first half of the tenn, the government may find it difficult to overcome the opposition. 
VII-4-J-5. Changing role o/vocational high schools andjunior colleges 
One of the most important changes in VB at the practical level is the moving of its 
main provision from vocational high schools to junior colleges. As a consequence, funding 
for vocational high schools has rapidly been squeezed, and students and parents are avoiding 
the vocational schools. 
The government invested about 100bil. Won every year in vocational high schools for 
equipment or for the diversification and specialisation scheme. But the amount was cut to 
30, 40 bil. Won from the late 1990s. Moreover, the government cancelled the rating 
system, which provided vocational schools with almost double the amount of funds per 
student for facilities and equipment, and devolved the authority to superintendents. (PM 1) 
Vocational schools increasingly find it difficult to recruit students. This seems to 
result from the failure of education policies that have undervalued vocational education and 
have contributed to academic drift. As nearly a half of vocational high school graduates 
continue to higher education, the purpose of the schools is changing, from preparation for 
work to preparation for vocational higher education. However, the serious problem is that as 
vocational school teachers argue, the majority of students continue to higher education 
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without any motivation to study90. The trend to 'universalisation of higher education' requires 
government to consider a new framework of VET and lifelong learning 91. 
Recently, more than 40% of vocational school graduates have proceeded to higher 
education, mainly to two-year junior colleges. In this context, junior colleges also allocate a 
certain portion of offers to vocational school graduates. As a result, the number of junior 
colleges has rapidly increased since the mid 1990s. In addition, from 2005, in the 
examination for entry to higher education, vocational studies are supposed to be taken as a 
new area, along with the two existing areas of social studies and science studies. The new 
examination system is expected to accelerate the advance from vocational high schools to 
junior colleges, because a majority of junior colleges are supposed to select students on the 
basis of their marks in the vocation studies area92 • 
VII-4-2. Changes in the regulations of funding 
Whereas the VET Promotion Act proclaims the direction of the new VET reform, 
its weakness is the lack of funding to implement it (RE5l3• The lack is mainly because the 
funding system is divided between VE and training, and also because the focus of training 
policies has changed from initial training to further training. The most significant change in 
the regulations for VET funding may be the launch of the Employment Insurance System 
(EIS), and this section mainly discusses its implications for training. 
90 I interviewed two vocational teachers, who are representatives of the teachers' trade union. Both emphasised 
that vocational schools lost their identities because the government had downplayed vocational education. 
91 Irrespective of the quality of higher education, the rate of graduates who continued to higher education was 63.9 
percent of females and 69.2 percent of males in 1999. 
92 See http//www.hani.co.kr. (Internet Hankyoreh, 4 Feb. 2003). 
93 In an informal interview, a researcher working for the Presidential Commission for HRD Policy succinctly 
pointed out that "the VET Promotion Act proves to be almost a dead Act because there is no funding to 
implement the Act. It plays a role only as a signal for the direction" 
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VII-4-2-1.Emp/oyment Insurance System 
The EIS paved the way for a change in funding for training from the training levy 
to the social insurance system, focusing on developing the vocational competency of the 
employed. In fact, the EIS completely replaced the levy system in 1999, when the Basic 
Vocational Training Act of 1976 regulating the compulsory system of training and the VT 
Promotion Fund Act were annulled. On the basis of the EIS, the Worker Vocational Training 
Promotion Act (the VT Promotion Act) of 1997, which was valid in 1999, has played a major 
role in changing the training system, from being initial training-oriented to being further 
training-oriented. An officer from the MoL stressed that the training system has changed, 
from state-driven to client-oriented. 
By the Worker Vocational Training Promotion Act, the training system has changed from 
state-driven to employer-oriented, and client-centred. (PM4) 
It would be better to say that the focus of training policies has changed from initial 
training to further training. However, initial training is still fairly state-driven. Public initial 
training programmes are mainly provided by the KOMA and the Korea Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (KCCn. They are divided into one-year courses for graduates from 
lower secondary schools and above, and two-year courses for graduates from upper 
secondary schools and above. For example, the Vocational Training Institutes (VTIs) of the 
KOMA mainly provide one-year or short-term programmes, while those of the KCCI provide 
two-year training programmes. By contrast, Polytechnic Colleges provide two-year diploma 
programmes. Although the two-year training programme of the KCCI is not a diploma 
course, support is provided for trainees who wish to get a two-year associate diploma when 
they complete the training programme. The funding for public training programmes is 
provided by the government budget or the Employment Insurance Fund. 
However, as one member of staff of the VTIs pointed out, with the influence of a 
diploma-oriented and academic-centred society, youngsters are likely to avoid vocational 
training and many trainees prefer 'white collar' to blue collar' jobs. 
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One of the most distinctive characteristics of trainees in these days is that they have 
'white collar' consciousness. When vocational training centres recruit trainees, IT -related 
courses are very competitive, while there are vacancies for manufacturing courses. 
(PUP4) 
Therefore, although tuition and accommodation are free, it is getting difficult to 
recruit trainees for traditional 'blue collar' jobs. To encourage recruitment, by linking up 
with the Credit Bank system, VTIs of the KCCI try to provide trainees with opportunities for 
a two-year associate diploma, like two-year junior colleges' graduates. However, it is very 
difficult to change the academic-centred consciousness of trainees. More important, the 
division between education under the MoE and training under the MoL makes it difficult to 
be flexible in meeting students' demand. If the VTls of the KCCI want to be an institute with 
the title of college, like Polytechnic Colleges, they have to get permission from the MoE. 
After this, it may be difficult to get funding from the MoL; their funding might even be 
reduced to the level of Polytechnic Colleges. 
Compared to initial training, further training can be described as employer-oriented. 
The VT Promotion Act was enacted to "establish a system for vocational competency 
development and to encourage enterprises to provide further training for the employed on a 
voluntary basis" (KRNET 2000: 76). It lifted strict restrictions on in-plant training provision 
to allow more autonomy for employers in providing further training programmes such as 
vocational competency development training for their employees. 
Before the VT Promotion Act, the government controlled training methods and contents, 
approving training provision on the basis of government-decided criteria such as for the 
training process and the period. But, after the enactment of the Act, training has changed, 
becoming employer-oriented. (PM4) 
However, "employer-oriented" would not mean same as "market-led" because the 
government is still playing a major role in regulating the market and defining the role of 
social partners. For example, as an officer says, to improve the quality of training the 
government monitors training programmes and provides valuable training information for 
consumers through an Internet system, called WorkNet, as well as providing administrative 
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and financial incentives for outstanding programme providers (PM4). According to the Act, 
the government regulates the minimum criteria for the financial support of training. For 
example, the training period should be 20 hours and over, and the space of the training 
facility should be more than 60 metres square. 
More important, the system of funding for training may be characterized as a 'state-
coordinated' social partnership-oriented rather than as market-oriented. First of all, while the 
government is mainly regulating the system, the main contributors to funding are 
government, employers and employees. For example, while 31 per cent of the total training 
budget came from the pure government budget, 69 per cent came from the ElF in 2000 (KLI 
2000: v). This means that the larger portion of the total training budget is collected from 
employers and employees on the basis of the social insurance system, called the EIS. 
Moreover, the ElF is mainly allocated for training the development of employees' 
competency, according to the Employment Insurance Act of 1995. 
Therefore, the concept of 'employer-oriented' seems to mean that the majority of 
the Elf is directly allocated to employers, who can choose training providers. However, as a 
senior member of staff of the Korean Federation of Employers complained of the 
complicated requirements for financial support, the government still intervenes strongly, by 
defining the maximum rate of financial support for large firms and SMEs as well as the 
criteria of funding. 
Although large fIrms provide training for employees which costs more than the maximum 
limit of the fInancial refund, in many cases, they could not get a complete fInancial refund 
because of the complicated requirements. (EM 1) 
For this reason, he argued that the EIS needed to be changed, because they 
voluntarily invested in training more than the maximum limit of financial support. 
Large fmns need to be exempted from the Employment Insurance System, only 
contributing their share to re-employment of the unemployed or support for SMEs. 
(EMl) 
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This shows that employers' associations such as the Korean Federation of 
Employers are sceptical of the EIS. However, the EIS has contributed to the rapid expansion 
of continuing training and paved the way for lifelong learning. The government provides two 
forms of financial support for employers who provide training for the employed: a subsidy 
for training costs and loans for training facilities (KRIVET 2000: 77). The government also 
provides two forms of financial support for individual employees covered by the EIS. One is 
a subsidy for training costs in case an employee is 50 years old and over or planning to 
transfer jobs. The other is a loan for an employee attending higher education for the purpose 
of developing vocational competence. So far, financial support for training has been mainly 
provided for employers. However, according to the officer quoted above, individual support 
is supposed to be increased from now on. As a consequence, since the changes in the funding 
system, further training has rapidly increased. 
The number of workers trained has increased since the implementation of the new 
training policy under the EIS. In addition, most in-plant training schemes include 
"advanced" courses, instead of basic training as tended to be the case under the levy 
system. (KRIVET 2000: 78) 
However, the EIS also has some problems to tackle, because while further training 
in large firms has rapidly increased, the EIS has not been successful in reducing the gap 
between large firms and SMEs in the provision of training opportunities. 
In addition, large firms are the main beneficiaries of the training programs for the 
employed. It would therefore appear that the EIS has not succeeded in increasing 
substantially training provided by small enterprises. (KRIVET 2000: 78) 
It was confirmed by an interviewee from an association of SMEs that the shortage 
of workers prevented SMEs from providing training programmes for employees. 
train. 
It is difficult to provide training for employees because of the shortage of workers. In 
case of skilled or experienced workers, they are so busy on production lines that they 
have no time to participate in training. (EM2) 
Job-hopping is also pointed out as one of the main factors reducing the incentive to 
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levy. 
Moreover, when members of a workforce become skilled workers, they are likely to 
move into larger firms. (EM2) 
In this context, employers of SMEs tend to complain that the EIS operates like a 
SMEs only pay money for the Employment Insurance without benefiting fmancially from 
it. (EM1) 
Therefore, one of the most serious issues to tackle in the provision of training may 
be the increasing polarization of the labour market, particularly between large firms and 
SMEs. In this regard, the EIS needs to introduce "special financial incentives to encourage 
training by small firms and some targeting of the programs at older workers, women and low-
skilled workers" (KRIVET 2000: 79). 
V/I-4-2-2. Workers' Learning Fund and state-coordinated partnership 
On the other hand, as a way to promote partnership between labour and 
management, the 'participation of labour and management in training for competency 
development' has been encouraged by the Enforcement Ordinance of the VT Promotion Act 
since 2001 (PM4). 
If employers provide training for employees according to plans drawn up in cooperation 
with employees, the government is to provide full support for the training according to 
the Enforcement Ordinance of the VT Promotion Act since 1st July 2001. (PM4) 
In this regard, the 'Labour-Management Council' is emphasized as the main means 
to promote labour-management partnership in training. Recently, the government has 
promoted labour-management partnership in training at the company level. However, as the 
officer pointed out, labour-management cooperation is the prerequisite for developing the 
participation of labour and management in training. 
It is not easy to promote the participation of labour and management in training for 
competency development in a situation in which trade unions are normally confronted 
with employers. (PM4) 
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However, enterprise unionism tends to place limits on corporatism in training, and 
a move to industrial-sector unionism is needed. Moving from enterprise to industrial-sector 
unionism has been an important issue in relation to training as well as industrial relations. In 
this regard, since the new government came to power, industrial-sector unionism and 
collective bargaining has been a major issue. This issue will be discussed in the next section. 
More important, the Tripartite Commission came to an agreement on the 'Workers' 
Learning Fund' in November 200294• This is the result of continuing discussions about the 
'plan for raising funds for workers' learning', which was proposed in the' Agreement on the 
Direction of Improvement in the Vocational Training System' in July 2001. The fund is to 
promote training for cooperation between labour and management. According to the 
Agreement, a Decision-making and Evaluation Committee will be established to review 
projects proposed by labour-management cooperation and choose amongst them, as well as 
monitor the management and evaluate the results. 
On the other hand, with regard to the promotion of lifelong learning, the distinctive 
division between the vocational education budget and the training budget has been under 
challenge. Whereas the vocational education budget is mainly dependent on the MoE budget, 
as mentioned above, the training budget is managed by the MoL. The distinction between 
education and training has been strengthened mainly by the completely divided budget 
system. One officer pointed out why this distinction has been strengthened in Korea. 
While vocational education funds are allocated from the 'government budget' for the 
management of schools, training funds for vocational competency development of the 
employed are mainly allocated from the 'Employment Insurance Fund' .... These 
different sources of funds make it impossible for a part of the education budget to be used 
in training and vice versa. (PM2) 
Therefore, it is evident that a big change in the funding system is necessary for the 
development of the lifelong learning system. 
94 The Tripartite Commission reached agreement on the Workers' Learning Fund after the Subcommittee on 
Economic and Social Affairs had come to an agreement on the Fund in September 2002. 
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VII-4-3. Cbanges in tbe regulations of tbe labour market 
VI/-4-3-1. The Tripartite Commission and state-coordinated partnership 
With regard to skills fonnation, the most distinctive change in the labour market 
may be characterized as the 'launch of partnerships between labour and management and the 
government'. The establishment of the Tripartite Commission (KTC) is one of the most 
significant changes in the regulations of the labour market. It is worth mentioning that the 
KTC was set up to share the sufferings between labour, management and government in the 
process of overcoming the economic crisis. This means that the government, for the first 
time, recognized trade unions as partners in negotiation with government and management. 
This shows the implications of globalisation and democratisation for the relations between 
the state and civil society in Korea. The government accepted trade unions as its partners in 
overcoming the economic crisis ignited by globalisation. The government could press 
employers to share the sufferings which resulted from economic reform, referring to the 
pressure of the trade unions. 
It is true that the Tripartite Commission played a role in overcoming the economic crisis. 
(PRJ) 
Due to the effort of the KTC, labour, management and the government could reach 
agreement on the adjustment of the industrial structure and the flexibility of the labour 
market. It is significant that the KTC contributed to coping with the economic crisis by 
alleviating social conflicts between labour and management, not least because 
confrontational industrial relations had been one of the characteristics of the Korean 
economy. In the process, the representation of trade unions was strengthened while the 
tension between the government and the Chaebols was increased. For example, the Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) , which had been oppressed as a combination of 
illegal trade unions, was recognized as a legal organization, like the Federation of Korean 
Trade Unions (FKTU). Teachers' trade unions was also legalized by the Act on the 
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Establishment and Operation, etc, of Trade Unions for Teachers in 1999. These changes 
show a significant change in government policies on trade unions; the state has been moving 
from being an oppressor of the trade union movement towards being a mediator between 
labour and management. 
The KTC was legalized as the Presidential advisory body on the basis of the Act on 
the Establishment and Operation of the Tripartite Commission in May 1999. Until then, it 
had been regulated by the Presidential Decree No. 15746. The legislation paved the way for 
the institutionalisation of labour, management and the government negotiating over policy 
concerning training as well as industrial relations. In particular, the government has been very 
positive in operating the KTC, compared to labour and management. This might be because 
government regards it as a productive mechanism. 
The MoEHRD also would like to be a part of the Tripartite Commission. . .. The 
Tripartite Commission would be very effective if it were managed properly. Under the 
Commission, there are special Committees, which seem to be a very good mechanism 
because labour, management and the government can reach agreement with a little effort. 
(PM2) 
This tripartite mechanism is a unique experiment in East Asia. The Tripartite 
Commission is seen as a distinctive example of the changes in the regulation of VET and 
lifelong learning, as well as of the labour market, under the severe pressures of globalisation 
and democratisation. However, it has not been successful all the time, because some 
representatives of labour and management withdrew several times, and the KCTU and the 
Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) had not come back until the next government came to 
power in 2003. At the moment, the FKTU, the Korean Employers Federation (KEF) and the 
MoL playa major role in decision-making. Therefore, the Commission needs to find new 
long-term projects, which can reflect main interests of both labour and management. An 
academic explained this situation well. 
However, now, the Tripartite Commission can't playa role well. During the period of the 
economic crisis, it functioned well, but why can't it function now? Sure, it, to a certain 
degree, might function because of the situation of crisis. But, if the Commission proposes 
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and reaches an agreement on lifelong education, doesn't the promotion of lifelong 
learning become a long-term role? (PRl) 
In this context, training and lifelong learning started to be regarded as an important 
agenda of the KTC. Recently it came to an agreement on training and lifelong learning. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the KTC reached an 'Agreement on the Direction of 
Improvement in the Vocational Training System' in 2001. At the head of the text of the 
Agreement, the concern of labour, management and the government about skills is well 
explained. 
The Three Parties (Labour, Management and the Government) hereby agree as follows, 
sharing the view that the quality of human resources is the key to securing national 
competitiveness as well as that of workers and businesses in this knowledge-based era. 
The following agreements are also designed to positively come to terms with changes in 
the structure of the labour market and to invigorate the development of workers' job 
skills. (KTC 2001)95 
Following this agreement, it also came to another agreement on the 'Workers' 
Learning Fund' in November 2002. If the first agreement is a kind of proclamation of the 
direction, the second is expected to promote actual partnerships between labour and 
management in training because it includes funding resources. As a consequence, it may 
contribute to the institutionalisation of labour-management partnership in training, although 
the amount of the fund is not revealed. 
VIl-4-3-2. Labour and Management Councils and weak social partnership 
In addition, according to the Workers' Participation and Cooperation Promotion 
Act of 1997, an employer should establish a Labour and Management Committee (LMC), 
which should decide the 'Basic Plan of education and training and competence development 
for employees' at the company level. In 2001, according to the revised Enforcement 
Ordinance of the VT Promotion Act, the government allows exceptions to designated criteria 
95 The text was obtained from the website of the KTC and slightly changed, http://wwvv..lmg.go.kr/eng/index.htm. 
on 28 Nov. 2002. 
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in order to promote training by the LMCs. In addition, government policies on training 
encourage the role of the LMCs in promoting in-plant training. 
However, there are still some limits for the LMCs in playing a major role in skills 
formation. First, although they are established by the Act, they seem to find it difficult to be 
active, particularly in SMEs because few SMEs are interested in training. 
Although Labour-Management Councils have been formally set up in SMEs, in fact, they 
cannot playa role in training. (EM2) 
It is not surprising that the LMCs cannot play a role when training is rarely provided. 
Therefore, particularly in the case of SMEs, training also needs to be agreed and provided at 
the industrial sector level. 
With the increasing mobility of labour, employers are expected to have less 
incentives for long-term training. Moreover, the increasing number of atypical workers has 
been one of the serious social issues in the wake of the trend to the labour market flexibility. 
Therefore, there are limits to reliance on labour-management partnership at the company 
level. 
It is expected that afteIWards, employers are less likely to invest directly in education and 
training. In that situation, it is inevitable that education and training at the trans-company 
level becomes a new alternative. (PM4) 
In this regard, representative organizations of employers or trade unions are required to playa 
role in building a broad training framework beyond the company level. 
How much consensus and how much difference are there between the three parties 
concerning skills formation? As mentioned, the main consensus is succinctly pointed out in 
the first KTC Agreement. 
the quality of human resources is the key to securing national competitiveness as well as 
that of workers and businesses in this knowledge-based era (KTC 200 I) 
In addition, labour, management and the government agree not only to encourage 
the "participation of labour and management in policy-making" and on "enhancing the 
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efficiency of operations of systems", but also to provide "workers' voluntary education and 
training" and financial "subsidies". The main consensus was confirmed by interviews. 
Employers also admit the importance of training because they think human resources are 
the essential resource for competitiveness. But the system and direction are not set up yet. 
(EMl) 
While the three parties all admit that human resources are essential to enhance 
competitiveness, it seems to be more difficult for them to agree over the new training system. 
What kind of training system do employers want? As a senior member of staff of an 
employers' organization said, employers prefer an employer-led training system, which is 
modelled on TEes in England. 
An employer-led training system is required because it may not only reflect demand, but 
encourage employers to have systematic concern and to invest in training. Particularly in 
the case of SMEs, although they know HRD is important, they don't have a concern for 
training. This is not only because there are no training professionals in companies, but 
there is no system to attract employers' concern to training. (EM 1) 
However, employers cannot reject the participation of trade unions in the training 
system, because they recognize that workers' active involvement is pivotal. 
Indeed, it is necessary for trade unions and the labour world to participate in the new 
system. Workers' participation is necessary because, eventually, training is not productive 
without workers' active concern and efforts. A genuine labour-management cooperation 
model has to be developed. (EM 1) 
Nonetheless, although employers admit the importance of labour in training, they 
raise doubts about trade unions' active role in training. 
There is no need to oppose the social partnership model. ... but, it is doubtful whether 
trade unions such as the FKTU propose the social partnership model with the possibility 
of practice. With regard to the participation of trade unions, employers are not sure that 
trade unions have substantial capabilities as professionals to play a role in training. 
(EMl) 
Moreover, employers' organizations such as the KEF firmly oppose replacing 
enterprise unionism by industrial-sector unionism. Thus, employers' concern for cooperation 
between labour and management seems to place limits on the partnership model, in that their 
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ideas are still mainly based on the orientation of employers to the company level. Employers 
may be characterized as the main driving force of market or neo-liberal approaches to 
training. 
By contrast, trade unions emphasize partnerships between labour and management 
and government in training, and in making policy and implementation. At present, while the 
FKTU participate in the KTC, the KCTU has withdrawn from the KTC96• Therefore, the 
FKTU has a more positive stance concerning the role of the KTC in training. It proposes the 
social partnership model of training (park, D. 2001). An interviewee from the FKTU 
particularly emphasized the participation of labour and management in policy-making 
concerning skills formation. He strongly criticized the state-driven training system. 
The most serious problem of the present training system for developing competency is 
that labour and management are excluded from the process of decisions on training and 
implementation. (TV I) 
In this regard, he emphasized the importance of "participation by both labour and 
management in policy-making concerning the development of job skills and the operation of 
related systems" (KTC 2001), pointing to the meaning of the KTC Agreement on training. 
The KTC Agreement on training has a very important meaning in that it can be the 
turning point in changing the focus of labour movement from struggle for distribution to 
policy. (TVI) 
With regard to the training system, he also stressed the danger of the market-driven 
model. 
It is the present situation that as the problems of the state-centred model have been 
serious, there have been efforts to replace it simply by the market model. .... However, 
the market model may eventually increase the anarchy of the training market, and 
poaching problems will prevail. As a result, there may be a chronic shortage of skilled 
workers. (TVI) 
96 At present, trade unions are mainly represented by the FKTU or the KCTU. Since 2001, whereas the FKTU is 
the biggest representative organization of trade unions, the political influence and membership of the KCTU 
has been increasing. 
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This analysis seems to criticize neo-liberal approaches to training. He conclusively 
spelled out the need for the corporatist approach. 
To enhance the level of skills, the only alternative to the training system may be the 
corporatism model, in which labour, management and the government all actively 
cooperate in order to produce high skills. (TVl) 
As seen above, the trade union movement has been one of the main driving forces 
in establishing the KTC in Korea. More important, it is worth mentioning that representative 
organizations of trade unions, such as the FKTU and the KCTU, have been making their best 
efforts to build industrial-sector unionism. They seem to be aware that enterprise unionism 
places limits on the traditional model of corporatism. As for the KCTU, by December 2001, 
the number of industrial-sector trade unions was 23 and the number of their members was 
equivalent to 40.1 per cent of the total of KCTU members97• However, it also needs to be 
mentioned that, as trade union leaders admit, trade unions are still mainly occupied with 
issues of industrial relations, and training recently started to become an issue. Therefore, 
although trade unions may be potentially one of the main driving forces in promoting social 
partnership in training, it will take some time for trade unions to become such a like that. 
Finally, the government still seems to playa major role in building the framework 
for new skills formation, although what its role in the transition should be is still a quite 
controversial issue. The government has been keen to maintain the KTC, because it has been 
one of the main beneficiaries of the KTC. Although there are many different views on the 
role of the KTC after the economic crisis, it is agreed that it contributed to overcoming the 
economic crisis. In addition, the government has tried to change the systems of skills 
formation because, as mentioned above, the oppressive and bureaucratic mechanism has been 
criticized by the public as well as by both labour and management. For example, the 
government introduced a series of Acts, including VET-or training-related Acts, the Lifelong 
Education Act and the Basic HRD Act. 
97 See hnp:i/www.nodong.org (2 Dec. 2002) 
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In addition, during the economic crisis, governments could bring labour and 
management together to the negotiating table focusing on the issues of industrial relations. In 
the process, government has tried to be seen as the facilitator between labour and 
management rather than as an oppressor of trade unions or the operator of an inefficient 
system. In this regard, government officers tended to stress 'devolution of central government 
power' or 'change from being state-centred to client-centred'. 
The majority of central government power has been devolved upon provincial 
Educational Offices. The authority for primary and secondary schools has been taken 
over by superintendents of provincial educational councils. What the central government 
still bas is only the authority to allocate budgets. (PM2) 
In 1999, with the annulment of the Vocational Training Basic Act and its replacement by 
the VT Promotion Act, vocational training policies changed from state-orientation to 
market autonomy, in other words, to c1ient-centeredness based on private orientation. 
(PM4) 
More important, as the KTC has started to produce agreements on training and 
work-based learning, the government is seen to stress social partnership approaches to skills 
formation. 
VII-4-3-3 The KTC and state-coordinated partnership in training 
As for social partnership, it is a prerequisite that the government guarantees the 
participation of labour and management in the whole process of making and implementing 
policy. In this process, the government can play a major role in bringing labour and 
management together to share their responsibilities, and in regulating the partnership between 
labour and management so that it works smoothly. In this regard, the KTC Agreement text on 
training indicates the minimum requirement. It reads as follows. 
The government shall positively study ways of realistically expanding and guaranteeing 
participation by both labour and management in various council and committee meetings 
for the establishment and operation of the systems of state-administered standard 
qualifications related to job skill development (KTC 2001). 
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Moreover, the government needs to guarantee the participation of labour and 
management in the process of making and implementing policy concerning skills formation. 
This is a very important issue, because labour and management agree in strongly criticizing 
government-driven policy making and implementation. An interviewee from the employers' 
organization, which is involved in the KTC, raised the problems of the mechanism of making 
and implementing policy. 
Substantial participation of employers in policy-making and implementation is not 
allowed. . .. Participation is perfunctory. The government mainly drives policy-making 
and implementation, with a few civil servants and academics. In the 1970s, the 
mechanism was effective because it was possible to decide and implement in a short time. 
However, now, the mechanism has to change. (EM t) 
An interviewee from the organization representing trade unions which is involved 
in the KTC also criticized the exclusion of labour and management from the process of 
making, implementing and evaluating policy; he explained the case of vocational competency 
development programmes. 
Although labour and management pay for the development of vocational competency 
througb the employment insurance system, their representative organizations are allowed 
to be members of only a few policy commissions concerning policy-making. Even those 
cases aren't more than a formality. In fact, they are restrained from participating in the 
process of policy implementation and evaluation. (TVt) 
As seen from the above interviews, the government has been under pressure to 
institutionalise a participation mechanism for stakeholders particularly after the opposition 
parties came to power in 1997, for the first time in the last four decades. This pressure is 
closely related to the results of the rise of civil society ignited by the democratic movement. 
In this context, the government has stressed the needs not only for a lifelong education 
system based on the Credit Bank system and on networking between lifelong education 
centres, but for 'national systems of innovation (NS!)' based on partnership between 
industry, and academic world and research. The government emphasizes the participation and 
contribution of private and voluntary sectors in responding to the rapidly expanding social 
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demand for lifelong education, as well as for skills and vocational qualifications. The role of 
the government is also required to regulate the new systems, strengthen the evaluation system 
and coordinate different ministries or stakeholders. 
For the whole systematic mechanism ofHRD, the HRD [Basic] Act is supposed to pass 
the National Assembly .... Afterwards, it is necessary to coordinate on the basis of a fair 
and trusted evaluation system (PM2) 
It is worth mentioning that, as seen in the concepts of National HRD and the 
National Systems of Innovation, the government emphasizes nationally a framework of 
lifelong learning and HRD. This means that the state is not only still playing a major role in 
regulating the national system, but expanding its intervention in skills formation from formal 
VET to the national framework of both formal and informal VET. This expansion may be 
one of the characteristics of the state-coordinated partnership model. For example, the 
government is promoting partnership between industry and academy and research for 
establishing the national systems of innovation' (MoEHRD et al. 2002). The main purpose of 
the partnership is to promote the establishment of the NSI in the knowledge-based economy. 
The NSI is promoted through the activation of partnership between industry and academy 
and research, and it can accelerate restructuring the Korean economy towards the 
knowledge-based economy (ibid. p.9) 
A "Taskforce Team" was set up in September 2001, and plans were decided in the 
Ministerial Meeting on HRD in 2002. As a result, the government is supposed to set up the 
'Committee for promoting partnership between industry and academy and research' under the 
Ministerial Meeting on HRD. 
More important, the Ministerial Meeting on HRD is the coordination system at the 
central government level for education and training. The government also emphasizes the 
NSI as the main means to enhance national competitiveness in the knowledge-based 
economy. Within this framework, experts and representatives of stakeholders are allowed 
limited participation in policy-making, only through advisory committees, whereas the 
private and voluntary sectors are encouraged to participate in the delivery of lifelong 
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education and training98• This means that social partners are still restrained from policy-
making, although they are encouraged to participate in implementation. By contrast, the 
government still plays a major role in policy-making and coordination. 
VII-5. State-coordinated partnership Model in Korea 
Institutional structures of the state-coordinated partnership model can be explained 
on the basis of the power relations between the state, capital and labour. As seen in below 
Figure VII-I, when organised labour has the political power to press central government and 
capital, the direction is likely to move towards the social partnership model. 
Capital 
Market 
Developmental State 
Government 
State-coordinated 
partnership 
Labour 
Social Partnership 
Figure VII-I. Transition of the Developmental State Model 
98 In an interview with a government officer, he explained that the government would enact the Basic HRD Act, 
which would suggest the establishment of advisory professional committees under the Ministerial Meeting on 
HRD through which experts and representatives of stakeholders can be involved in policy-making. (PM2) 
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By contrast, when capital drives the transition process, the direction is likely to 
move towards the market model. Therefore, the state-coordinated partnership model seems to 
be the result of negotiation between the state, whose role is changing, and capital and labour 
which have increasing influence over policies. Finally, when the role of the state is refined to 
building cooperative frameworks or infrastructure on the basis of voluntary partnership, 
focusing on remedies for market failure, the direction can be defined as towards the network 
model. In this context, although employers also address the importance of networks or 
partnership in terms of skills formation, they tend to prefer voluntary cooperation to regulated 
partnership. In this regard, the state-coordinated partnership approach can be compared to the 
'voluntary partnership' approach in that the state plays a major role in promoting or 
regulating the relations between social partners. 
As seen in the above sections, the regulations for VET and lifelong learning have 
been moving toward the state-coordinated partnership model in Korea. Which factors do pave 
the way for the state-coordinated partnership model in the Korean context? First, the state 
still plays a major role in skills formation, although the state-driven planning model was 
given up after the civilian government carne to power. Secondly, education, industry and 
research sectors share interests in high skills formation as a way of moving towards the 
knowledge-based economy (MoEHRD et al. 2002, Report to the Cabinet Meeting). Thirdly, 
there are still weak institutional structures for social partnership, and traditions of 
collaboration between government, employers and trade unions are lacking. Fourthly, the 
rapid development of information networks has produced an environment allowing for the 
involvement of stakeholders with more flexibility. As seen in the cases of the Credit Bank 
system and the cyber universities, the dramatic expansion of broadband is becoming as 
driving force for the development of learning networks. 
The most important changes are that democracy has been deepening, and that the 
government recognizes the role of civil associations and trade unions as well as employers in 
skills formation and lifelong learning. As a result, civic participation in policy-making and 
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implementation has been emphasized. For example, the Presidential Commission for the New 
Education Community (PCNEC) was established to "carry out field-based educational 
reforms" (MoE 1999). It tried to promote educational reform, based on the participation of 
parents' organizations, teacher unions and civil associations at the local level. This was a 
significant experiment to expand the role of civil associations and teachers' unions, as well as 
to emphasize the participation of local communities in educational reform. 
However, it resulted in only limited success, partly because the coordinating system 
was not institutionalised. This lack was partly because local governments have had little role 
in education and training; local education and training policies have been implemented by 
provincial education offices or local labour offices that are separate from local governments, 
and mainly controlled by the MoEHRD and the MoL respectively. As a consequence, how to 
incorporate local education and training with local governments became a fresh issue in terms 
of civic participation in educational reform. 
By contrast, the Tripartite Commission paved the way for the institutionalisation of 
social partnership in industrial relations and training, although it faces challenges from trade 
unions as well as employers. It is worth noting that the new "Participatory Government" of 
Roh Moo-hyun came to power in February 2003 on the basis of people's support for 
democratic reform. As the name of the Government implies, 'social participation' and 
'reform' are key words in promoting a new framework of skills formation and lifelong 
learning. Therefore, the government is expected to play an active role in strengthening the 
institutional basis of social partnership for social cohesion as well as economic development. 
As a consequence, the idea of participatory citizenship seems to be increasingly important in 
skills formation and lifelong learning. 
In this regard, the state-coordinated partnership model can be characterised as a 
'state coordination and active civic participation', compared to the traditional corporatist 
model as well as the developmental state model. First, the role of the state is still crucial in 
coordinating because the institutional basis of social partnership is weak. For example, the 
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government has played a significant role in promoting negotiation between social partners, 
changing manpower policies from the exclusion to the inclusion of trade unions. Still, there 
are conflicts between employers and trade unions regarding the issue of industrial-sector 
unionism, because enterprise unionism is still dominant and places limits on social 
partnership. As seen from an interview with a representative of the employers' organization, 
although employers no longer deny the need for partnership with trade unions, they are 
strongly resistant to industrial-sector unionism. By contrast, one of the two national umbrella 
organizations of trade unions broke away the Tripartite Commission, and demands industrial-
sector unionism in return for coming back to it. Since the President promised to introduce 
industrial-sector unionism in its Election Manifesto, industrial-sector unionism has been a 
key issue in skills formation and lifelong learning as well as the labour market. 
Secondly, with the increasing influence of civil associations on policies, civic 
participation has contributed to the promotion of social partnership in skills formation and 
lifelong learning. It is worth noting that civil associations have become influential, and they 
are treated as key stakeholders to represent the public interest because they are recognized as 
crucial contributors to democratisation. In addition, teachers' unions and the national body of 
progressive trade unions (KCTO) were legalized after a long period of struggles against 
authoritarian regimes. However, widened civic participation has not resulted in the demise of 
the state and, by contrast, has demanded the crucial role of the state in social and economic 
reform. For example, whereas active civil associations and teachers' unions have criticized 
the control-oriented authoritarian system, they have also been against neo-liberal policies. 
They demand strengthening of the public education system on the basis of civic participation 
and social cohesion in response to globalisation and neo-liberal policies. 
In conclusion, since the economic crisis, the rapid economic liberalization has 
resulted in increasing social inequalities as well as in rapidly increasing part-time or 
temporary jobs. As a result, continuing vocational training and lifelong learning have become 
a key issue in relation to education and training. In addition, with the increasing influence of 
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mobilized civil society, the state needs to respond to the increasing demands of various social 
interests. Therefore the state is pressed to cope with the challenges of globalisation on the 
basis of social participation. In this regard, civic participation based on participatory 
citizenship is increasingly recognized as important in relation to skills fonnation and lifelong 
learning. 
The exercise of citizenship as a process, in relation to changing structures of work and 
conununity, requires a more highly mobilised civil society, accompanied by 'civic 
virtues' and structures for democratic participation (Evans 2001: 112). 
As a consequence, a holistic approach to lifelong learning is required. For the 
holistic approach, three divided approaches, focusing on broadened access, skills 
development and participatory citizenship respectively, need to be brought together in order 
to promote social cohesion based on democracy as well as economic development. 
VII-6. Conclusion 
This chapter examined the characteristics of the emerging framework for VET and 
lifelong learning and defined the new framework as state-coordinated partnership. The state-
coordinated partnership model was characterised as a 'state coordination and active civic 
participation', on the basis of the analysis of changes in regulations for qualifications, 
funding and the labour market. The most significant changes are that democracy has been 
deepening, and that the government recognizes the role of social partners and civil 
associations in skills formation and lifelong learning. In particular, the Tripartite Commission 
paved the way for the institutionalisation of social partnership in industrial relations and 
training, although it still faces challenges from trade unions as well as employers. 
The success of the state-coordinated partnership model may depend on the 
promotion of participatory citizenship as well as a new institutional mechanism for the 
involvement of social partners. Therefore the Roh Moo-hyun Government is pressed to cope 
with the challenges of globalisation on the basis of a transparent economy and participatory 
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civil society. In this respect, democratic or active citizenship is increasingly recognized as 
important in relation to skills formation and lifelong learning. More important, a holistic 
approach to lifelong learning is required in order to bring broadened access, knowledge and 
skills development, and participatory citizenship together. 
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Chapter VIII. Summary and Conclusion 
VIII-I. Summary 
VIU-l-l. The outline of the thesis 
My research explores historically why and how the developmental model of skills 
formation and lifelong learning has been changing into the 'state-coordinated partnership' 
model in South Korea in response to the challenges of globalisation and democratisation. It 
has particularly examined the modes of regulation of VET and lifelong learning with regard 
to qualifications, funding and the labour market. As a result, this thesis has conceptualised 
the 'state-coordinated partnership' model of skills formation and lifelong learning, analysing 
changing relations between the state and social partners before and after the Asian economic 
crisis. 
For a broad understanding of the theoretical framework, five international models, 
of the welfare state, social partnership, network, market and the developmental state in 
relation to skills formation and lifelong learning, were compared with changing models in 
Korea. To compare these different models, two principal dimensions, regulation and purposes 
were considered. According to the extent of regulation and the relationship between the state 
and civil society, a continuum between the state, social partnership, network and market 
models was hypothesised. According to purposes, a distinction was made concerning whether 
or not these relationships put emphasis on society, economics and nation-building, on the 
assumption that particularly in the developmental state, nation-building is regarded as pivotal 
for the legitimacy of the state in terms of independence and sovereignty. 
To develop the theoretical framework of the state-coordinated partnership model, 
discussions of the role of the state and civil society were analysed in the East Asian context. 
In Korea, active civil associations have confronted the authoritarian state and have played a 
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crucial role in the democratic transition since the late 1980s. They mainly constitute what 
many Koreans have referred to as 'civil society' (simin sahoe), "often seen as the key 
element of Korea's maturing democracy in the 1990s" (Armstrong 2002: 1). 
To discuss the role of the state under the democratic government, the liberal 
democratic approach to civil society was critically examined, because liberal theory 
influenced policy-makers and the public, but revealed its limits when democracy was 
institutionalised after the democratic transition. The limits are evident because while the 
liberal approach emphasizes the tension between the state and civil society, the main focus of 
conflict has changed after democratisation, from 'the authoritarian state versus active civil 
society' to 'conservative civil society versus active civil society' (Choi, J.J 2002). For 
example, conservative interest groups were likely to resist democratic reforms, and to weaken 
the role of democratic governments, emphasizing the market economy and the autonomy of 
civil society. By contrast, active civil associations and trade unions demanded that 
democratic governments should play an active role in economic and social reforms, although 
they tried to keep a distance from the government. Moreover, during the economic crisis, the 
active role of the democratic government contributed to building social consensus, and to the 
involvement of social partners in economic development and democracy. 
On the basis of documentary sources and semi-structured interviews, this thesis 
argues that since the developmental state came to an end with the rise of civil society and 
democratisation in the 1990s in Korea, the model for skills formation has been changing, 
from the developmental to the state-coordinated partnership model, on the basis of the 
increasing involvement of social partners. However, as in other policy studies it is hard to tell 
to what extent the changes have been rhetorical or real. Therefore, to enhance validity, the 
triangulation method was adopted. 
Developmental skills formation was a part of developmental state formation, which 
focuses on economic modernization as a major assurance of national security, but at the 
expense of political freedom. While developmental skills formation played a role in rapid 
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economic development, it also revealed negative effects on participatory democracy as well 
as on critical and creative thinking. Therefore, policies for reforming skills formation have 
focused on replacing many state-driven institutions by private- or partnership-oriented 
institutions in education, training and the labour market. 
However, some policies were unsuccessful, because the government realized too 
late that particularly such partnership-oriented institutions could emerge only with the 
appropriate intervention of the government in promoting the involvement of social partners. 
In relation to the involvement of social partners, the Tripartite Commission was especially 
discussed as an example to show the changing direction. This case indicates that widened 
civic participation has not resulted in the demise of the state; in fact, it increasingly demands 
the democratic coordination with the state in building a holistic framework of skills 
formation and lifelong learning on the basis of social cohesion and participatory citizenship. 
Finally, VET and lifelong learning policies were critically examined in relation to a 
holistic approach to lifelong learning in Korea. Although the previous government 
established the Ministerial Meeting on HRD to coordinate divided approaches to skills 
formation and lifelong learning, the coordination of lifelong learning policies has not been 
well organised. Compared to western European countries, lifelong education policies were at 
first liberal and humanistic, mainly focusing on expanding access to higher education on the 
basis of increasing deregulation of the quota system in higher education. However, since the 
economic crisis, central governments have emphasized human resource development as one 
of the main purposes of lifelong learning. By contrast, many local governments have 
contributed to promoting lifelong learning to encourage broad civic participation in support 
of non-governmental organizations. However, these different approaches have not been 
successfully connected, not least because of the administrative division between (vocational) 
education and vocational training and civic participation, in spite of the establishment of the 
Ministerial Meeting on HRD. 
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In this regard, this research has emphasised the importance of a holistic approach to 
lifelong learning, stressing the role of lifelong learning in vitali sing civil society. It has also 
emphasised the active role of the state in promoting the involvement of social partners and 
civil associations in making and implementing policies. This role is required, to support the 
holistic approach. 
VIll-1-2. Move towards a 'state-coordinated partnership' model 
The thesis has analysed the early state of the transition from the developmental 
skills formation to the state-coordinated partnership model in Korea since the mid-1990s. The 
model for developmental skills formation in Korea has changed to the state-coordinated 
partnership model in Korea since the mid-1990s. Let us consider what have been the main 
changes in detail. First, the EPB-driven coordination mechanism for the supply of and 
demand for skills was given up with the dismantling of the EPB in 1994. The super ministry 
used to coordinate ministries at the central government level on the basis of its centralised 
authority over governmental planning, budget control and economic policies. The EPB drew 
up the Five-year Plans for Economic and Social Development, as well as setting targets for 
vocational education and training provision according to the economic growth targets. It 
steered the related ministries, the MoE for vocational education, the MoL for training and 
industrial relations, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) for the creation of 
workplaces, through its power over budget allocation. This was a vertical system oriented to 
economic development with each ministry implementing the targets through its own agencies. 
However, with economic liberalisation under the pressure of globalisation, the state 
coordination of the supply of and demand for skills was no longer possible. In this context, 
the education quota system based on manpower planning was abandoned. 
Second, in 2001 the Ministerial Meeting on HRD was established under the 
responsibility of the 'Deputy PM for Education' in order to coordinate policies for building a 
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national system of innovation99• As a consequence, the driving force of skills fonnation has 
moved to the MoEHRD, with an emphasis on the supply side of education and training. The 
main role of the Ministerial Meeting is to decide on the "Five-year Basic Plan for HRD" and 
Ministerial annual action plans, as well as to evaluate results of their implementation. 
According to the Basic HRD Act of 2002, the Minister for the MoEHRD should evaluate the 
results of the Basic Plan and the annual action plan every year, and report these evaluations 
to the Ministerial Meeting. However, because the Ministerial Meeting is not allowed to 
allocate the budget for coordination, the mechanism is likely to be more indirect and 
horizontal, in that it depends on the evaluation system 100. The role of local governments is 
emphasised in relation to the implementation of HRD policies. Non-governmental experts are 
also allowed to participate by setting up "Sector Professional Committee" under the 
Ministerial Meeting, in reviewing agendas for deciding policies. 
Third, the centralised system of education and training has been gradually devolved 
to the local or institutional level. Since the establishment of provincial educational councils 
as well as provincial or local governments in 1995, many roles regarding the delivery of 
education and training have been devolved to them from the central government. For 
example, provincial Education Offices have increasingly played a role in the administration 
of school education, as the majority of school funding is allocated from the MoEHRD to 
schools via them. By contrast, the government introduced a system for evaluating provincial 
Education Offices and provided financial incentives according to the results of evaluation. 
More important, since the school governing body system was introduced in the mid 1990s, 
governments have gradually emphasised the participation of parents and local communities in 
education. For example, the Presidential Commission on Education Reform (PCER) was 
replaced by the Presidential Commission for the New Education Community (PCNEC) to 
implement education reform proposals on the basis of the participation of local communities 
99 The Ministerial Meeting on HRD was later legitimised by the Basic HRD Act as the Act passed the National 
Assembly in 2002. 
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after the Kim Oae-Jung Government came to power. In addition, since 2001, a school-based 
accounting system has been introduced by the School Education Act, 30-2, to increase the 
flexibility of school accountinglOl. 
Fourth, with political democratisation, the oppression of the trade union movement 
was significantly weakened, and social partnership approaches to labour relations and 
training started to be introduced. The oppression of labour was the major means of sustaining 
low-wage labour at the expense of workers' rights. It was legitimised on the requirements of 
nation-building in confrontation with North Korea. However, the Tripartite Commission 
paved the way for social partnership in industrial relations. With the setting-up of KTC just 
after the economic crisis, the trade unions contributed to overcoming economic difficulties. 
As a consequence, trade unions could raise their voice regarding the labour market and 
labour-management relations. In this context, the Tripartite Commission reached a basic 
agreement on training, and also agreed to raise funds for training. 
Fifth, the Employment Insurance System replaced the training levy system. This 
means that the focus of training has shifted from initial vocational training (NT) to 
continuing vocational training (CVT). As more than 99 per cent of lower secondary school 
graduates advance to upper secondary schools, vocational training institutes are finding it 
difficult to recruit trainees. In other words, the educational attainment level of VTI trainees 
has risen from being mainly that of primary or lower secondary school graduates to that of 
upper secondary school graduates. Therefore almost a half of all public VTIs have changed 
into Polytechnic Colleges, which mainly provide two-year associate diploma programmes for 
upper secondary school graduates. Other VTIs are also providing short-term NT 
programmes, mainly for upper secondary school graduates, or CVT programmes for 
employees 
100 See, http://www.MoE.go.kr/Engiish/. 2 September 2002. 
101 http://upokw.new21.org/rules!ru]esAuditl 2.htm, 04-09-2002 
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Sixth, provincial or local governments have also considerably expanded the 
provision of training for the unemployed and of lifelong learning for their residents. For 
example, many local governments are making efforts to set up lifelong learning cities, like 
K wangmyung city which drew up a Five-year Plan for Lifelong Learning in 2001 and built a 
new 'Lifelong Learning Institute' 102. Kwangmyung city proclaimed itself as a lifelong 
learning city in 1998 and is now one of leaders in this field (K wangmyung-Si 2001). Most 
important, local governments have not only become a driving force in promoting lifelong 
learning in terms of the scale of funding, but are also developing a holistic approach to 
lifelong learning that is likely to bring both liberal and vocational meanings of lifelong 
learning together in terms of' participatory citizenship for adults' . 
VIII-2. Conclusion 
This section will discuss some lessons from the Korean economic and educational 
reforms, which were introduced both before and after the Asian Economic crisis, for skills 
formation and lifelong learning in East Asian countries. It will stress the active role of 
government and the involvement of social partners in the state-coordinated partnership 
model. Finally, there will be some policy suggestions for the Participatory Government in 
Korea, focusing on building a holistic framework for skills formation and lifelong learning. 
VIII-2-1. Lessons from Korean economic and educational reforms for east-Asian 
countries 
The Asian economic crisis was another turning point in the transition from 
developmental skills formation to the state-coordinated partnership model in Korea. Although 
the Kim Young-Sam government made some attempt to introduce the state-coordinated 
partnership mode of skills formation, the approach failed, mainly because of the exclusion of 
102 Kwangmyung city is located in the Kyunggi Province that surrounds Seoul. See Five-years Planning Book for 
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labour. However, following the IMF bailout, the Kim Dae-Jung government fonned a 
Labour-Management-Government Tripartite Commission and produced the historic Tripartite 
Accord. This Accord paved the way for the involvement of social partners in a national 
policy-making body, by recognizing the collective bargaining rights of schoolteachers and 
civil servants and the participation of trade unions in political activities (Koo, H.G. 2002: 123. 
The launch of the Tripartite Commission was an important move from 'corporatism without 
labour' towards 'corporatism with labour'. 
With the involvement of social partners, government could play an active role in 
overcoming the economic crisis. As a result, Korea has emerged with a "more competitive 
economy" (Stiglitz 2002: 127). In 2002, the economic growth rate was 6.3 per cent and the 
economy shows some achievements due to the recent economic refonn, particularly 
improvement in the banking system and the rapid development of the information-technology 
industry (The Economist 2003)103. 
However, there are also serious social issues which have appeared after trade and 
financial market liberalization. They are mainly related to 'economic instability' and 'job 
insecurity'. For instance, since the economic crisis, one of the most significant changes in the 
labour market is that the rate of 'atypical' workers soared and by 1999 more than half of all 
employed workers were atypical workers. With increasing economic instability as well as the 
increased bargaining power of labour, there is a pressing need for employers to hire 
temporary workers rather than regular workers «Koo, H.G. 2002: 127). However, job 
insecurity is a very important issue because it can destroy the "social value of reciprocity", 
which has been the "basis of institutional practice in Korean companies" (ibid. p. 121). 
The wage difference between large finns and SMEs has also widened since the late 
1980s. This disparity has increased especially since 1987, because large firms in core 
industries have offered better wages and generous welfare benefits to their workers in order 
Lifelong Learning in the Kwangmyung city (Korean), Kwangmyung city: 2001. 
103 See, Keeping the lights on, A Survey of South Korea, April 19lh 2003 
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to "buy labour cooperation and company loyalty" (ibid. p. 126). These welfare benefits 
include house subsidies, commuter buses, medical insurance, children's tuition support, 
funeral expenses, and a variety of family-related supports. These benefits are not provided for 
atypical labour. The polarizing of the labour market has increasingly been a difficult problem 
for government to solve without the support of employees as well as employers. 
In 2003, the Participatory Government led by Roh Moo-hyun came into office on 
the basis of people's participation and the IT revolution. The government is the result of 
successive moves towards democratic government and a mobilized civil society since the 
1987 democratic movement put the cornerstone on the demise of the authoritarian regime. 
This important additional move forward for participatory democracy means that the 
government is required to introduce new institutional mechanisms to deal with challenges 
regarding globalisation and reunification. The active role of the state and social partners is 
crucial in building a holistic framework for skills formation and lifelong learning 
What can be learnt from the experience of economic and educational reform in 
Korea? 
First, an appropriate regulatory system has to be established in preparing for 
economic liberalization. The experience of the economic crisis in Korea proved that rapid 
"[f]inancial market liberalization unaccompanied by an appropriate regulatory structure" 
almost certainly leads to economic instability (Stiglitz 2002: 84). This means that a 
government has to be 'effective and enabling' in response to globalisation. How can a 
government take an active role in institutionalising an appropriate regulatory system, 
particularly during the transition to democracy? 
The Korean experience shows that a government needs to promote the participation 
of social partners in building a social consensus in response to globalisation. As seen in the 
case of the Tripartite Commission, the government has to playa key role in coordinating 
social partners, particularly when there has been distrust between capital and labour. The 
involvement of social partners contributed to persuading economic stakeholders to share 
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economic sufferings, as well as to increasing the negotiating power of the government in 
dealing with international economic institutions. It is significant that Stiglitz stresses the role 
of the Korean government in overcoming the economic crisis, arguing that "[h]ad the IMF's 
advice been followed, the recovery would have been far more muted", (Stiglitz 2002: 127). 
Secondly, the Asian economic crisis shows that globalisation has made it 
increasingly difficult for governments to intervene, particularly through economic policies, to 
promote social cohesion (Nayyar 2002: 9). During the Asian economic crisis, the IMF 
underplayed the "long-term social and political costs" of their "market fundamentalist 
policies" (Stiglitz 2002). As a result, the programmes have led to "risks to the poor", and 
even to the erosion of the middle class which had pushed for democracy, a healthy economy 
and the expansion of public education (ibid. p. 84). Therefore, academics and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) raise their voices in favour of "governing globalization" 
(Nayyar 2002). International economic institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank have 
to be reformed to deliver policies to strengthen "national financial systems" and to encourage 
"measures to curb excessive inflows of short-term capitals" (You 2002: 233). For example, 
Governments and NGOs can contribute to strengthening regional cooperation, by establishing 
a "network of regional and sub-regional organizations, including the regional and sub-
regional development banks and reserve funds", like the Asian Monetary Fund (ibid. p. 234). 
Thirdly, the Korean experience during the democratic transition has given an 
example to show that East Asian economies can go along with democracy in response to 
globalisation. In Korea, the widened participation of social partners has not resulted in the 
demise of the state. On the contrary, social partners demand the active role of the government 
in negotiating with different interest groups, and in dealing with globalisation. Moreover, 
most developing countries have been under pressure to "reshape their domestic economic 
policies so as to integrate much more into the world economy and to enlarge the role of the 
market vis-a-vis the state" (Nayyar 2002: 4). Without the democratic involvement of social 
partners, economic liberalization may mean "opportunities for a few countries and some 
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people in the developing world, but a very large proportion of both countries and people have 
remained untouched or have been marginalized by the same process" (ibid. p. 5). For 
example, in Korea, the main cause leading to the crisis was the liberalization of capital 
accounts driven mainly by the influences of Chaebols and international economic institutions 
on economic policies. 
On the basis of the active participation of social partners, democratic government 
can pursue broad reform for the sake of political and social as well as economic development. 
The broad support of the society is a prerequisite for the success of reform through which 
benefits are broadly distributed. For example, the governments and social partners are 
required to cooperate in expanding a social safety net which can minimize the adverse effects 
of globalisation. Government also needs to encourage the role of civil associations in the 
democratic transition and in the maturing of democracy. After the experience in Korea, it is 
worth mentioning that democratic citizenship acquired through education or involvement in 
NGOs has contributed to raising the consciousness of people and to vitalizing civil society. 
Active civil society has contributed to the transparency of the economy as well as to political 
democracy. 
Fourthly, a holistic framework for skills formation and lifelong learning is 
increasingly important in promoting social cohesion and democracy as well as economic. 
competitiveness. The Korean government has tried to build a connected framework for skills 
formation and lifelong learning under the coordination of the Ministerial Meeting on HRD, 
although it has not been very successful yet due to the divided administrative system. The 
main purpose of the Ministerial Meeting is to build a framework which brings skills 
development, widening access to higher education and adult education for civic participation 
together. 
The holistic framework for skills formation and lifelong learning is required for a 
coordinated approach to the three dimensions of skills development, social cohesion and 
democracy which are all essential in a successful democratic transition. Despite the advent of 
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the global economy, labour mainly remains within national borders, and human skills and 
insight each become nation's primary assets (Reich 1991: 1). Therefore, many governments 
see 'high skills' as the main means to enhance national competitiveness in the global market. 
In addition, with the increasing fragmentation of societies, promoting social cohesion also 
remains as the main role of the public education system (Green 2002: 14). 
The third dimension is also important because enriching 'participatory citizenship' 
becomes a crucial role of lifelong learning in promoting active civil society and in governing 
globalisation. After the experience of the Asian economic crisis, most Asian countries have 
recognized the importance of the partnership between government and social partners in 
dealing with economic instability, and the serious impacts of international economic 
institutions on national economies. The relationship between governments and social partners 
has become an increasingly important issue, because many countries are experiencing 
transitions to democracy in spite of various opposing forces and processes. 
In Korea, active civil associations have emphasized their role in enhancing the 
social consciousness of the people and in promoting citizens' participation in changing the 
society. Now there is no doubt that active civil associations have contributed to the rise of 
civil society and democratisation. Moreover, the democratic government and active civil 
associations strongly support the role of lifelong learning in expanding 'public spaces for 
reflective action'. It is worth mentioning that given the democratic transition in Korea, active 
civil society itself is a place for "reflective learning", which requires "educated attributes, the 
abilities to read the world and reflect critically upon it" (Evans 2002: 31). 
VIU-2-2. Policy suggestions for tbe Korean government 
As the new government is named as a 'Participatory Government', the Roh Moo-
hyun government emphasizes the importance of civic participation for democratic reform. 
With regard to labour market reform, the President has stressed the importance of the 
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tripartite system. In addition, the reform of education and training has been also one of the 
most important issues. 
As examined in chapter VI and VII, Korean skills fonnation has been changing into 
the state-coordinated partnership model in terms of modes of regulation. However, there are 
some systemic weaknesses in education and training in relation to the implementation and 
practice of related policies. Therefore, policy suggestions will be proposed for building an 
effective mechanism of implementation and practice, and for pursuing the holistic framework 
for skills formation and lifelong learning. 
First, the government needs to refonn the central administrative system of 
education and training in order to expand the involvement of social partners in making 
policies on skills formation and lifelong learning. The main complaint of employers as well 
as trade unions is still that they are excluded from deciding policies on VET and lifelong 
learning. Therefore the involvement of social partners needs to be regarded as one of the 
most important factors in improving quantitative and qualitative matches between the supply 
and the demand sides of education and training. In addition, the coordination by the 
government should be long-term oriented and properly institutionalised, because there are 
still disputes between social partners with regard to the direction of reforms. For example, 
whereas trade unions call for a regulated social partnership, enterprises are likely to stress a 
deregulated, market-oriented partnership. More important, as the power of government is still 
dominant in making policies on education and training, a systematic approach to cooperation 
between the MoEHRD and the MoL should be emphasised as the prerequisite for the 
coordination of VET and lifelong learning. 
Indeed, as many interviewees emphasized, the division between the MoE(HRD) 
and the MoL is the single most important factor restricting the broad coordination of the 
government. The division has made it difficult for many reforms for VET and lifelong 
learning to be effective. The VET Policy Commission has been unable to take a major role in 
reforming the VET system, mainly because of poor cooperation between the two ministries. 
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Even the Ministerial Meeting on HRD has difficulty in actively promoting a holistic approach 
to VET and lifelong learning, not least because of the conflicts between the two ministries. In 
addition, although the role of the Tripartite Commission has expanded into VET and lifelong 
learning, it will evidently be difficult for the Ministerial Meeting to take an active role 
without cooperation between the two ministries. 
It should be mentioned that most interviewees who are academics and practitioners 
argue that without a merger of the MoE and the MoL, cooperation between them is unlikely. 
Therefore the government needs to examine thoroughly the function of the Ministerial 
Meeting on HRD as well as the role of the two ministries, in order to establish a more 
effective coordinating system at the central government level. As emphasized in this thesis, 
there is a pressing need for the government to change from being the main driving force in 
planning and implementation to coordinating the involvement of social partners in planning 
and implementation. That is, the main role of the central administration has to change from 
'implementation' to 'coordination' and from 'control' to 'cooperation'. The implementation 
of school education needs to be devolved to the local government level, while the central 
coordinating mechanism needs to be more effective. In addition, MoL's role in controlling 
industrial relations and the labour market needs to be moved to the Tripartite Commission. 
The two ministries can then be slimmed in order to merge together, with the focus on 
planning and coordination of education and training. An effective coordinating system at 
central level is crucial in promoting a holistic approach to skills fonnation and lifelong 
learning. 
Secondly, to promote local partnership, the complicated administrative system also 
needs to change into an effectively connected system. There are two main systemic 
weaknesses in tenns of local partnership. One is related to the central administrative system. 
The divided system at the central government level has made it difficult for local 
governments to coordinate local partnership. As interviewees point out, the failure to 
establish local VET Committees should mainly be attributed to poor cooperation between the 
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two ministries. The effective cooperation of the MoEHRD and MoL is a prerequisite for local 
partnership in relation to education and training. 
The other weakness is the separation of provincial education offices from local 
governments. The superintendents and the councillors of provincial education offices are 
indirectly elected by representatives of school governors, who are likely to represent the 
interests of the world of education rather than of the whole local community. Thus the 
provincial education offices are not accountable to local people, and are mainly controlled by 
the MoEHRD. The involvement of local communities in education reforms has been very 
restricted, and this restriction is preventing the creation of a broad framework for education 
and training at the local level. For example, lifelong education led by local governments is 
disconnected from lifelong education led by the MoEHRD. 
Therefore, provincial education offices need to belong to local governments and to 
have relative autonomy. In addition, local governments have to take an active role in 
developing a holistic approach to VET and lifelong learning at the local level, considering the 
increasingly diverse demands for lifelong learning. 
Thirdly, institutions for VET and lifelong learning need to be restructured in order 
to implement a holistic approach to lifelong learning. Three institutions have played a key 
role in standard setting and in operating qualifications in VET and lifelong learning. The 
KED! is in charge of the Credit Bank system and the Lifelong Education Centre. By contrast, 
the KRIVET is in charge of government-approved private qualifications, and conducts 
research on the national vocational qualifications system. The KOMA is in charge of national 
technical qualifications. However, their roles overlap, and the conflicts between them have 
contributed to the emergence of a divided framework for VET and lifelong learning. For 
example, the KRNET was originally supposed to replace the KOMA. However, after the 
failure of the merger, the relationship between them has been ambiguous. 
Although the reform of national vocational qualifications was given priority, the 
qualifications reform driven by the KRIVET highlighted the issues of GAPQs rather than the 
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whole system. As a result, the reform failed to solve the mismatch between national 
vocational qualifications and the changing demands of the labour market. The failure was 
mainly because the government was not enthusiastic about involving employers and trade 
unions in making policies on qualifications. It was also partly because many GAPQs were 
approved without seriously considering the demand of the labour market. This shows that the 
most urgent issue regarding national vocational qualifications is to solve the mismatch; this 
solution requires the involvement of social partners in building a quality control system. 
Another issue is the divided approach to lifelong learning. For example, the KEDI 
emphasizes liberal adult education oriented to lifelong education, while the KRIVET stresses 
HRD-oriented lifelong learning. Although the CBS tries to include VET programmes, it is 
mainly focused on widening access to higher education. Therefore these three institutions 
need to cooperate in developing a broad framework for lifelong learning, which includes 
democratic citizenship as well as liberal adult education and HRD. In this regard, the 
government needs to overhaul the roles of those three institutions in order to build an 
overarching framework of qualifications with the quality control system. 
The KRNET and the KOMA could be merged and put in charge of standard 
setting and the operation of national vocational qualifications. The merger could provoke the 
restructuring of the national awarding body system for vocational qualifications. By contrast, 
the KED I needs to be restructured as a national awarding body for non-vocational 
qualifications, including those in democratic citizenship as well as for academic courses. As 
for the quality control system, a regulatory mechanism should be established on the basis of 
the involvement of social partners, civil associations and professionals; it should be free from 
the pressure of any specific ministry or awarding body. The main weakness of the 
qualifications system is that there is no appropriate regulatory system to check the quality of 
national vocational qualifications in relation to the demands of the labour market. For 
example, the KOMA is responsible for the whole process of vocational qualifications, from 
standard-setting and examination to quality control. Therefore, the main priorities should be 
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to enhance the match between the supply and demand of qualifications on the basis of the 
quality control rather than the quantity control of qualifications. 
Fourthly, the Presidential Commission on Education and Human Resource Policy 
(PCEHRP) needs to broaden its main role, from HRD to developing a holistic framework for 
lifelong learning. The framework should encompass cultural and political as well as 
economic development, by including democratic citizenship as well as knowledge and skills. 
The lack of a holistic framework has caused lifelong learning policies to be disconnected and 
to overlap. For example, although one of the key policies on lifelong VET is to link 
vocational high schools and junior colleges, their curricula and qualifications are not 
connected. Therefore it is not surprising that the policy has been suspected of being only a 
way to solve the problem of junior colleges finding it difficult to recruit students. The CBS is 
also too much focused on access to higher education, although the higher education degrees 
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obtained through the CBS are distinguished from normal higher education degrees, and are 
unlikely to be recognized in the labour market. 
The present qualifications system needs to be overhauled in order to develop a 
holistic framework for lifelong learning. A new system could provide a new framework for 
lifelong learning, solving the many problems arising from many disconnected and 
overlapping initiatives. For example, it could solve the problem of the separation of the 
vocational high school curriculum from vocational qualifications. This has been the main 
problem of VET. It could also provide a link between vocational high schools and vocational 
higher education, such as has been suggested as a contribution to widening participation in 
lifelong learning. Moreover, civil associations, which have played a major role in providing 
informal education programmes for democratic citizenship, could also be involved in 
providing modularised programmes supporting democratic citizenship as required for the 
promotion of active civil society. In this regard, the CBS should be expanded and flexible, so 
as to include vocational and 'civic' (democratic citizenship) programmes as well as 
academic-oriented programmes. 
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Since the result of the college entrance examination is valid only in the year when it 
is taken, those who fail to get a place in higher education have to take the examination again 
if they want to enter higher education in another year. Also, as the system is mainly for 
academic high school graduates, it has been a barrier against vocational high school 
graduates going to university. Therefore, the college entrance examination should be included 
as part of the lifelong learning framework. It needs to be replaced, becoming part of a new 
qualifications system, which could contribute not only to overcoming divisions between 
academic and vocational programmes, but also to encouraging a broad 'lifelong progression' . 
Fifthly, increased partnership between educational institutions and employers is 
desirable. However, to achieve this partnership, the mechanism of the partnership needs to be 
institutionalised. The main reason why the 2+ 1 system was not successful is that employers 
tended to regard the partnership as an opportunity for using cheap labour rather than training 
future skilled labour. Therefore, the responsibility of employers has to be clearly indicated in 
the form of contract and the process of work-based training has to be monitored and assessed 
by internal and external organisations such as the Labour and Management Committee and 
the KeCI under the responsibility of the government or the Tripartite Commission. 
The successful partnership between formal education and employers can pave the 
way for smooth transition by students from schools and colleges to work. This is very 
important now, at a time when youth unemployment is a serious issue. Partnership can also 
contribute to overcoming not only the division between education and training, but the 
mismatch that has existed between qualifications and the changing demands of the labour 
market. 
Sixthly, the Tripartite Commission needs to take an active role in involving social 
partners in VET and lifelong learning. The role of the previous government was crucial in 
forming the Commission with the support of social partners. There is no doubt that the 
Tripartite Commission contributed to overcoming the economic crisis, by involving social 
partners in policy decisions. This involvement strengthened the position of the government in 
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dealing with IMF structural adjustment programmes, as well as with the demands of 
employers or employees. Therefore, the Commission can be characterized by the concept of 
the state-coordinated partnership. Its contribution shows that a government can play an 
"essential role not only in mitigating these market failures but also in ensuring social justice" 
in response to globalisation and democratisation (Stiglitz 2002: 218, emphasis by author). 
So far, industrial relations have been the main focus of the Commission, although it 
has partly contributed to involving social partners in training. The Commission needs to deal 
with training and lifelong learning as one of its main roles. Lifelong learning, including 
training, is an increasingly important issue for employers and employees in the knowledge 
economy. Moreover, because the promotion of lifelong learning is a constant and long-term 
task, it would also contribute to enhancing the status of the Commission. However, there are 
three main prerequisites for the active role of the Commission in lifelong learning. First, 
enterprise unionism needs to change into industry-sector unionism. This will be discussed in 
the next paragraph. Secondly, a task force needs to be established under the Commission, to 
develop a broad framework for lifelong learning, increasing the participation of employers 
and employees on the basis of cooperation between the MoEHRD and MoL. Thirdly, trade 
union leaders particularly need to regard lifelong learning as a main issue for collective 
bargaining, and they should develop their own policies for lifelong learning. Therefore the 
government needs to promote the role of labour-management councils and to provide various 
opportunities for trade unions to be involved in making policies on lifelong learning. 
Finally, enterprise unionism needs to be changed into industry-sector unionism, to 
tackle the widening wage difference between large firms and SMEs and also the increasing 
proportion of atypical workers. With the devastating impact of the economic crisis, these 
problems have become serious social issues which threaten social cohesion. The labour 
market has been increasingly polarized, and these problems have hampered wide skills 
diffusion. Therefore, although the Employment Insurance Fund contributed to the increase of 
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continuing vocational training in large finns, it failed to promote the participation of SMEs. 
These issues are difficult to tackle when there is enterprise unionism. 
Therefore industry-sector unionism needs to be encouraged as the main means to 
deal with these issues. In May 2003, the metal trade unions started, for the first time, 
collective bargaining with representatives of employers, and large enterprise unions decided 
to change into industry-sector unionism 104. National umbrella organizations of trade unions 
have already insisted on the main role of industry-sector unionism in collective bargaining. In 
tenns of training, the industry-sector unionism may contribute not only to the participation of 
trade unions and employers at the sector level, but also to the vitalization of labour-
management councils at the company level. Therefore, the Tripartite Commission needs to 
play an active role in institutional ising the framework of industry-sector unionism. Then 
industrial sector-based trade unions and employers can be encouraged to put forward their 
demands for skills fonnation as well as for collective bargaining. 
In conclusion, as democracy is becoming mature, the mechanism for state-
coordinated partnerships is increasingly required, to enable the government to play an active 
role in promoting the involvement of social partners in skills fonnation and economic 
development. It is also a prerequisite for the vitalisation of social dynamics in the process of 
democratisation and reunification. 
104 See Internet Journal Pressian, www.pressian.com. May 6, 2003. 
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Appendix 1. Questionnaires (five types) 
1) Questionnaire for policy-makers (regarding the VET Policy Commission and 
local VET Committees) 
2) Questionnaire for social partners (regarding the VET Policy Commission and 
local VET Committees) 
3) Questionnaire for education authorities or policy-makers (regarding the 
KRNET) 
4) Questionnaire for researchers (regarding the KRIVET) 
5) Questionnaire for social partners (regarding the KRNET) 
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Appendix 4. The organisation and key functions of the KRIVET 
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Appendix 1. Questionnaires 
I. Questionnaires for different groups with regard to the VET Policy Commission and a local 
VET Committee 
1-1. Questionnaire for policy-makers. 
1. Since the previous government, your Ministry (the Ministry of Education or the 
Ministry of Labour) has tried to introduce a new framework of education and 
training in terms of lifelong learning or a learning society. Could you elaborate 
the main reasons to introduce the new framework of lifelong learning (or 
lifelong YEn as a direction of education and training reform? 
2. As a part of main YET reforms, the Policy Commission and a local VET 
CotnnUttee were proposed by the VET Promotion Act of 1997. Do you think 
the VET Policy Commission and a local VET Committee has played or will 
play a major role in promoting the lifelong VET system? Then, could you 
explain why you think so? 
3. Do you think the introduction of the VET Policy Commission and a local VET 
Committee has been a significant shift toward the social partnership? Then, 
could you explain why you think so? 
4. Could you explain what kinds of policies are needed to encourage social 
partners to participate in the national Board? 
5. Could you explain what kinds of policies are needed to encourage social 
partners to participate in the regional Committee? 
6. The present government established the Ministry of Education and Human 
Resource Development (MoEHRD) with the status of a vice-Prime Minister, 
emphasising a new framework of NHRD (Human Resource Development at the 
national level). What are the factors for the change in terms of high skills 
formation? 
7. Has the new framework of NHRD impacted on the VET Policy Commission 
and local VET Committees? Then, could you explain why you think so? 
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8. Do you think the rise of civil society including business has contributed to the 
promotion of lifelong learning? If you say yes (or no), could you elaborate how 
the relationships between the government and civil society such as civil 
associations, trade unions and business have changed in promoting lifelong 
learning? 
9. What kind of relationships between the government and civil society are 
required to promote more holistic approach to lifelong learning, including 
social development as well as economic development? 
10. South Korea is regarded as one of the most successful countries with regard to 
the diffusion rate of the Internet. Do you think the rapid increase of usage of the 
Internet has contributed to the evolution of lifelong learning or a learning 
society? Then, could you elaborate how leT have affected the regulatory 
mechanism of lifelong learning? 
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1-2. Questionnaire for Social Partners (trade unions, business and programme providers) 
I. Since the previous government, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of 
Labour have tried to introduce a new framework of education and training in 
tenns of lifelong learning or a learning society. Could you explain the main 
reasons for the government to introduce the new framework of lifelong learning 
(or lifelong VET) as a direction of education and training reform? 
2. As a part of main VET refonns, the VET Policy Commission and a local VET 
Committee were proposed by the VET Promotion Act of 1997. Has your 
institute or organisation been interested in participating in the VET Policy 
Commission or a local VET Committee? Then, what are reasons for your 
decision? 
3. Does your institute or organisation regard the VET Policy Commission or a 
local VET Committee as a significant shift toward the social partnership or 
another government directed policy? Then, why do you think so? 
4. Do you think the VET Policy Commission or a local VET Committee has 
played or will playa major role in promoting VET? Then, why do you think so? 
5. Could you elaborate what kinds of policy encourage or discourage your 
institute or organisation to participate in the VET Policy Commission or the 
local VET Committee? 
6. The present government established the Ministry of Education and Human 
Resource Development (MoEHRD) with the status of a vice-Prime Minister, 
emphasising a new framework ofNHRD (Human Resource Development at the 
national level). What are the factors for the change in terms of high skills 
formation? 
7. Do you think the new framework of NHRD has impacted on the VET Policy 
Commission and local VET Committees? Then, could you explain why you 
think so? 
8. Do you think the framework of NHRD has contributed to or will contribute to 
the promotion of broad meaning of lifelong education beyond narrow meaning 
of VET? 
9. Do you think the rise of civil society including business has contributed to the 
promotion of lifelong learning? If you say yes (or no), could you explain how 
the relationships between the government and civil society such as civil 
associations, trade unions and business has changed in promoting lifelong 
learning? 
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10. What kind of relationships between the government and civil society are 
required to promote a more holistic approach to lifelong learning, including 
social development as well as economic development? 
11. South Korea is regarded as one of the most successful countries with regard to 
the diffusion rate of the Internet. Do you think the rapid increase of usage of the 
Internet has contributed to the evolution of lifelong learning or a learning 
society? Then, could you describe how leT have affected the regulation of 
lifelong learning in transition to democracy? 
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U. Questionnaires for different groups with regard to the KRlVET 
U-l. Questionnaire for education authorities or policy-makers. 
1. VET Refonns have been implemented on the basis of the proposals for the 
'Educational Refonn for the Establishment of a New Vocational Education 
System (m' made by the Presidential Commission for Education Refonn in 
1996. What are the factors to propose the formation of the lifelong VET system 
as the direction of the VET Reforms? 
2. The MoE and the MoL jointly established the KRIVET in 1997 as the part of 
the three proposals for the VET Refonn Acts. Could you explain the main role 
of the KRlVET in promoting the lifelong VET system, which has been the 
priority of VET policies? 
3. With regard to the regulation of lifelong learning, could you elaborate the role 
of the KRlVET in setting VET standards as well as the development of 
qualification system? 
4. Could you explain the relationships between your Ministry and the KRNET 
with regard to the VET Policy Commission and regional Committees, proposed 
by the VET Promotion Act of 1997? 
5. Do you think the establishment of the KRlVET has been successful in 
promoting lifelong VET system? Then, could you explain the reason why you 
think so? 
6. The MoE and the MoL jointly established the KRNET in 1997 as the part of 
the three proposals for the VET Refonn Acts. Do you think the establishment 
of the MoEHRD has impacted on the cooperation between vocational education 
and vocational training with regard to the fonnation of the lifelong VET 
system? 
7. Do you think the new framework of NHRD contributes to the promotion of 
lifelong learning beyond the framework of VET? If you say yes, how do you 
think the framework contributes to it? 
8. Since the early 1990s, civil society including business has increasingly become 
more influential in the process of policy-making. Do you think the roles of 
social partners need to be im;gorated to participate in the process of decision-
making on the formation of the lifelong learning framework? 
9. Do you think the role of the state (or government) needs to change in promoting 
lifelong learning (or lifelong VET) according to the rise of civil society? If you 
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say yes, could you explain the direction of a change with regard to the 
relationships between the state and social partners? 
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n-2. Questionnaire for researchers of the KRNET 
I. VET Reforms have been implemented on the basis of the proposals for the 
'Educational Reform for the Establishment of a New Vocational Education 
System (II)' made by the Presidential Commission for Education Reform in 
1996. What are the factors to propose the formation of the lifelong VET system 
as the direction of the VET Reforms? 
2. The MoE and the MoL jointly established the KRIVET in 1997 as the part of 
the three proposals for the VET Reform Acts. Could you elaborate the role of 
the KRIVET in promoting the lifelong VET system, which has been the priority 
of VET policies? 
3. With regard to the regulation of lifelong learning, could you elaborate the role 
of the KRIVET in setting VET standards as well as the development of 
qualification system? 
4. Could you explain the relationships between government Ministries and the 
KRIVET with regard to the VET Policy Commission and regional Committees 
proposed by the VET Promotion Act of 1997? 
5. Do you think the establishment of the KRNET has been successful in 
promoting lifelong VET system? Then, could you explain the reason why you 
think so? 
6. The MoE and the MoL jointly established the KRIVET in 1997 as the part of 
the three proposals for the VET Reform Acts. Do you think the establishment 
of the MoEHRD has impacted on the cooperation between vocational education 
and vocational training with regard to the formation of the lifelong VET 
system? 
7. Do you think the new framework of NHRD contributes to the promotion of 
lifelong learning beyond the framework of VET? If you say yes, how do you 
think the framework contributes to it? 
8. Since the early I 99Os, civil society including business has increasingly become 
more influential in the process of policy-making. Do you think the roles of 
social partners need to be im;gorated to participate in the process of decision-
making on the formation of the lifelong learning framework? 
9. Do you think the role of the state (or government) needs to change in promoting 
lifelong learning (or lifelong VET) according to the rise of civil society? If you 
say yes, could you explain the direction of a change with regard to the 
relatIOnships between the state and social partners? 
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fl-3. Questionnaire for social partners about the KRIVET 
1. VET Reforms have been implemented on the basis of the proposals for the 
• Educational Reform for the Establishment of a New Vocational Education 
System (m' made by the Presidential Commission for Education Reform in 
1996. What are the factors to propose the formation of the lifelong VET system 
as the direction of the VET Reforms? 
2. The MoE and the MoL jointly established the KRNET in 1997 as the part of 
the three proposals for the VET Reform Acts. Do you think the KRNET has 
played a role (or will do) in the formation of the lifelong VET system, which 
has been the priority of VET policies? 
3. With regard to the regulation of lifelong learning, could you elaborate the role 
of the KRIVET in setting VET standards as well as the development of 
qualification system? 
4. Do you think the establishment of the KRNET has contributed to setting VET 
standards as well as the development of qualification system? Then, could you 
explain the reason why you think so? 
5. Could you explain the relationships between government Ministries and the 
KRNET with regard to the VET Policy Commission and regional Committees 
proposed by the VET Promotion Act of 19971 
6. The MoE and the MoL jointly established the KRNET in 1997 as the part of 
the three proposals for the VET Reform Acts. Do you think the establishment 
of the MoEHRD has impacted on the cooperation between vocational education 
and vocational training in coordinating the formation of the lifelong VET 
system? 
7. Do you think the new framework of NHRD contributes to the promotion of 
lifelong learning beyond the framework of VET? If you say yes, how do you 
think the framework contributes to it? 
8. Since the early 1990s, ci\;l society including business has increasingly become 
more influential in the process of policy-making. Do you think the roles of 
social partners need to be \;talised to participate in the process of decision-
making on the fonnation of the lifelong learning framework? 
9. Do you think the role of the state (or government) needs to change in promoting 
lifelong learning (or lifelong VET) according to the rise of civil society? If you 
say yes, could you explain the direction of a change with regard to the 
relationships between the state and social partners? 
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Appendix 2. The changing education system in Korea 
University Other 
HE* 
V 
T 
v-
HE 
Junior College 
Academic Upper Secondary School Com 
prehe 
nsive 
Lower Secondary School 
Primary School 
V 
T 
Vocational Upper 
Secondary School 
V 
T 
*Other HE: Cyber Universities, In-plant University, Credit Bank System-based HE degrees 
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Appendix 3. The organisation and Responsibilities of the HSRC105 
1. Organisation 
I Chainnan of Directors I 
I Board of Directors 
Planning & Evaluation 
Committee 
I 
I 
Plannine Team 
I I 
r--'-' -.... -
Secretariat 
Auditor 1 
Advisory Board on 
Management & 
Coordination 
I 
I 
Evaluation Team 
_. __ ._--_._---_. ._--_._-_._-------_ .. __ . __ .. -
Staff 
Chainnan Director Team Assistant Functional 
Manager Manager 
1 1 2 6 2 
2. Responsibilities 
Board of Directors 
Total 
12 
Composed of one chainnan and less 15 directors; the board members are appointed by the 
Prime Minister; as the prime policy-making unit, it decide the items of the articles of 
association. 
Auditor 
Appointed by the Prime Minister after the recommendation of Board of Directors: the auditor 
is responsible for the auditing assets & executing activities. 
105 See http://www.kchsri.re.kr/eng/intro.html 
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Advisory Board of Management & Coordination 
Composed of the chainnan and directors of the board of directors and the presidents of 
member research institutes: the Board provides advices for major policy-making decisions. 
Planning & Evaluation Committee 
Composed of nine experts from industry, academia, and research fields: the Committee gives 
for the coordination of member research institutes and the long-tenn development plan for 
research; to support the evaluation process of the Council. 
Secretariat 
Composed of 1 secretary-general and 2 teams, the planning team execute the middle-long 
tenn planning, personnel, budgets, auditing, and other miscellaneous affairs, and monitors the 
research and management results of member research institutes. The evaluation team is 
responsible for evaluating member research institutes. 
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Appendix 4. The organisation and key functions of the KRIVET106 
Organisation 
Council for Research 
Office of 
Planning and 
Coordination 
Key functions 
Board of Directors (HSRC) 
Auditor 
President 
Comptroler 
International Studies & 
Cooneration Team 
National Center for Human Resources Development 
Department of Vocational Education 
Department for Vocational Training 
Center for Qualification & Accreditation 
Center for Career Development 
Office of Administration 
Center for Programme Development & Teaching-Learning 
Center for e-Learning 
I. conducts research on national policies to develop human resources and 
supports their implementation 
106 See http://www.krivet.re.kr/cgi-hinlrabout.cgi 
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2. supports the network of stakeholders in technical and vocational education 
and training (TVET) and human resources development (HRD) 
3. conducts research on TVET as part of lifelong learning for all and carries 
out related projects 
4. develops and propagates programs for TVET as part of lifelong learning 
5. conducts research on national and private qualification systems and supports 
elated projects 
6. evaluates TVET institutes and their programs upon request from the 
government 
7. provides information and career counselling for all for their employment 
and career development 
8. establishes and manages a system for collecting information and analysing 
the labour market trends on a regular basis 
9. promotes the international exchange of information on TVET 
10. collects, organizes and disseminates infonnation on TVET 
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